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This study concerns mainly with the status and 
position of dhimmi in various aspects of Islamic law. 
It is an attempt to survey the legal status of dhimmi 
in the scattered writings of Muslim jurists, and tie 
them up systematically in a one work. 
The Introduction deals with the purpose of the 
inquiry, the scope, and the relevant literature of the 
" thesis. 
In Chapter One the Muslim conception of the world, 
or Islamic law of nations; viz. dar al-Isläm, d8r al- 
h"arb. dgr al-'ahd. is analysed as is the nature of the 
relationship among those states, and category of non- 
Muslims. 
Chapter Two is devoted to the d immr's obligations 
pertaining to the fundamental concepts of lizyah 
kharä_i. 'ushr, and their need to observe some aspects 
of Islamic law. 
Chapter Three is concerned with the principles and 
aspects of the Islamic conception of tolerance towards 
non-Muslims as well as some archetypes of Muslim 
tolerance. 
Chapter Four gives a detailed discussion of the 
dhimmi's judicial status in Islamic criminal and 
family laws, and the law of contracts. 
X 
Chapter Five is concerned mainly with the analysis 
of dhimmf's religio-socio-political status. The 
question of religious autonomy, political rights, 
economic, edu - at i on, welfare etc. will be discussed. 




I have followed the transliteration system of the 
United States Library of Congress as outlined in the 
Cataloguing Service Bulletin 49 (November, 1958), 
with this exception: 
I have transliterated "[A it as "h". For instance, 
umma NOT umma. Abü Hans f ah NOT Abo Hand f a. However, 
all well known place names have been transliterated 
according to their usual form in English such as Mecca 
and Medina NOT Makkah and Madinah. 
A NOTE 
The expression rendered in English "peace be with 
him" after mentioning the Prophet MuIammad and the 
other Prophets, and "God be pleased with them" and 
"God have mercy on them" in respect of the Companions, 
Successors and eminent personalities in Islam, are not 
to be found in the main text of this thesis. These 
expressions should be understood by all Muslims 
whenever such people are mentioned. 
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INTRODUCTION 
I. The Purpose of the Inquiry 
This study seeks to analyse the rights, position, 
and above all, legal status of a dhimmi in all aspects 
of Islamic law as perceived and discussed by the 
jurists and scholars of Islam. This is, of course, a 
vast subject and its material is scattered in the 
writings of the early Muslim jurists, exegetes, 
historians and the like. The subject per se has never 
been dealt separately, in its own context, by those 
writers, in their writings, except by a few later 
jurists as will be seen. This is, perhaps, because the 
subject may have been not important enough, in their 
times, for them to undertake a separate study; and 
because it was sufficient to mention the subject here 
and there during the discussion of other subjects. 
Hence, the task of the writer, in this regard, is not 
only to identify the relevant sources and topics 
within these sources pertaining to the d mml but 
also to collect the material, from a large corpus of 
sources, and put it together in a one place, so that 
it becomes one body of rules, in a coherent form. 
It seems that this subject is becoming more 
relevant in our times especially after the emergence 
of Islamic movements in many parts of the Muslim 
world. The objective of these movements, inter alia. 
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is to establish the Islamic state, with all its 
institutions, including the law. The position of the 
dhimmi, however, is crucial under these circumstances. 
It is therefore pertinent to examine the dhimmi's 
legal status as perceived by the Muslim jurists and 
scholars to enable us to understand the normative 
framework of d mi' s position in Islamic law. 
II. The Scope of This Study 
Since the area of this subject covers a wide 
variety of disciplines in Islamic studies, this study 
will be limited to the immi's position in Islamic 
law. In so doing, the views of the four major schools 
of Islamic law, viz. Maliki, Hanaff, Shdfi'i, and 
Hanbalt will be the main basis of this study. The 
different views of these schools will be assessed in 
accordance with the relevant evidences used to support 
their position and the exigencies of the times. 
However, for the purpose of comparison and to 
give more scope for discussion, the views of other 
schools such as 7Mihirr, Jä"Fgri, and Zaydl will also be 
touched on briefly from time to time where it seems 
appropriate. In addition, the views of early 
individual (independent) jurists such as Zuhri of 
Hi j äz (d. 124/742), Ibn AbT Laylä of KQf ah 
(d. 148/765), Awza'I of Syria (d. 157/774), and Sufydn 
al-Thawrl of Kafah (d. 161/778) will also be mentioned, 
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from time to time, in order to throw more light--. on 
the issue. Although some of the views which were 
expressed in the early period of Islam, might need to 
be reexamined in the light of the present situation, 
those views and the discussion therein are still 
relevant and worth studying. For instance, the concept 
of jurisdiction, difference of domicile (ikhtiläf al- 
där), conversion during one's marriage, are real 
legal issues, and some opinions expressed by those 
jurists are still relevant in our time. 
This study covers no specific period of time. This 
is due to its very nature. For, the prolific yet 
scattered writings of the jurists on the subject, 
stretch from the inception of Islamic intellectual 
milieu until about seventh and eighth centuries A. H. 
when the period of decadence began and the so called 
the closure of the gate of i_itihAd prevailed. However, 
most of the subject-matter analysed in this thesis is 
mainly from the work of early jurists except in 
Chapter Five where many of the issues are relatively 
recent in nature, Hence the material used in that 
Chapter is from fairly late and modern works. 
Although this inquiry is primarily concerned with 
the legal aspects of the dhimml the literature of 
the Qur'än and its exegesis, al-slrah (the biography 
of the Prophet), his Traditions, the practi. es of the 
Four Guided Caliphs as well as the Companions of the 
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Prophet, their military expeditions and treaties, 
biographies and annals will also be examined. For 
those accounts are indispensable for the understanding 
and comprehension of the subject in its totality. The 
subject is so interrelated with different disciplines 
that these cannot be ignored. 
However, this study does not regard the 
Constitution of Medina as a document concerned with 
dhimmis because the document was drafted and ratified 
prior to the revelation of the verse of lizyah (9: 29). 
therefore that agreement, between the Prophet and non- 
Muslims in Medina, was not based on 'aad al-dhimmah 
(pledge of allegiance). However, mention of it will 
be made in relationship to some other treaties 
concluded, which are based on z$. 
The study also does not cover the so called "the 
Pact of GUmar" or shurf% GUmariyyah or 'Ahd 'Umar 
which was attributed to GUmar I. For, ESQ- PO-cL 
kas -º, oL 
llte+M o-ceapýed by ttie Nit taý. dj discussed it. 
III. A Brief Survey of the Sources 
A. Islamic Sources 
The main sources of information on the subjects, 
of course, can be derived from, in general, the well 
known materials of Islamic f iqh. Therefore, the 
primary works of all major schools of Islamic law or 
the book of Islamic jurisprudence (filth) will be the 
primary sources of information and form the basis of 
xvi 
analysis to the problems and issues in question. 
1. The Works of Fiah 
The books of filth or text books of Islamic law 
reflect the points of view of the fugähä' (jurists). 
Each author writes in accordance with the stand point 
of his school on each issue but the view of other 
schools are also recorded 
comparison. They not only 
matters of law, but are also 
for the purpose of 
contain . information on 
rich 3it all sorts of 
information including historical, philological, 
biographical, theological and the like. They provide a 
normative framework for the d immis according to 
Islamic law, not how they were actually treated by 
Muslim rulers whether fair or otherwise. 
These general legal works include: 
al-Mudawwanah al-Kubrä by Malik b. Anas (d. 179 
A. H. /795 A. D. ), al-Radd 'als Siyar al-Awzä'i by Abu 
YOsuf (d. 182/798), Kitäb al-Umm by al-Shäfi'i (d. 
204/819), Kitsb Ikhtil8f al-Fugahäý by al-Tabarl (d. 
310/923), Aikäm al-Sul 'nlyyah by al-Mdwardi (d. 450 
A. H. ), al-Muhal ld by Ibn Hazm (d. 456/1065) Abkam Al- 
Sultdniyyah by al-Farrä' (d. 458 A. H. ), Sharb al-Slyer 
al-Kabtr by al-Sarakhst (d. 483 A. H. ), dem e- 
MabQt ), 8add' i' a -$and' i' fS Tart lb al-Sherd' iG by 
al-Käsäni (d. 587 A. H. ) and al-Mughn by Ibn QUddmah 
(d. 620/1223). 
Perhaps the earliest monograph on the subject is 
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the one written by Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyyah 
(d. 751/1350), a Hanball jurist, entitled: Ahkäm Ahl 
al-Dhimmah. It was edited with commentary by the late 
$ubhi al-! ýälih and first published in Beirut in 1961. 
It was not uncommon for the classical jurist to write 
a book in response to a question forwarded to him. 
This was also the case of the book. 
Since the author directly dealt with the subject, 
it covers most of the topics pertaining to the dhimmi 
such as iz ah kharä_i. Cushr as well as many aspects 
of law and social relationship between Muslim and non- 
Muslims. In short, the work is1invaluable reference on 
the subject. 
There are several modern works on the subject. For 
example, al-Tashri' al-Islämi li Ghayr al-Muslimin, by 
al-Maräghl, Cairo, n. d. This book gives some account 
on the status of dhimmi in Islamic law, the treatment 
by the four Guided Caliphs and some treaties with non- 
Muslims. Since the author treats the issues briefly it 
lacks clarity and at some points it needs further 
clarification. Nonetheless, it is a useful reference 
for understanding the concept of d immi and its 
related subject. 
Another treatise on the subject is, lrshad al- 
Ummah 118 Ahkgm al-Hukm bayn Ahl-Dhimmah. by Mu} ammad 
Bakhiat, a former ut of Egypt, Cairo, 1349 A. D. (32 
pp. ). That treatise is too short to handle such a big 
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subject. 
More recently, Abkam al-Dhimmlyyln we al- 
Musts' minln fi Dar al-Islam, by 'Abd al-Karim Zaydän, 
Baghdad, 1976 (630 pp. ). The work was originally ýt. 
Ph. D. thesis submitted to the Faculty of Law, Cairo 
University, 1962. It is a comprehensive work on the 
subject with detailed notes and explanation of each 
aýº1: 
concept. Indeed, it is4invaluable and indispensable 
reference on the subject. 
At- 
Another book is al-'Alägät A I. itim6'iyvah bayn al- 
Muslimrn we Ghayr al-Muslimin, by Badrän AbO al- 
'Aynayn Badrän, Alexandria, 1968. The book treats the 
rules of social relations between Muslims and non- 
Muslims, but it does not cover all aspects of the 
problem. Al-Islam we Ahl al-Dhimmah. by 'Ali iiusni al- 
Kharbutlf, Cairo, 1969, is another work dealing with 
the subject. But the book mainly treats historical 
Alp, 
accounts andAsocial life of the dhimml under Islam. It 
also gives some accounts of tolerance towards non- 
Muslims. 
Finally, YQsuf al-Qaralswi published his work 
Ghayr al-Muslimin ff al-Muitama' al-Islams 2nd ed. 
Beirut, 1983. The work has been translated into 
English, and some other Muslim languages, by Khalil 
Muhammad Hamad et al. Indianapolis, 1985, entitled: 
Non-Muslims in the Islamic Society. Although the book 
is brief and small in size (77 pp. )' it is a useful 
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reference on the subject and the author has made a 
useful contribution to the field. 
2. Early Works on Kharä. i 
The works on kharr not only deal with the land 
tax, but also provide a number of accounts on the 
subject/. as a whole. The authors usually employ the 
method of isnäd as was customary with many classical 
works. Amongst these works are: Kitäb al-Kharä i by Abe 
YOsuf, Kitäb al-Khar6l by Yahyä b. Adam (d. 203/818), 
Kitsb al-Amwäl by Abe 'Ubayd (d. 224/838), Kitäb al- 
Khar5j by Qudämah b. Jaa 'far (d. 320/932), and al- 
Istikhrä_i li Ahkäm al-Kharä_i by Ibn Rajab al-Hanball 
(d. 795 A. H. ). 
The first and the second of these books employ the 
same narrators and provide almost similar accounts, 
whilst the third is the main source of the fourth. 
3. In addition, the works of early exegetes such 
as Abkam al-Qur' Sin by al-Shgf i'i, Ta sS by Tabarl, 
Abkam al-Qur' gn by Jaccäq, (d. 370 A. H. ), Tafsir al- 
Kashshäf by Zamakhsharz, (d. 528 A. H. ) and al-Jami ' li 
Ahkdm al-Qur' gn by Qurtubl (d. 671 A. H. ) are also 
consulted in order to serve as supporting evidence 
for each case and compared with the understanding of 
the jurists. 
4. The same applies to the book of Traditions of 
the Prophet. Since the jurists frequently quoted 
Tradition to support their views on every case, resort 
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to the books of Tradition is indispensable in order to 
ascertain their validity and applicability to the case 
in point. Amongst the frequently consulted book of 
't'raditions are: al-Muwatta by Malik b. Anas, al- 
Mu$annaf by al-fan'ani (d. 211 A. H. al-Musnad by 
Ahmad b. lianbal (d. 241/855), ýahih Bukhäri by Bukherl 
(d. 256/869), 5ahih Muslim by Muslim (d. 261/874), and 
Sunan by AbO Dä' üd (d. 275/888). 
5. The books of annals, Islamic history and 
Ekg 
(biography of the Prophet are also frequently consulted 
as are the accounts on treaties, important events and 
incidents. Amongst those books are: The Life of 
Muhammad by Ibn Ishaq (d. 152/768), al-STrah al- 
Nabawiyyah by Ibn Hisham (d. 218/883), Futüb al-Buldän 
by al-Balddhuri (d. 279/892), and T11rfkh al-Umam wa 
al-MulOk by al-Tabarf. 
B. Western Sources 
Perhaps one of the earliest works in English on 
the subject is The Caliphs and Their non-Muslim 
Subjects :A Crit. ical Study of the Covenant of 'Umar 
by A. S. Tritton, first published in London, 1930. The 
book has been translated to Arabic by kiasan Habshi 
entitled: Ahl al-Dhimmah fT al-Islam and first 
appeared in Cairo, 1949. The treatise gives some 
accounts of the d immi's social condition under 
Muslim rulers. The legal position of h mmi is hardly 
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discussed except incidentally. It is a descriptive or 
at- rather anecdotal account of4dhimmi's social condition 
under Muslim rulers. 
There are two related studies but both only 
treated the subject partially, namely iz a, kharä_i 
and some related forms of taxation. They are Islamic 
Taxation in the Classic Period by F. Lokkegaard, 
Copenhagen, 1950, and Conversion and the Poll Tax in 
Early Islam by D. C. Dennett, Cambridge, Mass. , 
1950. 
Arnold's work The Preaching of Islam, first 
appeared in London, 1896, gives some accountI of the 
dhimml's life and condition under Islam. Some expose 
of Muslim treatment and tolerance towards non-Muslims 
seem to be well documented. Though the book was not 
directly involved on the subject it is a useful 
reference and informative. 
Similar account can be found in The Muslim Conduct 
of State by M. Hamidullah, first published in 
Hyderabad-Deccan, 1941-42. Thefirst partial German 
edition appeared in Bonn, 1935. The treatise deals 
mainly with the Islamic law of nations. Since the 
subject of & dhimmi was always dealt by the jurists 
during their discussion of al-siyar and the like, the 
author follows the same method. The book seems to be 
well researched by providing many primary sources. It 
is indispensable for the subject. 
xxi i 
Fattal in his work Le Statut Legal Des Non- 
Musulmans En Pays D' Islam, Beirut, 1958, is one of few 
European works on the subject and it is a fairly 
useful account. 
Bat Ye'or in her work The Dhimml: Jews and 
Christians under Islam. was originally published in 
French as Le Dhimmi Paris, 1980. The work has been 
translated into English by David Maisel et al., New 
Jersey, 1985. The book provides a considerable account 
on the subject. Again it mainly concentrates on the 
social condition, as many other authors do, of the 
dhimmi stretching from the classical period- to the 
modern time. It covers the areas from Palestine to 
Muslim Spain. Even the concept of ihäd against Israel 
is discussed in the book. Such a wide coverage not 
only reduces the quality of the work, but also 
involves it in a large amount of i- 
_° 
-- detail. 
Bernard Lewis in his Islam: From the Prophet 
Mut ammad to the Capture of Constantinople, ed. and 
trans. London, 1974, devotes one section for the 
status of non-Muslims. The section mainly contains a 
translation of classical Arabic texts. 
Unlike some previous works, Non-Muslims Under 
Shari'ah by 'Abdur Rahmdn I. Doi, first published in 
The United States, in 1979, is an interesting modern 
work on the subject. For it provides a considerable 
account of A 
legal aspects and rights of the immi. 
xxiii 
It is a useful reference for a basic understanding 
of the subject. 
1 
CHAPTER ONE 
The Islamic Conception of the World 
Any discussion of the concept of dhimmfs will 
involve some aspects of the Islamic law of nations. 
Since dhimmis constituter a part of the community 
(umma ), or rather a state in the modern sense of the 
term, the relationship between a dhimmf and the state 
is naturally governed by Islamic private 
international law. The Muslim jurists, however, 
usually discuss this subject, in their writings under 
the topic of al-siyer or under the Book of al-jihad. 
Since the area of investigation falls under the 
above " mentioned topics (in the Islamic books of 
jurisprudence- figh), at times, we find that many of 
its rulings were a product of jurists as well as of 
those in authority according to the exigencies of the 
moment. For this reason, the subject of our investiga- 
tion usually falls within the domain of al-siyäsah al- 
shar'iyyah (Islamic polity), another branch of Islamic 
studies. 
According to Muslim jurists the world at large can 
be divided, theoretically, into two distinct 
categories, i. e. dar al-Islam (the abode of Islam or 
the Islamic state) and dar al-barb (the abode of war 
or the enemy state). Some jurists, particularly, 
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al-Shäfi'i (d. 204 A. H. /820A. D), introduced another 
category that is dar al-'ahd (territory of covenant). ' 
I. Dar al-Islam (abode of Islam) 
Dar al-Isläm2 can be defined as the territory 
wherein Islamic law is enforced by a Muslim authority 
or the whole territory wherein the law of Islam 
prevails. Its unity resides in the community of the 
faith, the unity of the law, and the guarantees 
assured to members of the ummah. 3 Its inhabitants 
are, broadly speaking, Muslims and non-Muslims who 
enjoy full protection as to their lives, property, and 
religious freedom, subject to certain restrictions 
imposed by the State. Since the law of the land is the 
Islamic law proper, administered by the Muslim 
authority, it therefore follows that every ordinance, 
institution and socio-political system therein should 
be in line with the general rules of Islamic 
teachings. Perhaps an equally significant corollary is 
the adoption of the principle of Islamic tolerance to 
the inhabitants of the state belonging to different 
religions. The principle is vividly seen in most major 
sources of Islamic law. " 
In early Islam, the territory of dar al-Isläm6 
with respect to the modes of acquisition, has three 
different categories: 3 
A. Those which have been taken by force of arms 
3 
4anwatan); 
B. Those which have been taken without fighting 
after the flight of their previous owners; and 
C. Those which have been acquired by treaty 
(sulh). 
This third category can be divided again into two, 
according to the original title of the property/land, 
namely, 
1. Those vested in the Muslim community as wagf. 
In this case the former owners, in fact, can remain 
on their land; they pay kha s6 and their country 
becomes dar al-Islam. Hence, the title to the land 
can neither be alienated nor leased. As to the 
question of iz ah al-Mawardl said that they can pay 
it if they wish for an unspecified period of times, 
but the Muslim authority, however, can by no means 
force them to pay it since they are ahl al-'ahd 
(people of the truce) not dhimmis 
2. In this case the treaty is concluded on the 
terms that the original owners keep their estates and 
pay khard from its revenues. This kharal is regarded 
as a iizyeh and they continue to pay it so long as 
they do not embrace Islam. Thus, their country is 
considered neither as dar al-Islam nor darr al-barb but 
as dar al-rRulh or dar al- Gahd. Their-estates, however, 
can always be alienated or leased by them, for the 
title is absolutely theirs. Hence, the Muslim 
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authority can not impose a lizyah on them as they are 
not part of dar al-Islam. 7 
According to Abts 1ian1fah (d. 150 A. H. /767 A. D. )8 
dar al-Islam may lose its de lure status as dar al- 
Islam subject to three conditions : 
a. That the laws and regulations of non-Muslims 
be enforced therein; 
b. That it should be surrounded by other countries 
meeting the description of dar al-barb without any 
country of the description of dar al-Islam being 
contiguous to it; and 
c. No Muslim or di ml:, that is, a non-Muslim 
subject of the Islamic state, be 'permitted to live 
there, ' in the same security and harmony as under the 
previous Muslim government. But two of Aba Hanifah's 
great followers, Abo Yasuf (d. 182 A. H. /798A. D. ) and 
Mubammad al-Shaybani (d. 189 A. H. /805 A. D. ), the 
former being a jurist, practising lawyer, and a Chief 
qaýl maintained that once the law of non-Muslims was 
enforced rather than al-sharT6ah, the country was no 
longer considered as dar al-Islam. '? For Abo Uanifah' s 
followers then the test of dar al-Islam is whether al- 
sharf Gah is fully enforced or another body of law is 
in operation. It would appear appropriate to consider 
any dar (territory), whether Islamic or otherwise, 
basically from the supremacy of the law over that 
territory, i. e. if the sharl cahl o is enforced and 
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supersedes other forms of laws, the territory in 
question is der al-Islam The Islamic state); 
conversely, if foreign law is applicable, though 
administered by the Muslim judges, the territory 
ceases to be dar al-Islam. 
In addition, another test to this effect in Muslim 
political theory is that a territory becomes dar al- 
Islam or otherwise depending on the sovereignty over 
that territory. If it belongs to the Muslims and they 
apply the Islamic system, the territory is both de 
fact and de lure dar al-Islam and vice versa. 11 The 
test is therefore on the question of the sovereignty 
over the territory and to what extent the Muslim 
community observe&Islamic principles. 
It is worth mentioning here that the Muslim 
jurists consider all Muslim territories -- 
i ; nc as one dar 
regardless of boundaries or the existence of one or 
more rulers. For, in theory, those territories are not 
recognised as separate entities and should be governed 
by one uniform constitution derived from the Qur'an 
and sunnah. Any law and regulation must be based on, 
and enacted in conjunction with those two primary 
sources. It follows that the Islamic law, legally 
speaking, binds individuals with respect to the Muslim 
community (ummah) they belong to, not the territory 
they live in. Hence, Muslims are obliged to observe 
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the Islamic injunctions to their utmost no matter 
where they reside. Any infringement of the said law 
would effect his credibility as a Muslim and would 
be liable to be punished either in this world or by 
God in the Hereafter. For the Muslim should, at all 
times, at any place, observe and uphold the Islamic 
teachings both in his deeds and character. 
It should be noted that in many contemporary 
Muslim countries, the authority' is in the hands of 
Muslim rulers, but the system of government, the laws 
and almost the whole socio-economic system are 
incompatible with the Islamic teachings. The 
prevailing situation entails consideration of the 
legal -question as to whether or not those countries 
could be legally considered as dar al-Islam. This 
state of affairs has motivated many Muslim scholars, 
headed by Muslim jurists, to appeal to the Muslim 
public as well as to those in power that the system 
should take the shari bah as its source. 12 This urgent 
need for change is manifested in the emergence of many. 
Islamic movements in many parts of the Muslim world 
beginning in the late forties. 13 
Finally, there is no provision in the Qur' än that 
divides the world into two categories as has been 
discussed above. The Qur'an does, on several 
occasions, mention nations and tribes and it 
encourages the Muslims to spread the word of God all 
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over the earth. l" The hadith. however, that is, the 
Prophetic Traditions, traces the idea of där al-barb 
back to the Medina period. There are several 
Traditions which report that the Prophet himself sent 
letters as well as messengers to princes, Caesar, the 
people of Yamämah etc. inviting them to accept Islam 
as their religion. 1s 
II. Där al-barb (Abode of War/ Enemy Territory) 
D6r al-barb is a territory or a land inhabited and 
controlled by non-Muslims. The authority as well as 
the law of non-Muslims are, enforced therein. There is 
no relationship or bilateral agreement between dar al- 
Islam 'and dar al-barb but rather a state of animosity 
prevails. Thus, dar al-barb includes those countries 
where Islamic law is not enforced, 16 the authority is 
not in the hands of Muslims, and finally peace has not 
been proclaimed between Muslims and non-Muslim 
authorities. 
As has been mentioned earlier a twofold division 
of the world was formulated by the jurists as a result 
of the concept of ii had in Islam. 17 Therefore, the 
status of territory in question or al-der could be 
transformed from al-Islam to al-barb or vice versa 
according to the manner by which that particular 
territory was acquired. If it was conquered (el- 
fath)1e by force the territory became parts of der 
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al-Islam; conversely, if it ended up with a peaceful 
agreement the territory became dar al-Gahd. On the 
other hand, if for instance, a territory of dar al- 
Islam was occupied by non-Muslims forces, it 
immediately becomes dar al-barb provided that (a) the 
law of unbelievers replaces that of Islam; (b) the 
territory in question directly adjoins dar al-barb; 
and <c) the inhabitants therein no longer enjoy peace 
and security as they had under the Muslim 
authority. 19 
The traditional example of dar al-harb according 
to Muslim jurists was Mecca after the migration of the 
Prophet and his Companions whereas Medina was the 
first 'dar al-Islam. 20 It follows that the whole raison 
d'etre of dar al-Islam is to achieve the sovereignty 
and execution of God's Will on earth. It is for this 
reason that Islam is reluctant to recognize the 
diversity of the world, the plurality of laws, in its 
ipso lure" for the existence of different forms of 
governments. and, systemsof laws is immaterial to Islam. 
the, 
They are, 'fr, inAIslamic legal point of view, contradic- 
tory to the law of God-the Islamic law.. because all 
other laws are of human origin and belong- therefore 
to the category of regulations or government orders, 
or to be exact what the majority wants, emanating from 
temporary authority and subject to space-time 
limitation. Nevertheless Islam admits, at least, ipso 
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facto the existence of one form of nation or another. 
This is suggested by al-Qur'en itself when we read: 
"... because of a nation being more numerous than 
(another) nation.... 1121 
This verse suggests the existence of non-Muslim 
entities which have their own systems and authorities. 
In the next verse of the same sürah we read: "Had 
Allah willed He could have made you (all) one nation, 
but He sendeth whom He will astray and guideth whom He 
will, and ye will indeed be asked of what ye used to 
do. " 
At all events, Islam urges Muslims to spread the 
message all over the world and it is incumbent upon 
Muslims to establish a community or a state as a means 
to carry out both religious and temporal affairs 
according to the Islamic system. 22 Therefore, unlike 
other religions, Islam considers its relationship with 
a state as inseparable and interdependent. 
However that may be, some writers object to the 
two fold division of the world or even the tripartite 
division, which include dar al-'ahd. arguing that 
that division was the innovation of the cAbbäsid 
jurists in order to distinguish, in the time of actual 
war, between Muslim and non-Muslim states. Therefore 
they reject. the inclusion of that division in the 
principles of Muslim legal theory. 23 But if the 
division were to be excluded from the principles of 
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Muslim legal theory there would not exist a division 
of non-Muslims into harbi, musta'min etc. No authority 
can be found who rejects those categories of 
non-Muslims. Despite the Islamic view that the origins 
the. 
of /, Islamic legal system were divine and revealed in 
nature, since God is the sole legislator in Islam, the 
Muslim jurists have played an important part in 
interpreting and developing the principles of that 
revealed law into various forms of human activity. It 
would seem, therefore that this division is 
indispensable both in the time of actual war or peace 
in order to identify the status of the opposite party. 
Thus, the division is a matter of practical rather 
than theoretical need. The Qur'an implicitly admits 
that division when we read : 
"0 mankind! Lo! We have created you male and 
female, and have made you nations and tribes that 
ye may know one another.... 1124 
In later times for various reasons, the division of 
the world into der al-Islam and d9r al-barb became 
almost insignificant. But it never entirely 
disappeared. Its concept remained to be seen and it 
was always possible, from the Muslim point of view, to 
reactivate it as indeed happened from time to time. It 
follows that barbi. the subjects of d6r al-herb, could 
also be redefined according to the rules of al-siyäsah 
al-shar 'iyyah. 
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III. Dar al-'Ahd (Territory of the Covenant) 
A third category of the där according to Muslim 
constitutional law is dar al-Gahd. This category of 
land was introduced by al-ShäfiC12S for that land 
which was considered neither as dflr al-Islam nor dar 
al-barb but rather a truce or a covenant had been 
concluded between Muslim and non-Muslim authorities. 
This territory was alternatively called dar al-culh26 
(territory of peace) to signify non-Muslim territories 
which were involved in atreaty agreement with dar 
al-Islam. The term culhan indicates peace agreement as 
opposed to 'anwatan which means acquired by force. 
Under this agreement, the non-Muslims agree to pay 
kharä " or land tax to the Muslim sovereign and the 
latter guarantees their security as to their life, 
property and religion from internal intervention and 
external attacks. Furthermore, by no means can 
Muslims authority impose iz a on them since they are 
not living under the jurisdiction of dar al-Isl m. 27 
for in order to collect iizyah the Muslims had to 
occupy the land by force or there was an agreement to 
that effect but that was not the case of dar al-sulh 
because the inhabitants had proclaimed treaty 
relationship with dar al-Islam. The Muslims henceforth 
could not attack them nor could they impose any extra 
burden on a muGahid. It has often been presumed a 
priori that the relationship between the two 
12 
contracting parties is governed by the provisos of 
their agreement. It would appear that the mu'ähids 
could still maintain their laws, religions, customs 
and general practices. No colonization by Muslims was 
permitted there, and no interference by Muslim 
officials in their internal affairs. But in any event, 
in spite of maintaining its independence and entity, 
där al-'ahd could not be considered, from the 
constitutional point of view, as a full sovereign 
independent entity (state). 28 This is because of the 
existence of the bilateral agreement that -pAs it in o-, 
relationship with the Islamic state. For 
this reason, some Muslim jurists incline to consider 
it as'a temporary and therefore intermediate territory 
between dar al-Islam and dar al-barb. 
On the other hand, Abu Iianifah, the founder of the 
Hanafi school, and some other jurists, do not agree 
with al-Shäfi 'I. Instead they maintain that such a 
territory can be considered only as part of dar al- 
Is sm and there can be no territory other than that 
defined by the twofold division of the world as has 
previously been discussed. Some jurists, however, held 
that this was, in fact, not a question of rrulh or 'ahd 
but merely of an armed truce of armistice (ud a) and 
the implementation of some reciprocal undertakings. 
This opinion apparently is held by those who are not 
prepared to accept a non-status territory, i. e. 
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neither Islam nor barb and its implications. 
While some Hanbalite Jurists29 agree with al- 
Shafi'i, the majority of Muslim jurists do not accept 
dar al-Gahd as a separate entity out side the realm of 
Islam. The majority argue that since the people in 
such a land have concluded a peace agreement (culh) 
they should be considered as ahl al-dhimmah (protected 
people) and liable for iz ah. Their land therefore 
should be included under the domain of dar al-Isläm. so 
The two historical examples of such cases which 
apparently give rise to the whole concept of al-Wh 
were Najrän and Nubia. The Prophet himself concluded a 
treaty with the Christians of Najran guaranteeing them 
security, as to their life, property and religion, and 
levying on them a certain tribute as a token of 
protection. This tribute is regarded by some hitherto 
as kharS and by others as iz ah (protection tax). 31 
By the same token, 'Abd Allah b. Sa -d the Governor of 
Egypt,, entered into a treaty (rýulh) with the Nubians 
in 31 A. H/652 A. D. 92 The Nubians were famous for their 
skills in archery and successfully maintained their 
independence against Muslim attacks for many years. 
However, unlike the agreement with the Najran, the 
Muslims concluded with the Nubians an exchange of 
commodities, rather than on kharai or i2 ah as their 
term of agreement. 33 Moreover, an agreement was also 
concluded between Mu'awiyah and the Armenians 
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stipulating that they had liberty over their land and 
fully autonomous control over their internal affairs. 
In return, they had to pay iz ah to the Muslim 
authority. 34 In a later development, we find that the 
Ottoman sultans granted 'ahd we am5n to the tributary 
Christian princes whereby the latter made a yearly 
tribute in the form of khardi in exchange for peace 
and security. It is absolutely an act of goodwill on 
the part of the Sultan through his good office. 35 
This state of affairs continues so long as the 
contracting parties respect and observe the terms of 
the agreement. The iz ah cannot be collected from 
them and the amount of land tax cannot be increased 
since they are not in dar al-Islam and more precisely, 
both parties have to abide by the original terms of 
agreement. 
As regards to the situation created by a violation 
of the treaty, the various schools are not in 
agreement. According to al-Shafi'i, if their territory 
was then conquered, it came into the category of 
territory taken by force; and if it was not conquered, 
it became dar al-harbbAbQ Hanf ah, however, maintained 
that if there were Muslims in that country, or if it 
was separated from dar al-herb by Muslim territory, 
the territory was still considered as dar al-I lain 
and the inhabitants were bughät (rebels). 36 If neither 
of these conditions applied the land became dar al- 
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Narb. On the other hand, two of AbQ Hanifah'Scompanions., 
AbQ Yflsuf and Muhammad al-Shaybäni,, argued that it 
became där al-barb in both cases. 37 As the latter, the 
father of Muslim public international law, has pointed 
out: 
The crucial factors <to be considered) for 
every territory are authority and power in 
ruling that territory. If the rules/law of 
covenantees are enforced; the territory is 
dar al-muwäda Cah (territory of covenant). 
If on the other hand, the rules of others 
(from another territory) are in force; none 
of the inhabitants of the two territories 
could be considered under the rules of 
muwäda 'ah. 3B 
This statement clearly expresses that authority 
and force are two main factors that can determine the 
status of the territory, whether or not it should be 
considered as dar al-muwädaCah. In the course of 
events, no matter what the opinions of the school may 
have been, these territories, throughout the course of 
the Muslim history, are to be finally included under 
the domain of d6r al-Islam. 
It seems that this theory, devised by the Shafi'I 
school of law, provides a proper basis for 
contemporary international relations between the 
Muslim and non-Muslim sovereigns. These contractual 
relations, which may be bilateral or multilateral are 
very important in order to safeguard the flow of trade 
and to ensure the socio-political-economic interests 
of the parties concerned. Moreover, the present state 
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of peace not war is a basis upon which the relation- 
ship, between Muslim and non-Muslim states, should be 
established. This can perhaps be considered as a 
po. sible justification for the idea of dar al-'ahd and 
also a result of the development of a genuine 
relationship, that is to say, when they are in a state 
of belligerency, the twofold division of the world 
applies; but when the state of stability and peace 
prevails, a peace treaty relationship is 
indispensable. Finally, a peaceful relationship will 
be the only basis for the foreign relations of an 
Islamic state. 
IV. The Nature of Relationship between Islamic and 
non-Islamic States. 
Before we investigate the nature of relationships 
between Islamic and non-Islamic states, it is 
imperative to say something about the world order 
before the emergence of Islam and the relationship 
among the states in the pre-Islamic era. To begin 
with, we find that 
ookd s4hrodiýg aýeý, S Arabia, the Prophet's birth place, /, w* - in a state of 
"-h&c, i, ' instability where every tribe- 
could attack the other. In such a situation, the 
weaker community becomes the prey of the 
stronger; hence the law of4jungle prevails. This state 
of affairs continues so long as there is no covenant 
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or pact between the rival parties. Even if a pact 
exists the balance of power between the conflicting 
parties should always be maintained; otherwise the 
weaker state will be the object of aggression. The 
final say however, always rests with and belongs to 
powerful and influential parties. "'=: 
It was in such a state of affairs that Islam 
emerged and proclaimed that the basis of relationships 
among the states, as among human beings, is peace not 
aggression. This is the position of the Qur'an and it 
was the practice of the Prophet during his war against 
the aggressors: 
"Therefore if they withdraw from you but 
fight you not, and (instead) send you 
(Guarantees) of peace, then God hath opened 
no way for you (to war against them). "39 
This verse shows clearly that international 
relationships in Islam should be based on peace. This 
relationship should be governed under these Qur'änic 
precepts, i. e. human dignity, 40 men are originally 
from one community, 41 cooperation enjoins good and 
forbids evil, "2 tolerance, "3 freedom, 4+ al-faclilah 
(moral excellence, virtue), 45 justice, 46 reciprocal 
treatment, "7 fulfilment of agreements, "8 and kindness 
and prohibition of immorality (asad). +9 These are 
some major principles of international relations in 
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Islam. The Muslim state should adhere to these 
principles in every transaction with non-Muslim states 
in times of both peace and war. Just as these 
principles are good among the states, so they are also 
applicable in individual relationships. Such 
principles therefore should form the basis of a code 
of conduct of nations, ethnic groups, communities, 
organizations, business firms as well as individuals. 
It should be noted that in applying these principles 
no discrimination on the basis of race, religion or 
any background differences should occur in the process 
of decision-making or the stages of either planning or 
application. For the principle per se is the 
manifestation of the Will of God in respect of all 
human beings. Thus these principles could very well be 
universal and free from limitations of the space-time 
dimension. 
If we turn back to the early intercourse between 
the Muslims and the polytheists of Mecca, we find that 
the early Muslims had to face all sorts of 
persecutions, slander, boycotts, and above all 
physical torture and killing as had happened to Bil8l 
b. Rabbi, the family of Yäsir and others. S° Facing an 
unbearable plight, some ofA Prophet' s followers had to 
take refuge in Abyssinia where they found protection 
and were able to practice their new religion in the 
fullest sense of the word. Even after the Prophet's 
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migration to Medina, the Quraysh continued their 
pressure and planned for another strike. The struggle 
now shifted from direct to indirect confrontation. 
Their medium was the Jewish tribes, the Hypocrites and 
certain inhabitants of Medina. The Quraysh had tried 
all possible ways in order to annihilate the message 
of Islam including trying to take the life of the 
Prophet; whereas the Muslims had done nothing except 
to pronounce the word of God. But Islam did not emerge 
ex nihilo. This physical, psychological as well as 
emotional warfare that the early Muslims had 
undergone, leaving betlind their wealth, families and 
friends, made them repeatedly ask permission from the 
Prophet to defend themselves and their faith. The 
Qur'an gives us a complete picture as follows: 
To those against whom war is made, 
permission is given (to fight), because 
they are wronged; and verily God is Most 
Powerful for their aid; 
(They are) those who have been expelled 
from their homes in defiance of right, (for 
no course) except that they say, "Our Lord 
is Allah" Did not God check one set of 
people by means of another, there would 
surely have been pulled down monasteries, 
churches, synagogues, and mosques, in which 
the name of God is commemorated in 
-abundance measure. God will certainly aid 
those who aid His (cause); -for verily God 
is Full of Strength, Exalted in Might, 
(Able to enforce His Will). ss 
As we have pointed out earlier, the relationship 
between Muslims and non-Muslims is primarily based on 
peace. This peace process presumably remains in effect 
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until the Muslim community (State) is attacked or 
about to be attacked or the Muslims have no liberty in 
practising and preaching Islam. The war then becomes a 
necessity for self-defence or in defence of religion 
or defence of the freedom of religion. The Muslims had 
been driven out unjustly from their home, for no other 
reason than that they worshipped 'the One True God' 
(Verse 40). This was the first occasion on which 
fighting in self-defence was permitted. 52 The 
justification for fighting was far greater here, when 
the little and weak Muslim community was not only 
fighting for its own existence against the polytheists 
Quraysh, but for the very existence of their new Faith 
and its survival. Furthermore, the Qur'an has made the 
situation clearer as follows : 
They ask thee concerning fighting in the 
prohibited month. Say: "Fighting therein 
is a grave (offence); but graver is it in 
the sight of God to prevent access to the 
path of God, to deny Him, to prevent 
access to the Sacred Mosque, and drive out 
its members. " Tumult and oppression are 
worse than slaughter. Nor will they cease 
fighting you until they turn you back from 
your Faith, if they can.... 53 
The episode did not stop at this point. The 
struggle continued. At one stage, the pagan Arabs 
approached the Prophet asking him to provide them with 
some teachers to teach Islam. Later, as the teachers 
arrived in good faith, they were brutally killed. The 
incident is known to the Muslim historians as the Bi'r 
Ma'Qnah incident. s" It was a bitter experience for the 
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Muslims. Moreover, in Medina, Bana al-Nadir together 
with Quraysh and some other tribes planned to abolish 
the Muslims' existence in Medina. The Muslims felt that 
the alliance was too strong to be faced in the 
battle-field. Instead they dug a trench about Medina 
to stop the advancement of the enemy. Banü Quray:; ah, 
who were supposed to defend Medina and were allies of 
the Muslims betrayed them and conspired to join the 
enemy promising to attack the Muslims' line from 
behind. ss 
"A full picture is portrayed in the Qur'än as 
follows: 
When they came upon you from above you and 
from below you, and when eyes grew wild and 
hearts reached to the throats, and ye were 
imagining vain thoughts concerning Allah: 
There were the believers sorely tried, and 
shaken with a mighty shock. 
And when the hypocrites, and those in whose 
hearts is a decease, were saying: Allah and 
His messenger promised us naught but 
elusion. 
And when a party of them said: 0 folk of 
Yathrib! There is no stand (possible) for 
you, therefore turn back. And certain of 
them (even) sought permission of the 
Prophet, saying: Our homes lie open (to the 
enemy). And they lay not open. They but wish 
to flee. (10-13). 
Of the believers are men who are true to 
that which they covenanted with Allah. Some 
of them have paid their vow by death (in 
battle), and some of them still are waiting; 
and they have not altered in the least; 
That Allah may reward the true men for their 
truth, and punish the hypocrites if He will, 
or relent toward them (if He will). Lot 
Allah is Forgiving, Merciful. (23-20-56 
The study of some of these events helps us to 
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understand better the events and the struggle of the 
early Islamic era, and also to comprehend how the 
Muslim responded to it and the relationship between 
the two conflicting parties. Hence, armed struggle has 
become part and parcel of the relationship with the 
non-Muslims. 
We can also draw our conclusion that while Islam 
accepts peace as a basis of its external relations, 
this does not mean that Islam accepts surrender and 
capitulation to evil forces (bätil). For there will be 
" no peace if it is based on falsehood and humiliation. 
Hence, there will be no alternative in this critical 
moment except to fight back in order to preserve 
peace.. This is perhaps why permission to fight was 
revealed. The Muslims were forced to fight though it 
was hateful to them. Fighting in such circumstances is 
a rule of necessity. 57 
In the meantime, while war was going on for one 
reason or another, the jurists were contemplating 
whether Muslims' relations with non-Muslims is based 
on a situation of war or peace. Some said that it was 
based on war rather than peace. They based their 
arguments on reality, from what had actually happened, 
rather than texts. But the majority said that this 
relationship should be based on peace until there was 
a reason to fight. S8 The majority based their 
arguments on the texts of the Qur' en, sun a and the 
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wars that the Prophet had undergone as we have seen in 
the earlier discussion. Indeed, it is on the basis of 
this kind of relationship that Muslims and non-Muslims 
can live and work together for the betterment of 
mankind, world peace, and a better future for all. 
V. Al-'Ag dah as a Basis for Division of Mankind 
Unlike other systems of law, Islam takes a 
clear-cut position as to the division of people on 
account of their faith rather than on any other 
" consideration. This attitudes manifests itself in the 
Qur'an where it is declared that: 
"It is He who has created you; and of you 
are some that are unbelievers, and some that 
are believers: And God sees well all that ye 
do. "s 9 
This verse and others indicate clearly that people 
are of two kinds: a man may b"e Q+theý. fý 
a Muslim or 0. 
non-Muslim:. This division of human beings which is 
based on Islamic faith C'a td ) holds a paramount 
significance in man's life. As such, according to the 
Islamic legal point of view this division is not 
merely theoretical in nature having no effect in one's 
life; on the contrary, the division is a key factor 
that will determine one's destiny in this world and in 
the Hereafter. For it is on the basis of this division 
that one's legal status and position " determined in 
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the Islamic state. In addition to this, his position 
in the Hereafter is likewise affected and reward/ 
punishment < azä'> is based thereon, as God says in 
the Qur' gn: 
Then, as to those who believed and did 
righteous deeds, their Lord will admit them 
to His Mercy: That will be the achievement 
for all to see. But as to those who rejected 
God, (to them will be said): "Were not Our 
signs rehearsed to you? But ye were 
arrogant, and were a people given to sin! '0 
According to the above verses, the Qur'an divides 
people at large into two major groups: Muslims and 
" non-Muslims. This division is based solely on man's 
acceptance of Islam. It rejects all other peripheral 
basis whether social status, origins, race, colour, or 
any other denominational basis. Nonetheless, since the 
message of Islam is meant for all mankind, 61 it is in 
the capacity of every individual to join the Muslim 
community, and so to enjoy equal treatment from the 
Islamic state. 
VI. Categories of non-Muslims 
There are several categories of non-Muslims. But 
according to the Muslim theory of international 
relations, the Muslim jurists have classified non- 
Muslims, in this respect, into four categories: Aß}1 
al-dhimmah, must a' min or must a' man mu Gähi d or dial lf 
and, barbi In this work, the scope of discussion will 
be confined to the first category. However, references 
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to other categories will also be made where necessary. 
First, let us make a quick survey of every category. 
A. Ahl al-Dhimmah (Protected People 
Al-dhimmah literally means al-amän (peace) and 
al-'ahd (covenant/pact), thus ahl al-dhimmah, in the 
legal sense, are those non-Muslims, normally Jews, 
Christians and others, who have concluded a permanent 
agreement with a Muslim authority. They pledge loyalty 
to the State, pay lizyah and become subjects of the 
Islamic state. In return, the state, by virtue of the 
agreement, affords them positive protection and 
security as to their lives (and family), property and 
religion. 62 The beneficiaries of the dhimmah are 
called dhimmis. and are collectively referred to as 
ahl al-dhimmah or simply dhimmah. By concluding such a 
contract the state implicitly consents to the 
existence of non-Islamic elements on its soil and its 
consequences in return for receiving some iz ah from 
non-Muslim subjects. 
This contract, according to Islamic history, was 
first introduced after the surrender of Mecca. 63 Prior 
to this event though the Prophet had concluded with 
the unbelievers in Medina and elsewhere some forms of 
agreement; but it was not considered as Cagd al- 
dhimmah per se, hence there were no rules pertaining 
to the dhimmah contract applied therein. 64 This view 
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can be justified when we take into consideration the 
fact that the ruling verses of jizyah revealed in the 
year 9 A. H. i. e. , after the conquest of Mecca. 6S The 
verse reads as follows: 
Fight those who believe not in God nor the 
Last Day, nor hold that forbidden which hath 
been forbidden by God and His Apostle, nor 
acknowledge the religion of truth, (even if 
they are) of the people of the book, until 
they pay the iz ah with willing submission, 
and feel themselves subdued. 66 
As regards the rationale for the contract, 
according to some jurists, it represents some sort of 
opportunity offered to non-Muslims to intermingle with 
Muslims, to hear and witness the justice and beauty of 
Islam and to transfer from barbi to dhimml status. It 
is expected that by observing and experiencing Islam 
through direct contact with the Muslim community they 
will be able to appreciate the teachings of Islam. '' 
This is the ideal interpretation as far as the 
contract is concerned, and therefore should preclude 
it being a means of internal revenues as has been 
suggested by some authors. 68 
As to the method of contract, there is no specific 
forms designed for this purpose. It can be concluded 
as any other ordinary contract provided that the imam 
(head of state) himself or his representative 
concludes the contract with the non-Muslims. Owing to 
the fact that this contract touches the interest and 
security of the state, it is natural that such a 
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sensitive contract should be executed and ratified by 
the highest authority of the state. Hence, it is a 
political rather than legal matter. As to the dhimmfs 
they could enter into this contract either by 
surrendering themselves to the political authority 
which has established itself in their country, thus 
becoming subjects of that authority, or by approaching 
the Muslim authority individually or collectively 
should their country not have concluded any agreement 
with an Islamic state, 69 or by entering into a 
peaceful agreement as the people of Najran and Banu 
Taghlib did during the time of the Prophet and 'Umar 
respectively. 70 
It should be borne iii. mind that by concluding the 
contract, the Islamic state is under obligation not 
only to tolerate the non-Muslim's faith, religious 
practices and laws, but also to offer them protection 
of their lives and properties as 'Ali b. Abi Tdlib, 
the fourth Caliph said: "The contract has been granted 
so that their properties (are to be considered) as our 
properties and their blood as ours. "71 For this 
reason, the dhimmfs are granted certain rights and 
their position in the Islamic state, from the very 
beginning, is unique. In return, they accept Islamic 
rule, pay -lizy8h and some other obligations towards 
the state. In the following chapters these matters 
will be discussed in detail. 
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B. Other Categories of non-Muslims 
Conceptually speaking, the barbi, whether a 
Scripturary or a polytheist, is a citizen of dar al- 
barb, regardless of his cc antry of origin. 72 Since där 
al-barb is, in theory, at war with dar al-Islam, its 
citizen is also considered to be in a state of war 
with the Muslims. 73 This state of affairs continues 
so long as there is no agreement or pact between the 
two states. If there is an agreement of any sort such 
as a non-aggression pact with the Islamic state, the 
citizen of that state is called mu'ahid or hälif. 74 
The relationship between the two parties is governed 
by their agreements. The Prophet is reported to have 
said In this respect: "Whoever enters into a pact with 
a people should neither relax its terms nor tighten 
them until it expires or it be returned to them on 
terms of equality. "7 s 
On the other hand, there are cases where the 
citizen of Klär al-herb could apply for the amän (safe 
conduct) which would permit him, his family and 
property, to travel or reside in dar al-Islam for a 
limited period, hence he is called muste'min. 76 This 
situation is vital for the purposes of trade, tourism, 
missions or the like. 77 The Qur'an signals its 
approval of this as follows: "And if anyone of the 
idolaters seeketh thy Protection (0 Muhammad), then 
protect him so that he may hear the word of Allah, and 
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afterward convey him to his place of safety. That is 
because they are a folk who know not. "78 
In Islamic law, the amän may be given either by 
the imäm. his representative, and individual Muslim. 
The former may be called "official" whereas the latter 
is "unofficial" am5n. 79 It should be noted that no 





In this chapter four main topics pertaining to the 
dhimmi's obligations as resident of the Islamic state 
will be discussed. They are iz ah kharä. i 'ushr. and 
the observance of some aspects of the Islamic law. 
The first two, as frequently dealt by the classical 
jurists, will be surveyed in detail; while the 
remaining two topics will only be touched on briefly 
here. This is in order to avoid repetition as they 
will be discussed from time to time during the course 
of this study. 
I. Jizyah (Protection Taxt 
A. Basic Notion of Jizyah 
Perhaps one of the most controversial issues, in 
the course of discussion of the concept of dhimmi. is 
one pertaining to the concept of iz ah and its 
application vis-a-vie non-Muslim subjects. At the 
outset, we would like to state our position that we do 
wish to avoid the confusion in some writers2 about 
the nature of . iizyah and 
k and . Our position is that 
iz ah is a tax on dh mm': whereas kharal is a tax on 
land, though at times, both appeared to be 
interchangeable and loosely used by some Muslim 
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historians as well as jurists. 3 This position is 
justifiable if we take into consideration that 
iz ah is the Qur'Finic injunction whereas kharFaj is 
the iitihäd of 'Umar I which later became the 
consensus (i mä G) + of the Prophet's Companions. 5 
The law pertaining to iz ah is derived from the 
following verse: 
Fight against such of those who have 
been given the Scripture as believe 
not in God nor the Last Day, and 
forbid not that which God hath 
forbidden by His messenger, and 
follow not the religion of truth, 
until they pay the tribute (iz ah) 
readily, being brought low. 6 
It is said that this verse was revealed to the 
Prophet commanding him to attack the Byzantines. 7 Soon 
after that the Prophet and his Companions proceeded to 
TabQk in the year 9 A. H. /630 A. D. They met no 
resistance. Thus, the Prophet concluded a treaty with 
the inhabitants stipulating that they pay iz eh. e 
Thereafter, many Christian principalities bordering 
the Syrian regions concluded the same treaty. They 
agreed to pay iz ah and in return, they were granted 
complete protection as to their life, property and 
religion. 9 
The above two sources, which gave rise to the 
concept of Ji_zyah viz. the Qur'an and the Prophetic 
tradition, form the basib on which the Muslim jurists 
developed the concept by recourse to i_itihed. when 
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facing a new problem with a different situation, after 
the rapid expansion of the Muslim territories. It is 
under this precept and understanding that we find, at 
times, in different parts of the early Muslim 
Caliphate, the policy-makers were not in agreement in 
the course of implementation of the iizyah' s concept. 
This state of inconsistency in decision-making, after 
a careful diagnosis, we find that It was partly due to 
the exigencies of the situation and its local's need 
and partly because the authority exercised their own 
i. itihed. However, it should not be a matter of prolonged. 
discussion for those who comprehend ý the Islamic 
legal history. Needless to say,, notwithstanding that 
some Muslim authorities, at times, had abused its 
power vie & vie the dhimmi. But it is suffice to 
remind them the warning of the Prophet: 
"Beware whosoever is cruel and hard 
on a contractee or imposes on him 
more than he can bear, I will be his 
opponent (on the Day of 
Judgement). '10 
'Umar I on his deathbed said: "I advise my 
successor to comply with the covenant made with those 
under the protection of the Prophet, protect them from 
those who persecute them and do not impose burden more 
than they can bear. "', 
It is interesting to point out here that the 
exegetes (al-mufassirün) as well as the jurists are 
not in agreement in their efforts to elaborate the 
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Qur'anic terms can yadin12 and rýäghirQn19 at the end 
of the above verse. According to the important exegete 
Tabarl (d. 310/922), a founder of a school of law, the 
former means "from hiS(dhimmi) hand to the hand of 
the collector. " As for the latter Tabari recorded 
that there were three opinions. First, to pay < iz ah) 
in the standing position while the receiver 
(collector) is sitting; second, to pay for themselves 
by their own hands against their will. This is 
reported to be the opinion of Ibn 'Abbäs (d. 68/687); 
and finally, the act of paying per se is meant by the 
term. 1" 
The Mu't azi lite exegete Zamakhsharl (d. 528/1133), 
however, maintains that the former could be the hand 
of4payer (giver) or the receiver. This would mean that 
at his (the payer's) will he gives his hand. For if he 
refuses or declines, he would not give his hand. 
ehe. 
Zamakhshari argues that] act of receiving a lizyah and 
leaving their life and property intact is a great 
honour and blessing (Gma ) for them. 15 On the other 
hand, Qur%ubt (d. 671/1272), another important exegete, 
reports that there were several opinions concerning 
the first term. According to Ibn 'Abbäs it means that 
the d imm pays himself without intermediary, whereas 
Salmän says that it means "under protection". Ma'mar 
however narrated from Qatädah (d. 117/735) that he 
said, "by force. 11 It is said that it also could mean 
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giving them <dhimml) a comfortable and a carefree life 
after taking a iz ah. '6 This last opinion seems to be 
in harmony with that of Zamakhsharl. It is therefore 
apparent that both terms are used as being 
complementary to each other, in this verse, in order 
+nakt ibe1ýt- 
to! give more coherence to the concept and exclusive in 
meaning. 
At any rate, we should not take the state of 
submissiveness, for non-Muslim subjects, in its strict 
a 
literal sense. Rather it should be taken innlegal and 
political sense. For the verse in question, in its 
general context, is Medinan. 17 The nature of Madinan 
verses normally deals with the socio-political- 
economic: aspects of the ummah rather than fundamental 
questions of belief and metaphysics. In the words, of 
Shdfi 'i, he says that ' an va. iria 'alayhim hukm al- 
Islam, i. e. the rules of Islam should be applicable 
for them or submission to the authority of Islam. t8 
This interpretation is in line with the modern 
political theory of sövereignty where every subject is 
expected to render his loyalty and obedience to the 
state. The fact that the dhimmi had concluded the 
contract is a prima facie reason for him accepting 
the authority and rules of Islam. It is because of the 
contract that he is liable for iizyah. 19 
It is worth mentioning here that taxes like iz ah 
were not introduced by the Muslims. In fact, such a 
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tax had been imposed by the different sovereigns on 
their respective subjects before the emergence of 
Islam. Tabari records that Anüshirwän, the Persian 
emperor at the birth of the Prophet, imposed a tax on 
non-warring subjects for defence purposes. The 
emperor made this ruling in order to motivate the 
soldiers as they risked their lives in the defence of 
the country. Therefore, they deserved something from 
the public. It is for this reason that the emperor 
imposed the tax on the people and it was later known 
as iz a . 20 It is reported that the Byzantines 
imposed the same tax on the people of coastal regions 
aFCUýd ` 
of Asia Minor ix Ok J; 500 C,. E, 'rk similar tax was also 
imposed by the B Xza1 JS upon the conquered peoples and 
LG 
cwas reported that the amount was far greater than what 
was introduced by the Muslims. 21 Even the term za 
itself, according to Shibll Nu'mdnf, has been 
Arabicized from the term kizyat which means a levy 
which the Persian emperors used in the administration 
of war affairs. Shibl argues further that this term 
was either in currency in both languages, or the Arabs 
adapted it from the Persian language. But what seems 
likely is that the Arabs first knew about this tax 
from the Persians. 22 According to Cahen the Roman- 
Byzantine empire had a more complex system of tax 
including a personal tax which was only used for 
colonists and non-Christians. The Sdsänid empire had a 
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dual system of tax namely, a general tax on land and a 
raYis 
poll tax, at,: -- varying, (depending on the capability 
of the tax-payer but the aristocracy were exempted. 23 
There is no sharp disagreement among the jurists 
as to those who should pay iz ah. Initially, it was 
collected from ahl al-kitäb (People of the Book i. e. 
Jews and Christians), but at later stage, it was 
expanded to include the Majtis (Magians), ! ýäbis 
(Sabeans), and Sämirah (Samaritans). 24 Certain 
i Christian tribes like Bang Taghlib and the Najrän had 
been given special treatment, therefore no iz ah 
was collected from them, though they had concluded a 
contract hence ahl al-dhimmah, instead a special tax 
was imposed on them. 25 As for the Magians although 
they are not considered as People of the Book, they 
were, as far as the iz ah is concerned, treated as 
one of them. It is reported that the Prophet collected 
. 
iizyah from the Magians of Bahrain and it is also 
reported that 'Umar I imposed iz ah on the Magians of 
Iraq without disapproval from any one of the Prophet's 
Companions ,. 26 From the Tradition we encounter the 
following reports concerning the Magians: 
Yahya related to me from Malik that 
Ibn Shihäb said, "I have heard that 
the Messenger of Allah, may Allah 
bless him and grant him peace, took 
iz ah from the Magians of Bahrain, 
that 'Umar ibn al-Khaýýäb took it 
from the Magians of Persia and that 
'Uthmän ibn 'Affdn took it from the 
Berbers. " 
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Yahya related to me from Malik from 
Ja'far ibn Muhammad ibn 'Ali from his 
father that 'Umar ibn al-Kha%#ßäb 
mentioned the Magians and said, "I do 
not know what to do about them. " GAbd 
al-Rahmän ibn 'Awf said, "I bear 
witness that I heard the Messenger of 
Allah, may Allah bless him and grant 
him peace, says, 'Follow the same 
sunnah with them that you follow 
with the People of the Book. "'z 7 
According to Malik, AbU Hanifah and his companions 
that the iz ah was taken from the Magians not because 
they were People of the Book, but rather they were 
considered as 'a am (non-Arab). On the contrary, 
ShAfi'I and Abü Thawr (d. 240/854), a founder of a 
school of law, are of the opinions that they were 
People of the Book. 28 Shdfi'S reaches such a 
conclusion apparently because he relies on the saying 
of 'A11 ibn AbT Tdlib on the authority of Sufydn from 
AbO Said from Nacr b. 'A im that 'Ali was asked 
about the Magians, 'All replied that they were ahl al- 
kitab but their book-had been taken away from them. 29 
As for the Sabeancand Samaritans there is no agreement 
among the jurists. Some jurists such as AbO Hanifah 
say that they are People of the Book while others held 
otherwise. At any rate, many jurists are of the 
opinion, that if their religions are compatible with 
any of the People of the Book, they are the People of 
the Book; otherwise they couldk be considered as the 
People of the Book. 30 
A consensus also arises among the jurists that 
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the Prophet refused to accept iz ah from idolaters or 
pagan Arabs let alone the Quraysh. For they were not 
to be tolerated as the People of the Book. They have 
Eke. 
to choose between 
Islam orhsword. 3i As to the non-Arab 
polytheists, the jurists are in disagreement on the 
basis of receiving iz ah from them. Malik, Abü 
Hanifah and his companions held that lizyah is 
accepted from non-Arabs whether they are People of the 
Book or otherwise, i. e. non-possessor s of the book, 
idolaters, and those who have no religion at all. They 
should take the rule and be treated as Magians. 92 al- 
Awzä 'i (d. 157/774), a Syrian jurist, says that those 
who are not People of the Book are Magians. 33 This is 
also the opinion of al-Thawri (d. 161/778), a Koff 
jurist. 3" But Abo Thawr says that za is not 
acceptable except from People of the Book as 
explicitly expressed by God (in the verse in 
question). So the question of Arabs or non-Arabs is 
immaterial for him. 35 This seems to be the opinion of 
Shafi'I but he takes the trouble to define the People 
A#' the Book. 3° Shdfi cl maintains that God only permits 
to take iizyah from People of the Book. Therefore, no 
one can take _iizyah except 
from those whom God has 
permitted to take it from them. The rest of the people 
according to Shafi(. have to face war as commanded by 
God, "And fight them until persecution is no more, and 
religion is all for God. ... "37 The fact that the 
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Prophet took iz ah from the Magians suggests that 
they are ahl al- kitab. 38 
On the other hand, there is an extreme opinion 
attributed to al-Hasen al-Ba$ri39 saying that iz ah 
is accepted according to A ancestral-line of the 
people. Otherwise, -1tß could not have been accepted 
from the Magians and the prohibition of taking iz ah 
wogLd')tat kove beep, ? 
asst t 
from polytheist Arabs/( both of them (the Magians and 
the polytheist Arabs) had no book. 40 However, Malik, 
and those who have the same opinion -&S= hei, argue 
that it is an established fact that iz ah was taken 
from the Magians who have no book; if iz ah could 
not be taken except from People of the Book, it 
therefore follows that iz ah could not be taken from 
to 
the Magians. The fact that it is permissible Itakt. 
iz ah from the Magians clearly indicates that it is 
ED 
also legally permissible Atak; 2. lizyah from all non- 
Arabs regardlessAwhether they are People of the Book 
or polytheists. 41 
B. Who Pays 
.1 izyah. . FtA 
One of the unique: 1. of this tax is that it is 
only collected from adult males, who have reached the 
age of puberty. Those who are physically unfit and 
mentally unsound are exempted from iz ah. 42 So, there 
is no iz a on women, children, old men andiinsane43 
as war is not waged against them and also because 
40 
iz ah was prescribed . on 'a. 
L(e-, 
-oclie4 "mm 
(ahl al-gitäl) according to the spirit of the verse. "" 
According to Ibn Hazm (d. 456/1063), a Zahiri jurist, 
. 
iiz: zsh is also imposed on women as it is imposed on 
men. He relies heavily on the verse in question 
stating that God has made no difference between men 
and women in matters of religion and responsibilities 
to it. He also depends on the Tradition which says 
that the Prophet is reported to have commanded Mu'ädh 
b. Jabal, when sending him to Yemen, to collect one 
dinar from men and women or the equivalent. 45 There is 
some modern relevance to this view especially,, in the 
present day's situation where women have 'ºrý: aýe. 
significant achievementS in their lives. In some cases, 
women are now even more independent and established 
financially than . i... ' _.. men. 
Jizyah is also exempted from the poor (who are 
entitled to cadagah). 46 The blind and crippleSonly pay 
when they are wealthy. Similarly, monks are exempted, 
if they are poor. However, if their institutions are 
wealthy, their superiors have to pay the tax. "7 These 
are the opinions of the majority schools of law except 
the Shgfi 'iS who contend that iz ah is just like the 
rent of the house. Therefore, the obligation to pay 
the rent is by no means different between the wealthy 
and the poor. "8 But within the Shäf1'f school, 
however, there is an opinion saying that the poor, the 
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blind and the like should be exempted from paying 
lizyah. 49 Qurtubl concludes that it is a consensus of 
scholars that iz ah is imposed on a free mature. ' man 
namely, those who able to fight but the women, 
the. 
children, slaves, ,, insane and old men are 
exempted. s0 
ih e. 
Another feature of ,( relaxation of the rule of 
iz ah is that it could be paid both in money or in 
kind, i. e. in garments, livestock, grain or the like. 
But wine, carrion and pigs are not legal, payment; for 
these items, according to Islamic law, habe no value 
and should not be accepted. S1 AbO Yosuf, however, says 
" that 'Umar b. al-Khaltäb prohibited taking z ah from 
those "articles and ordered that they should be sold 
and the tax paid from such sale. S2 From this report, 
we find that 'Umar I has set up a precedent on how to 
deal with such cases. It entails a legal question as 
to whether ii is lawful for the Muslim authority to 
collect tax, any tax, from the sale of prohibited 
materials such as pigs, liquor and the like. We will 
discuss these matters in detail in the following 
chapters. 
The jurists also dispute as to when the tax should 
be collected. This would appear to be sn 
administrative matter. However, 
4 
some cases the method 
of payment is expressly stated in the agreement as we 
shall see in the respective treaties. 
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C. The Amount to be Charged 
Initially, this tax was collected at the rate of 
one dinar or its equivalent per person as has been 
mentioned earlier in the case of the people of Yemen. 
It is reported that the Prophet took one dinar from 
the people of Ayld and the Meccan Christians. 53 It is 
reported that CUmar I introduced a new measure 
according to the capability of the tax-payer at the 
rate of forty-eight dirhams on the wealthy, twenty- 
four on the middle class, and twelve on the poor or 
the manual workers respectively. 54 AbQ CUbayd in his 
comment on the act of 'Umar says: "The rate could be 
increased or otherwise according to the capability and 
prosperity (al-yasdr) of the people. Had 'Umar known 
Ehe. 
that iz ah was atAfixed rate prescribed by the 
Prophet, he would not have changed it. "ss It is most 
likely that the Syrians and the Iraqis at that time 
were wealthier than the Yemenis. Kdsranl, however, in 
trying to justify the same act says that z ah is of 
two kinds : (1) Tizyah is collected on the basis of 
mutual consent which is the case of al-2ulh where the 
parties agreed at a specific amount or kind of payment 
as the Prophet had concluded with the people of 
Najrdn; and (2) Jizyah is imposed bykImäm unilaterally 
according to his discretion when the land is occupied 
by force. 5e 
When 'Umar took his decision (i. itihäd) in the 
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presence of the Companions of the Prophet, both an e 
and muhä. iirin, none of them a-l-e- reported to have 
objected to the decision. Therefore, it became a 
consensus of the ummah with all its implications. Si As 
a result, CUmar, in introducing a new measure based on 
the income of tax-payer, in fact, as in many cases of 
his rulings, created a new concept of taxation known 
in modern time5as graduated assessment. 
Another formula of the tax which had been imposed 
0" 9L 
on the dhimmi in the Islamic state wa6 charged/basis 
of group or community rather than on the 
individual. In this way, the head of the community is 
responsible for collecting the tax and paying it to 
the Muslim authority. It is therefore a collective or 
communal (tribal) responsibility based on a 
proportional share-tax system. Perhaps this kind of 
method was the one used by Khalid b. Walld when he 
charged the people of }IIrah for 60,000 dindrS per year 
after he had found that the total population liable to 
pay tax in the area was 6000.5" It would seem that 
K&sanl's view is more relevant here, for a fixed 
standard of iz ah to be applied to all people would 
seem unfair. This is because the degrees of well-being 
and natural resources of the people vary from place to 
place and from time to time. To fix a standard rate 
for all people is not only unfair, but undermines the 
earlier precedent. It follows that the amount of 
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iz ah should be either negotiated and agreed upon by 
both parties; thus the will of the contracting 
parties prevails as it . says in the maxim that "the 
contract is the legislation of the contracting 
parties"; 59 or the Imam imposed it at his discretion 
in the case of no negotiation, I. e. after the 
fighting. In both cases, however, the role of i. itihäd 
is there. Therefore, we can conclude that the amount 
of 1iz ah is the subject of i_itihäd of the authority 
concern7dapart from it being an administrative matter 
and it may vary from time to time even among the same 
people. 
D. The" Jizyah Is Not A Punishment. 
Although some Hanaff jurists even held that iz ah 
is imposed on dhimmisin order to punish them for their 
continuous state of infidelity, '0 that view is 
incompatible with the practice of the Prophet and his 
Companions as we shall see in their treaties with 
non-Muslims. It is also against the concept of 
contract per se which denotes security and 
protection. Furthermore, it also contradicts the 
concept of tolerance in Islam where the Qur' än 'skoýýis 
clearly that there should be no compulsion in Islam. e1 
For their infidelity is to be counted in the 
Hereafter. If iz ah is a retributive measure it must 
be imposed on all non-Muslims and surely there would 
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be no certain groups of people exempted from paying 
it. Finally, if any non-Muslim joins the Muslim army 
voluntarily, his obligation to pay iz ah is to be 
lifted as we shall see. The Prophet used to advise his 
Companions, hence the Muslims, to treat ehl al-dhimmah 
(the protected people) with special care, leniency and 
not to harass them. 62 The proper way to convey the 
message of Islam is to invite the people in a good 
manner and to use the faculty of reason as the Qur'an 
says: 
Call unto the way of thy Lord with 
wisdom and fair exhortation, and 
reason with them in the better way. 
Lot thy Lord is best aware of him who 
strayeth from His path, and He is 
Best Aware of those who receive 
guidance. 63 
E. The Case of BanO Taghlib 64 
As has been mentioned earlier, BanU Taghlib, with 
respect to paying iz ah occupy" a special position, 
i. e. they did not pay lizyah per se but cadagah. Their 
position has been reported by many historians as well 
as jurists. During his reign, CUmar I wanted to 
imposed lizyah on them. But they were reluctant to pay 
contending that they were Arabs and would be ready to 
pay cadagah or zak$t as the Muslims do. Initially, 
'Umar I refused to take iadagah from non-Muslims. 
Conceptually speaking, it is a form of worship 
('ibädah maliyyah) and it is only meant for the 
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Muslims. As a result, some of them fled and joined the 
Byzantines. Fearing that the "issue would Csc0. (±p. 
ýU 
!- th e. r-7 g 'Ubädah b. Nu'mdn al-Taghl i bi' s approached 
the Caliph and suggested that if the issue Wows not 
resolved quickly there could be a possibility that the 
enemy (Byzantines) would use them against the Muslims. 
Since Banü Taghlib were known to have considerable 
power, their alliance with the enemy could upset the 
balance of power in the region) something that the 
Muslims could not afford to allow to happen at that 
time. Bearing in mind all these factors, the Caliph 
concluded a peace treaty with the Banta Taghlib 
stipulating that they pay twice the rate of cadagah 
of the Muslims and that they should not baptise their 
children. 'Ublýdah says that they did baptise their 
they 
children hence, / did not comply with the latter 
condition. Their treaty therefore was no longer 
enforceable (falb 'ahd lahum). 66 
There has been no objection reported, from the 
Companions of the Prophet, to the decision of 'Umar 
I. Therefore, according to the principle of Islamic 
law, it has become a consensus ( mäc) binding all the 
ummah. Later jurists such as Ibn Abf Laylä, AbQ 
Hanifah, Abo Yasuf, Shaifi'I, Al? mad b. Hanbal, and 
others also agree with the act of GUmar I. 67 On 
the other hand, Malik b. Anas held that iz ah should 
be taken from the Christians of Bane Taghlib as it is 
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taken from another dhimmi. According to Mälik there 
should be no difference treatment on matters of iz ah 
between BanO Taghlib and the rest of dhimmis. 68 This 
is also apparently the decision of 'Umar II (d. 99/717) 
who says: "By God I shall take only iz ah from them. " 
He relies on the generality of the verse in 
question. 69 
At any rate, since the decision was taken in the 
presence of major Companions of the Prophet and there 
was no objection reported, hence it became the 
consensus and legally valid precedent. -_ It therefore 
entails a legal question as to whether the same 
treatment (pact) could also be given to any particular 
group-of non-Muslims-who came within the same criteria 
AS BanQ Taghlib. There was the view that if there is 
a genuine case such as the circumstances of BanO 
Taghlib then it is the prerogative of imam to decide 
as to what decision could serve the best interest of 
the ummah provided that the non-Muslims have: (1) 
considerable power and authority; (2) they refused to 
pay iz a but would consider a treaty (culh) and 
thereby alternative payments as a tax in the present 
time; and (3) their threat is imminent if no agreement 
is reached. So the test is therefore whether the group 
has a power to challenge the Muslim authority and the 
danger of not having an agreement with them. This 
seems to be the logical and proper analogy with the 
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rule set by 'Umar I to be applied by &ny subsequent 
Muslim authority when facing a similar case such as 
that of BanU Taghlib. This appeared to be a view 
suggested by Abu 'Ubayd, Shdfi'i, and Hanball 
jurists. 70 
It should be noted here however when the concept 
of sadagah or zakat is applied to non-Muslims, the 
rules and regulations of zakät rather than iz ah must 
be followed. i mmi women, for instance, should pay 
zakgt whereas under the rules of iz ah women were 
exempted. 71 Finally, the case of Bana Taghlib is a 
unique precedent set by 'Umar I which perhaps could be 
applied by a contemporary Muslim authority when facing 
the similar case. 
F. Cases Where Jizyah Is Exempted 
There are several cases where lizyah is exempted 
or lifted from dhimmT. For example, the dhimml 
converts to Islam, death, lapse of time, the state 
unable to protect them, joining the Muslim army 
(defence) and excusable difficulties such as being 
poor, old, cripple, unable to work and the like. Some 
of these cases however are subjects of disagreement 
among the jurists. 
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1. Converts and Death. 
Some jurists are of the opinion that iz ah is not 
to be charged when a dhimmi becomes Muslim or dies. 
This means that when iz ah is due for one year or 
more after they have converted to Islam or die, that 
iz ah is not collected from them. In the case of 
death, no iizyah would be taken from his bequest, nor 
on his heirs. For according to those jurists iz ah is 
not a debt. Jizyah also would not be collected when a 
dhimmt becomes blind, cripple, old (not able to work) 
and poor. This is the view of Malik, AbO Hanifah and 
his companions. 72 They rely on the saying of the 
Prophet that "There is no iizyah on Muslim, "7 s and it 
is also reported that 'Umar I dropped -iiz5zah 
from a 
d immi who had become Muslim. 7+ 
According to Shäfi'S iz ah should still be 
collected from a dhimmr who becomes a Muslim or dies 
if it is due for one year or more. It is still to be 
collected after his conversion, and in the case of 
death, the lizyah is to be collected from his wealth 
before it becomes the subject of inheritance, which is 
to be divided among the surviving heirs, and his 
bequest. Indeed, it is' just like the debt owed to a. 
human being thus, there is no room for im8m or gal 
(judge) to exercise his discretion. If the dhimmi 
converts or dies before one full year (al-bawl), then 
the iz ah is due and charged in accordance with the 
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portion of the year which has passed, a quarter, a 
half or the like. For according to Shdfi'f iz ah is 
made obligatory in lieu of permission to stay in där 
al-Islam and by analogy it is a rent that the dhimml 
has to pay from the portion of the year that he lives 
therein. 75 However, in the book of Slyer al-Wägidi. 
Shafi'i says that if a himmi becomes a Muslim before 
the iz ah is due, he will be exempted. But if he 
converts after due date, then he should pay iz ah. 76 
It seems that Hanbalit-e: are in harmony with 
Hanafite jurists in this regard. They held that ia 
is to be exempted when dhimmi becomes Muslim after the 
due date. They rely on the verse which read: "Say to 
the unbelievers, if (now) they desist (from unbelief), 
their past would be forgiven them; but if they 
persist, the punishment of those before them is 
already (A matter of warning for them). 77 However, in 
the case of death, the Hanbalites depart from 
Iianafites saying that it should not be treated as 
conversion when the death occurred after the due date. 
In this case, the iz ah still can be taken from his 
egýu-%er. But if the death took place before one year, 
naturally the tizvah will be exempted from him for a 
simple reason that i ah is not due and it will not 
be collected, in any circumstances, before the 
completion of one year. Some Hanbalites, however, say 
that iz a should be exempted by a death regardless 
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of when he dies. For it is like huT düd punishment , when 
the culprit dies, it ceases to exist. But Ibn Qudamah, 
a Fianbalite jurist, contends that iz ah is a debt 
which had been made obligatory on him during his life. 
Therefore, it should not be exempted by death. He 
argues that it is like the case of debt that the 
a 
dhimmt owes toAhuman being. This situation is rather 
different from the hudod because with the death of the 
accused there will be no more object of punishment. 
But that is not the case of iz ah. 78 
Abo 'Ubayd in elaborating the Tradition "laysa 
calä muslim cadagah, "7 9 says that "when a person 
converts to Islam at the end of the year (when iz ah 
had become obligatory for him), by so doing the iizyah 
will be exempted from him. " This is simply because the 
Muslim does not pay iz ah and therefore it will not 
be a debt for him. It was reported from 'Umar I, 'A11: 
b. Abi T61ib and 'Umar II that they had taken the 
position in agreement with this meaning. 80 
As to the exemption in the case of death, since 
iz ah was not intended for material gain but its 
purpose of legislation was perhaps to pave the way to 
becoming a Muslim as Qaräfi (d. 684/1285), a Mäliki 
jurist, says: "God has legislated iz ah in the hope 
that the dhimmi will accept Islam in the future as a 
result of living in dar al-Islam and observing the 
beauty of Islam. "81 In this case since dhimmi has 
,J %0 
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deceased it defeats the purpose, hence the imposition 
of iz ah was of no avail. 62 
2. Lapse of Time 
If the dhimmi. for one reason or another, has not 
paid his iz ah for one year or more is he still to 
pay the overdue iz ah or not? In trying to answer 
this question, the jurists, again, are not in 
agreement. Abo Hantfah says that the dhimmi is not 
required to pay his past iz a 83 and the iz ah for 
" the new year until its due date. Two of Abo Hani f ah' s 
companions however do not share his opinion. Instead, 
they maintain that dhimmf should pay his past iz ah 
together with that due for the new year. 64 They 
maintain that iz ah is just like keä. Both are 
debts. They are like ordinary debts which can not be 
exempted even if they are overdue. This is because the 
dhimmi is still alive. The case will be different if 
he dies or converts. '5 But AbO Hanlfah argues that to 
compare iz ah with kharä is inappropriate in respect 
of its late payment and consequence. For there is no 
element of cighär (submission to the authority of 
Islam) nor punishment in kharä_i. This is self-evident 
from its imposition on Muslim whereas there is no 
iz a on Muslims. Furthermore, if a non-Muslim becomes 
Muslim after one year, he would still have to pay 
khara on his land but not the lizyah. 66 With all 
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thebe differences, it is clear that iz ah can not be 
compared with ordinary debts, thus, the analogy of 
iz ah to kharä is baseless and unfounded. 
On the other hand, the opinion of other schools of 
law such as ShäfiGites and Hanbalites are almost 
unanimous in saying that lapse of time should not 
allow the iizyah to be exempted. It is a financial 
obligation to be paid annually. It therefore can not 
be included as interlock (intergradation) in the 
unpaid lizyah of the previous years as in the case of 
diyah (blood-money). 67 Thus, the arguments put forward 
by AbU Ranifah do not support his position, for -iizyah 
is by no means a punishment, as has been discussed 
earlier. On the contrary, it is a result of a contract 
and it could also be interpreted as a sort of 
financial contribution, on the part of the dhimmL. for 
the defence of dar al-Islam since he is not physically 
enlisted in the forces. This is perhaps the logical 
interpretation of the payment of the iizyah. hence, 





As has been mentioned earlier iz ah is paid 
for the protection given to a dh mmi by the state. 
Islam does not require a dhimml to bear the 
responsibility of defence against external attack 
militarily. This is partially in order to respect 
the 
dhimmi since they do not share the ideology of the 
state. For defence is a matter of deep commitment and 
undivided loyalty to the state. It costs 
lives. 
Conventionally speaking, defence is a state matter. If 
a Muslim authority, for one reason or another, 
felt 
that it could no longer protect the non-Muslims there 
. rcüLä be no more valid reason to collect iz ah. If it 
had been paid, it should be refunded. This is what is 
reported actually to have happened in the time of the 
Companions of the Prophet. These are some examples: 
a. Abo Yflsuf reports that in the time of 'Umar I, 
Aba 'Ubaydah b. al-Jarräh, the then Commander in Chief 
of the Muslim army, ordered the local administrators 
of Syria to refund all the za collected. This was 
owing to the fear of imminent danger brought on by 
news that the Romans had raised an enormous army to 
attack the Muslims. AbO 'Ubaydah explains: "We have 
receive news that a powerful army is advancing against 
us, so we have refunded to you the money that was 
collected. For this money was paid upon the 
understanding that you would be protected and defended 
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by us, and upon our pledge to fulfil this duty. We are 
now in no position to keep our pledge. However, if God 
grants us victory over the Romans, you can consider us 
bound to what we have taken upon ourselves in our 
mutual agreement. "89 Abü Yusuf adds that the 
Christians, overwhelmed by the fair treatment of the 
Muslims, gave their blessing to the Muslims, desiring 
their victory over the Romans, who would not have 
acted in such fairness and honour. 90 
b. The same pledge and treatment was reported by 
, E6 
Bat dhurS inktreaty made by Habib b. Maslamah with the 
people of Taflts [Tiflis] during his campaign in 
Armenia. 91 
c. " In the treaty concluded by Khalid b. al-Walld 
with galübd b. Nas%Ord of Hirah, he made it clear that 
z ah was for protection... "If we protect you, then 
iz a is due to us; but if we do not (or unable to do 
so), then it is not due. "9 2 
4. Military Service as an Alternative E0 Jizyah 
As stated above, the iz ah is collected in lieu 
VA& 
of security and protection rendered to tidhimmi by the 
state. But there is no injunction in Islamic law as to 
preclude a dhimmi from taking the task of defence of 
the state. According to Shdfi'i in Siyar al-Wdgidi the 
Prophet initially was reluctant to accept 
participation from non-Muslims in the battle of Badr. 
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But two years later in the expedition of Khaybar, he 
accepted some Jews of Qaynugä' to fight with him. In 
like manner, in the battle of Hunayn in the year 8 
A. H. /629 A. D. , the Prophet also receiveä 
the help of 
Safwän b. Umayyah, the polytheist. 93 From these 
evidences, it is clear that non-Muslims may join the 
Muslim army especially in the defence against the 
external attack which by and large endanger his family 
as well as his property. Thus, if a dhimmi willingly 
defends ddr al-Isläm, then he actually performs his 
duty as a responsible citizen and thereby should 
deserve exemption from iz ah for basically iz ah is 
charged on able-bodied man. The following examples, 
perhaps, will serve illustrate the point: 
a. Tabari reports that in the treaty made by 
'Utbah b. Farqad with the people of Adharbayjän it 
reads: 
In the name of Allah, the Beneficent, the 
Merciful. This is what 'Utbah b. Farqad, 
ýämil [tax-collector] of '-Umar b. sl- 
Ifhaý%äb the Commander of the Faithful, has 
granted to the people of Adharbayjän ... 
all of them shall enjoy amän (safety) for 
their lives, properties and religions 
provided that they pay iz a according to 
their abilit . whoever joins up the force (among them),, he will be exempted from 
za for that year.... 9" 
b. Tabari also reports that Shahrabaräz, a King of 
al-Bb, 'a region in Armenia had asked SarEkgah b, 'Amr, 
amir (governor) of that region to exempt him and those 
with him from iz ah. In return, the King will do 
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whatever is needed from him against the enemy. Sarägah 
accepted the offer and wrote to the Caliph asking for 
approval. The Caliph approved it and praised him. 95 
c. Balddhuri reports that Habib b. Maslamah al- 
Fihri, governor of Antioch made a treaty with the 
people of al-Jurjumah. Terms were made stipulating 
that al-Jaräjimah would act as helpers to the Muslims, 
and as spies and frontier garrison in Mount al-Lukäm. 
In return, it was agreed that they pay no tax, and 
that they keep for themselves the booty they captured 
" from the enemy in the view of the fact that they were 
fighting alongside the Muslims. All those who lived in 
the city besides the Jaräjimah were also entered into 
the same treaty. 96 
d. Thomas Arnold says: "The iizyah was levied on 
the able-bodied males, in lieu of the military service 
they would have been called upon to perform had they 
been Musalmans; and it is very noticeable that when 
any Christian people served in the Muslim army, they 
were exempted from the payment of this tax. " He adds: 
"We find similar instances of the remission of lizyah 
in the case of Christians who served in the army or 
navy under the Turkish rule. "97 
e. It has become a common practice, throughout 
history that any ruler would confer something ow his 
citizen or even the alien in exchange, hence 
recognition, of valuable services performed by the 
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latter. The same treatment could be expected from a 
Caliph. Therefore, iz ah, among other things, could 
be remitted in exchange for invaluable services 
rendered by non-Muslim subjects to the state. 
The historical evidences above were the practices 
of the Companions of the Prophet during their life 
times. According to Islam, they were the people who 
knew better the letter and spirit of Sharl'ah. Their 
i_itingd as well as judgements have become a hu ah 
(legal evidence) and a binding precedent for the 
Muslims to follow. The Examples above explicitly 
qýVf 
demonstrat. that iz ah would be exempted from4dhimmi 
who fights with the Muslims or voluntarily joins the 
battle in defence of the Islamic state. We possess no 
knowledge to. the contrary. There was no objection 
raised from the Companions of the Prophet when Sarägah 
asked 
ýer, 
approval from GUmar I. Therefore, it has 
become a consensus in the time of the Companions of 
the Prophet. Now, it has become certain that lizyah 
could be waived when dhimmt takes up arms ++L 
oftka 
def ence, h d6r al-Islam, or makes - necessary preparations 
for it in terms of material or the like. For, defence 
does not only mean actual fighting in the battle-field 
but also the preparation for it. 98 
G. Tizyah Is Not a Poll-Tax. 
Many modern writers, 99 particularly in works 
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published in Western languages, frequently used the 
term poll-tax to describe iz ah. The term seems 
is 
inappropriate and A. by no means equivalent to it. 
Consequently, it may lead to misconception 4 the 
concept of iz ah itself. For, its concept, objective 
and application are different from poll-tax as we have 
seen above. M. Walker in his definition of poll-tax 
says: "A tax of uniform amount on each individual or 
head. It has been levied several times in England, the 
first was in 1377.... Its use caused discontent in the 
United States and was declared unconstitutional by the 
24th. Amendment (1964). 11100 It would now appear that 
poll-tax is levied on every head, man and woman alike, 
which. is totally different from iz ah. For iizyah is 
only levied on able-bodied man as stated above in lieu 
of military service. It is a result of a contract 
('aqd al-dhimmah) between a Muslim authority and the 
inhabitants concerned. Each party is free to accept or 
reject the agreement. Thus, an element of mutual 
consent exists therein. 
On the other hand, poll-tax in the time of 
absolute monarchy was always a unilateral will, viz. 
imposed on the subjects. The tax collector has been 
an object of public fear, hatred and execration. At 
times, people revolt against the taxing power hence a 
ou. r civil war broke&inevitably. In the words of Walker "In 
the law of taxation justice has no place at all. "i o1 
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Arnold adds that "This tax ( iz ah) was not imposed on 
the Christians, as some would have us think, as a 
penalty for their refusal to accept a Muslim faithr 
but was paid by them in common with the other dhimmi 
or non-Muslim subjects of the state whose religion 
precluded them from serving in the army, in return 
for the protection secured for them by the arms of the 
Musalmans. "102 Tabard reports that when the people of 
} rah contributed the sums agreed upon, they expressly 
mentioned that they paid this lizyah on condition that 
"The Muslims and their leader protect us from those 
who would oppress us, whether they be Muslims or 
others. "1 o3 
It. would now appear that iz ah from its concept 
and application was not necessarily a poll-tax. It was 
simply a tax, a protection tax or "a security tax" 
against internal as well as external attacks. 104 It is 
a financial obligation upon a dhimml which is quite 
similar to that upon a Muslim in the form of zakät. 
sadagah and the like. Its nature, however, according 
to Majtd KhaddUri, was more of a collective tribute 
rather than a poll-tax paid by each individual to the 
Muslim authorities. 105 Finally, Dennett has erred in 
asserting that both lizyah and k arä were used in the 
sense of tax, for, as Khadduri says, only kharä_i. not 
iz a was used in the general sense of tax. 106 
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H. Jizyah is not a Fundamental Law. 
Having discussed iz ah in its literal, legal, and 
historical context, it is now pertinent to see whether 
the rule relating to z ah is a substantive law. In 
another words whether it is a fundamental law that 
left no room, in terms of its application, for 
discretion or i. itihäd, by the Muslim authority. We 
have seen earlier that iz ah was not the fabrication 
of Islam. But the system had been existed before the 
advent of Islam. It was practiced by the Jews, Greeks, 
Romans, Byzantines, and Persians. The first ever to 
introduce lizyah among the Persians was the King 
AnOshirwdn (531-579 A. D. ). 107 Therefore, izyah was a 
sort of reciprocal treatment in conformity with the 
prevailing custom. 
The first treaty concluded by the Prophet with the 
tribes of ' Aws, Khazraj and the Jews of Medina, later 
popular known as rahifah al-Madinah (Constitution of 
Medina), had made no provision of iz . 108 This 
treaty, it should be recalled, was continued to 
operate, even after the revelation of the verse of 
iz ah and the position of the Prophet was firmly 
establish in Medina. Similarly, the peace treaty 
(culh) was also concluded by the Prophet with the 
pagans of Mecca in the year 6 A. H. /627 A. D. known as 
the treaty of 1! udaybiyyah. 109 In this treaty, there 
was no mention of Jizyah. Another case in point is 
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that the agreement reached by 'Umar I with BanO 
Taghlib. In that agreement it was reported that the 
Caliph agreed to accept sadagah rather thatt iz a as 
insisted by Baru Taghlib. i10 
From the exposition of the historical facts above, 
we can say that lizyah is not a fundamental law which 
was required to be followed to the letter by Muslim 
authorities. "' It follows that the Muslim authority 
has the prerogative to enter into any treaty which it 
deems fit and proper for the interest of the Islamic 
state. This is simply because the main objective of 
Islam, in its relation to non-Muslims, is to achieve a 
long lasting peace so that it could enable the Muslims 
to exercise the mission of daGwah (propagating Islam) 
freely. 112 Furthermore, in concluding the treaty, the 
jurists have agreed that the authority may conclude an 
absolute treaty with unspecific time period and 
without involving any payment or tribute to the 
Muslims. Some jurists would even agree to the extent 
that the Muslims are also allowed to sign a treaty 
stipulating that they make a payment to non-Muslim 
authority. This treaty, however, should be concluded 
in the time of necessity and that it should be a 
temporary measure ( ulh mu'agqat). 113 This situation 
is just like the case of ransom to be paid to the 
captor. The similar incident was reported on the 
authority of 4Abd al-Wahhab al-Thagaft that the 
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Prophet was reported to have obtained the release of 
one of his Companions with two of his enemies. 114 
In conclusion, we can say that the Muslim 
authority is empowered to conclude a peace treaty with 
non-Muslims which is not based on paying iz ah. Such 
a treaty had been practiced by the Prophet and his 
Companions as has been discussed above. 
I. Jizyeh in the Contemporary Muslim Countries 
At present as in the past, there are a substantial 
non-Muslim citizens in the contemporary Muslim 
countries. Their religions however are varied from 
Judaism, Christianity, to Hinduism, Buddhism and even 
animism covering the areas from Morocco to Indonesia. 
Most of this countries, at present, are not practising 
totally the Islamic rules. 115 Their laws and systems 
of government are based on their previous colonial 
regimes whether in the forms of either a British 
Common law system or a French-Italian-Dutch Civil law 
system with the exceptional of some adaptability to 
suit the local custom and needs. But the colonial 
roots and concepts remain intact. 
With that prevailing situation, it is self-evident 
that the present Muslim governments do not treat non- 
Muslim citizens as dhimmfs, hence no Jizyah is 
prescribed on them. It is hard to determine, from 
constitutional point of view, whether those non- 
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Muslims are dhimmis since their presence in each 
respective countries, dated back from time immemorial. 
However, in some country like Malaysia, for instance, 
we know for sure that the Chinese and Indians were 
brought in by the British colonial in order to work as 
the blue collars workers in the tin minings and rubber 
estates. Legally speaking, to be considered as dhimmi 
there must be a formal contract concluded between the 
parties concerned. No such a contract had been made. 
At any rate, the only reasonable justification for not 
collecting lizyah from non-Muslim citizens, according 
to the theory of dhimmr. is that most Muslim countries 
have now made a compulsory military service on all its 
citizens, Muslim and non-Muslim alike. We have seen 
above that to render military service, will make the 
d immf liable for exemption of iz ah. As for those 
who do not serve a military service, for one reason or 
another, shall pay tax, a one uniform national tax116 
which equally imposed on all citizens. This state of 
affairs continues uninterrupted. The Islamic taxation 
so far has not been fully enforced by the government. 
Its application however depends solely on the 
conscientiousness of tax-payers. 
Now, it has become an established fact that the 
non-Muslim citizens in the contemporary Muslim 
countries do not pay iz ah for reason of, inter alia 
military service. This practice however, looking from 
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the theory of iz ah point of view, does not 
incompatible with Sharif-ah for reasons indicated 
above. Non-Muslim citizens, in fact, would be willing 
to defend their country, their family and their fellow 
citizens. They do not want to be discriminated in this 
respect. Furthermore, the motive of war and defence 
now has been for the national interest, or to be more 
specific, for the sake and pride of nation state that 
they live in rather than for the sake of God or iý häd 
as it used to be. In the past, the burden of war, as 
we recalled, lies solely on the Muslims but not in the 
present time. ii? 
J. Some Examples of Treaties 
1. We have mentioned in the beginning of the 
discussion of lizyah that the Christians of Najrän 
received special treatment with regard to iz ah. They 
did not pay iz ah per se but a form of contribution 
was agreed upon in the treaty. We reproduce the text 
of the treaty here, a typical example, as follows: 
In the name of Allah, the Compassionate, 
the Merciful, this is [the pact] which has 
been issued by Muhammad, the Apostle of 
Allah, to the people of Najrän, to whom his 
authority shall extend- their fruit, their 
money and their slaves. All these are left 
to them except the payment of 2,000 uncial 
dresses (hulal al-awägi), of which 1,000 to 
be paid in the month of Rajab and 1,000 in 
the month of afar together with an ounce 
of silver on each payment. If the produce 
exceeded, or became less than [the 
tribute], the latter will be estimated in 
proportion to the former. The people of 
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Najrän are expected to lend [the Muslims] 
shields, horses, animals and other objects. 
They must also entertain and provide 
supplies for my messengers for a maximum 
period of twenty days, but these must not 
be kept with them more than a month. If 
there were war in al-Yaman or in Ma'arra, 
they must supply clothes for thirty 
persons, thirty horses and thirty camels. 
If some of what was lent to my messengers 
had been destroyed or perished, the people 
of Najrän] shall be compensated. They shall 
have the protection of Allah and the 
promise of Muhammad, the Apostle of Allah, 
that they shall be secured their lives, 
property, lands, creed, those absent and 
those present, their families, their 
churches, and all that they possess. No 
bishop or monk shall be displaced from his 
parish or monastery and no priest shall be 
forced to abandon his priestly life. No 
hardships or humiliation shall be imposed 
on them nor shall their land be occupied by 
[our] army. Those who seek justice, shall 
have it: there will be no oppressors nor 
oppressed. Those who practice usury, shall 
seek no protection from me. No one shall be 
taken as responsible for the fault of 
another. For the continuation of this 
compact, the guarantee of Allah and the 
assurance of Muhammad, Apostle of Allah, 
sanction what has been written until Allah 
manifests His authority so long as [the 
people of Najr&n] remain faithful and act 
in accordance with their obligations, 
giving no support to oppression. Done in 
the presence of the following witnesses: 
AbO Suf ydn b. Harb, Ghayl än b. 'Amr, Malik 
b. 'Awf of [the tribe of] Banal Na$r, al- 
Agra' b. I bis al-Hanzall, and al-Mughirah 
b. Shu'bah. 'Abd Allah b. Abts Bakr acted as 
secretary. 1 18 
The significance of this treaty, the first in a 
series of treaties between the Muslim and Christian 
authorities, lies in the form of tribute paid by non- 
Muslims. Apart from obligations that both parties have 
to performed, the treaty provides a clear and absolute 
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freedom of religion to the Najrän. They can seek 
justice from Muslims and no one would be held 
responsible for the wrong-doing of another. 
2. Another treaty concluded by Khälid b. al-Walld 
with the Christians of Hirsh defining the nature of 
relationship between the two parties and the way how 
iz ah was based and collected, The text of the treaty 
is as follows: 
In the name of Alläh, the Merciful, the 
Compassionate. This is the agreement 
between Khälid b. al-Walld and the people 
of Hirah. The Caliph Abü Bakr has ordered 
me to proceed from Yamämah to the people of 
Iraq-Arabs and Persians- to call them 
first to believe in Alläh and His Apostle 
and to promise them paradise [if they 
accepted Islam] and to warn them with the 
Fire [if they refuse]. If Islam is 
accepted, they shall have the same rights 
and obligations as the Muslims. I have 
arrived finally at Hirah and met Iyäs b. 
Qabisah al-T&'5: with a few of the leaders 
of the city. I invited them to believe in 
Allach and His Apostle, but they refused. I 
have therefore offered them either to 
accept iz ah or fighting. The replied: "We 
do not want to fight; we want peace with 
the same conditions as those accepted by 
other people of the Book, namely, the 
paying of iizyah. " [I have accepted this] 
and counted them; they were seven thousand: 
one thousand of them of old age were 
exempted; those who have to pay the iz ah 
were six thousand. Our agreement was 
accordingly based on paying sixty thousand 
(dinar]. 
It was therefore agreed that [the people of 
Hfrah] will not violate their compact; that 
they shall not support an unbeliever 
against an Arab or Persian Muslim, and that 
they shall not pass on any intelligence to 
them.... If any of their men become weak 
and old, or inflicted with a disease, or 
was rich and had become poor, the _iizyah_ 
shall be lifted from him and he and his 
family shall be supported by the Public 
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Treasury [bayt mäl al-muslimin] so long as 
he resides in dar al-Islam. If they [the 
men] leave the dar al-Islam. their families 
shall not be supported by the Muslims. If 
any of their slaves adopts Islam, they are 
to be sold with the highest possible price 
and paid to their [Scripturary] masters. 
They the [the Scripturaries] shall have the 
rights to wear any kind of clothes save 
military uniforms, provided their clothes 
shall not be similar to those of the 
Muslims. If any one of them is found to 
wear a uniform, he is to be arrested and to 
give reasons for so doing; if [his answer 
is unsatisfactory] he is to be punished by 
a fine equivalent to the price of his 
uniform. It was agreed that their payment 
[of the iz ah] shall be made to the Public 
Treasury; if they ever need support, it is 
to be given from that Treasury. s19 
This instrument provides us with a couple of rules 
and regulations as to the relationship between the two 
parties. It was agreed that the Christians would have 
to pay iz ah in a collective form rather than on an 
individual basis. So there was no sense of poll-tax 
therein. Although it is based on the number of able- 
bodied men, there was no extra tax imposed either in 
the form of kharä or the like. Non-Muslims also were 
allowed to wear any dress except a military uniform or 
that similar to one of a Muslim. As to the military 
uniform it has become a common rule today that no 
uniform, particularly a military uniform, could be 
worn by any civilian. Therefore, the imposition on 
non-Muslims in this respect is a matter of 
administration rather than bearing any legal 
implication. Moreover, according to the treaty the 
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non-Muslims can preserve and maintain their cultural 
identity against absorption and assimilation with the 
Muslim community. For, Islam did not emerge to 
annihilate cultural identity of any ethnic group of 
non-Muslims so long as they remained outside the realm 
of Islam. This has been the attitude of the Muslims 
and its phenomenon can be seen even in the Muslim 
countries today. 
The treaty also provides that non-Muslims must not 
help the enemies of Muslim army including espionage 
for them. For passing information, in the military 
sense, would mean an act of treason which would 
jeopardise the treaty. The Christians, on the other 
hand, have an equal footing with the Muslims in having 
a social security from a Public Treasury in case they 
need the support. 
3. In the time of 'Umar I, the Patriarch of 
Jerusalem demanded that the treaty of Jerusalem should 
be signed by the Caliph himself rather than by his 
representative. The Caliph agreed and came to 
Jerusalem to sign the treaty. 120 The text of the 
treaty follows: 
In the name of Allah, the Compassionate, 
the Merciful; 
This is what the servant of God 'Umar, 
Commander of the Believers, has guaranteed 
to the people of Iliyd' [Jerusalem]; 
He guaranteed their lives, - property, 
churches and crosses.... 
Their churches will not be dwelt in [by 
foreigners], nor will they be destroyed or 
ruined in any part. Nor will their crosses 
70 
or property [be destroyed]; 
They will not be persecuted for their 
religion, nor will they be molested; 
Jews shall not be allowed to live with them 
in Myra'; 
The inhabitants of Iliyä' shall pay the 
iz ah as much as the inhabitants of 
Madä' in; 
They shall require the Rum [Byzantines] and 
the thieves to leave the city. If they 
leave, they shall be secure in their lives 
and property 
who prefer to stay, 
shall be given security and should accept 
the some obligations as those of the 
inhabitants of Iliy9' concerning the 
iz ah. Those who prefer to go with the Rom 
from among the inhabitants of Iliyd' shall 
be secure in their lives and property, 
[provided] they leave their churches and 
crosses.... 
Those who were in it [the city] from among 
the people of the land [farmers? ], before 
the death of so-and-so shall be allowed, if 
they wish, to stay in the city and shall 
have the same obligations as those of the 
inhabitants of Iliyä' concerning the 
iizyah. Those who prefer to leave with the 
Ram, [may do so ; those who prefer to go to 
their people their land], [may do so] 
until the time of their harvest; 
This document is guaranteed by the 
Assurance of Allah, of His Apostle, of the 
Caliphs and of the believers, if [the 
inhabitants] paid their duties of the 
.1I zyah: Witnesses are: Khälid b. al-Walld, 'Amr b. 
al-'Ac, 'Abd al-Rahmdn b. 'Awf, and 
Mu 'äwiyah b. AbT Suf yän. 
It was written in 15 A. H. ' 2t 
The foregoing treaty as has been seen above 
contains the nature of pledge or guarantees given by 
the Muslim authority to non-Muslim community. The 
treaty speaks more clearly in terms of religious 
freedom and"preserving its institutions. With respect 
to rights and obligations, the Byzantines were treated 
71 
equally with the inhabitants of Jerusalem if they 
chose to stay. Hence, it is a form of a constitutional 
guarantees offered by the Muslims to them. However, 
this treaty, although negotiated and signed like 
others, has two characteristics which make it 
different from others. First, it is designed to be a 
perpetual pact, for as it will be recalled, the 
contract of dhimmah is meant for a permanent one until 
there is an act, from the other party, which could be 
construed as otherwise. Second, from the moment the 
treaty came into force, the dhimmi became subjects of 
the Islamic state and their territory part of dar al- 
Isläm. 122 
Finally, the jurists advise the Muslims, at all 
levels, to regard their treaties, agreements, or even 
promises as religious obligations, binding at all 
times, and should be strictly observed. 123 This is in 
conjuction with the commands of the Qur'dn which 
frequently urges the Muslims to respect and fulfil 
their promises irrespective of the religious 
backgrounds of the people. i24 
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II. Khari (Land Tax) 
A. Basic Notion of Kharä. i 
At the outset we would like to state our position 
clearly that kharä_11 is a land tax. It should not be 
confused with some other formes of taxes in the 
Islamic fiscal system such as 'ushr, fay-', zakät (on 
land products) and the like. In this study, the term 
khar will always be used in its specific sense of 
land tax. In the mean time, we have observed that the 
Qur'an uses the term kharL_i in the sense of tribute, 
wage or reward. 2 So it is a Qur' änic term and it has 
its own significance in the development of Islamic 
law. 
According to the jurists, kharä_1 has two 
distinctive meanings: general and specific. The former 
is general inland revenues that the government 
receives regularly from various sources in the Islamic 
state such as zakdt, Cushr, iz ah, etc. whereas the 
latter is that kind of specific tax which is imposed 
by the authority on the kharä, j land. It is for this 
reason perhaps Mäwerdi def Ines kharä_i 
as something that is imposed on land which has to be 
fulfilled. 3 As for a land to be considered or 
categorize as kharä ]. and it must be, at initial stage 
and primarily, a "conquered land" which the imam 
decided not to divide among the warriors but retained 
in the hands of the original owners for cultivation. 
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In return, the tenant has to pay kharal (tax), for the 
sum agreed upon, to the Muslim Authority. The title to 
the land, however, is alienable with its burden to any 
person without prejudice to one's religious 
background. For kharg is precisely based on the 
nature of the land not the person. It follows that the 
new tenant would continue to pay khardl even after the 
conversion to Islam or even if he is a Muslim. " 
B. The Genesis of Kharä. i 
As in the case of iz ah kherä_i also was not the 
product of Islam. It had existed and been exercised by 
several nations prior to the advent of Islam. It is 
for this reason, perhaps, some writers claimed that 
the term kharäj is not Arabic, but it derived, via 
Syriac, from Greeks Both historians as well as 
jurists report that kharä was, in fact, a common 
practice of the regimes over their conquered 
territories in the east and the west alike. Yahyd b. 
Adam (d. 203/818) on the authority of Hasan b. : ýälih 
(d. 167/783) said: "As to our Sawad, we heard, was in 
the hands of the Nabat, who had been subjugated by the 
Persians to whom they paid Kha ä. The Muslims, when 
they defeated the Persian, left Sawäd and those of the 
Nabat and Diýgän who had not fought the Muslims, in 
the same position; they imposed iz ah surveyed the 
land in their possession and charged khardj on it. Any 
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land not possessed by anyone was seized as safäwi 
(state's land)6 of the imäm. "7 In like manner, Ibn al- 
AthSr has a similar report. But his account was rather 
more specific on the method of collecting kharä . He 
said that the Persian kings before AnQshirwdn had 
levied khar9j on the product of its territory in many 
ways; namely, one-third, one-fourth, one-fifth and 
one-sixth, depending *on its irrigation and 
prosperity. 8 It is reported that the Byzantine empire 
depended largely on land tax. The farmers in the 
Byzantine reign had to pay land tax both in kind and 
in cash. 9 These accounts, reflect a general 
understanding that the regimes would impose a land tax 
as a. main source of its revenues both either for 
administration or for maintaining expenditure or for 
vested interests at the expense of tax payers. 
It was under these circumstances that Islam 
evolved with its land tax. But the historical 
development which gave rise to kharFal is interesting. 
In the time of the Prophet and his first Caliph, AbQ 
Bakr, whenever the Muslims captured the lands, that is 
part of ghanimah, the practice had been that the land 
would be divided among the warriors. Each would have 
his own share depending on the degrees of his 
participation and contribution to the battle; i. e. the 
horse or camel rider would be allocated more than the 
foot soldier unless he voluntarily waived his greater 
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shares. 
In the time of 'Umar I, however, when Muslims took 
over Iraq (sawäd) i0, the land of fertile crescent, and 
its vicinity, the soldiers wanted to have their share 
of the land. But 'Umar I, as a responsible Caliph and 
a man of vision, did not like the idea. Instead he 
made it belong to the entire community (ummah) and 
whoever cultivated it should pay tax (k rä ); apart 
from zakät on the products in case of the cultivator 
being a Muslim. His suggestion however, at the outset, 
created discord among the Companions of the Prophet. 
Finally, 'Umar I managed to convince them after a 
prolong consultation. This conflict of opinions and 
discussions is recorded by many historians, jurists as 
well as in many literary works. Of these, we shall 
reproduce a full account by AbO YusOf: 
He (1-Umar) also consulted them (the 
Companions of the Prophet) about the 
distribution of the lands of Iraq and 
Syria, which God had bestowed on the 
Muslims. Some were of the opinion that the 
land should be distributed. To them 'Umar 
said: What about the future generations of 
Muslims who will find that all the lands 
with the tenants on them are already 
distributed, occupied and inherited? No, 
this is not good advice. When 'Abd al- 
Rahmän b. 'Awf asked: Are not the lands 
with their tenants part of what God has 
bestowed on us? 'Umar replied: Yes, but I 
do not see it from this angle. By God! It 
may be that after me there will be no more 
great conquests or perhaps such as will be 
only a burden. If I distribute now the 
lands of Iraq and Syria with their tenants, 
who will sustain the frontier settlements? 
And who will care for the children and 
widows of Iraq and Syria? Those in favour 
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of distribution, however insisted and 
asked: Do you want to create a trust of 
what God bestowed on us for fighting with 
our swords, in favour of people who did not 
participate in the war and were not present 
at the battles, and in favour of their 
children and grandchildren: When CUmar did 
not change his mind they asked him to 
consult the early Emigrants. 'Abd al-Rahmen 
b. 'Awf was of the opinion that the lands 
should be distributed but 'Uthmdn, 'Ali, 
Talhah and Ibn 'Umar agreed with 'Urrar. He 
then sent for ten of the Companions (al- 
anýär) five from the tribe of al-'Aws and 
five from al-Khazraj, from among the oldest 
and noblest of them. When they come he said 
to them: I troubled you to come because I 
want you to share with me the 
responsibility of administering your 
affairs. I am one of you and you are here 
to declare justly what your opinion is, be 
it against me or with me, as I want you to 
be objective. You have God's book speaking 
the truth and by God I want only justice 
and truth. There are those people who 
accuse me that I want unjustly to deprive 
. them of their rights. May God protect me 
from depriving someone of what belongs to 
him by giving it to another. This would 
make me very miserable. However, I think 
that there is nothing more to capture after 
the Persians lands and their tenants. I 
have distributed the movable spoils of war 
amongst those entitled to them after 
deducting the fifth and allotting it where 
it belongs. I thought, however, that I 
should not distribute the lands with their 
tenants, but rather leave them as a trust 
and impose on the lands the kharäi tax and 
on the men the iz a to constitute a 
permanent income for the Muslim soldiers, 
their children and future generations. Do 
you not think that the frontier settlements 
need soldiers in their garrison, or that 
places like Syria, al-Jazirah, al-Kuifah, 
al-Basrah and Egypt need not troops in 
their barracks? From where will all those 
troops get their pay if we distribute the 
lands with their tenants? Thereupon they 
(Companions) said: You are rightt If all 
the frontier settlements and those places 
are not provided with troops and their 
needs, the enemy will recapture them. 'Umar 
then asked them to propose someone of sound 
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Judgement and intelligence for the task of 
organizing a survey of the lands and their 
tenants. When they agreed on 'Uthmän b. 
Hunayf1' as a man of vision, brain and 
experience, he was sent to survey the lands 
of al-Sawäd.... 12 
C. Legal Basis of Kharä 1 
From the consultation of 'Umar I with some 
Companions of the Prophet and thereafter led to their 
agreement, we can say that kharäi was initially the 
decision and i_itihäd of 'Umar I. Since his iltihäd has 
been approved and agreed by the Companions of the 
Prophet, with the exceptional of a few Companions such 
as Biläl and 4Abd al-Rahman b. 'Awf, 'Umar I therefore 
has set aside the existing practice of distributing 
the conquered lands among the soldiers. Apart from a 
collective decision in the case of kharä. i, the Caliph 
also set a new precedence regarding the conquered 
lands which ever since constitutes a clear policy for 
subsequent Muslim rulers to deal with the lands 
acquired by force. This sort of land reforms however, 
is not without legal basis. In fact, the concept of 
k arä is manifest in the interest (ma5lahah) of the 
ummah as well as i m66 (consensus). 
1. Public Interests (Ma$l a }ah 
In Islamic legal theory, the head of state, in the 
course of resolving the issues before him, the 
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interest of the public outweighs individual's 
interest. It could be said therefore that Islamic 
law, theoretically speaking tends to favour public 
rather than individual interests. This tendency 
however should not be understood as the will of 
majority always prevails. It is precisely under this 
principle that make 'Umar I reluctant to divide Sawäd 
land. He was in the opinion that it is a matter of 
interests of the umma , especially later generations, 
not to distribute the lands among the fighters. The 
interests can be enumerated as follows: 
a. Guarantee Regular Income 
'Umar foresaw the future generations would 
probably facing difficulty in running and maintaining 
governmental agencies without having a regular flow of 
income in the State Treasury (Bayt-al Mäl). Some 
Muslims would even be deprived of their rights to 
living should the conquered lands be distributed. 
Therefore, arä certainly could answer the 
foreseeable problems. This rationale can be seen from 
'Umar' s words "What about the future generations of 
Muslims who will find that all the lands with its 
tenants on them are already distributed, occupied and 
inherited? No, this is not a good advice. "13 
It is natural that with the expansion of new 
territories there would be, certainly, more respon- 
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sibilities and more burdens to be reckoned with. At 
times, while dealing with those predicaments, the 
authority would encounter with a serious financial 
problem if all those lands had been distributed; hence 
no regular income from those lands for the state. It 
deems therefore vital for the state in order to run 
its machinery and to defend its territories to have a 
regular income from those lands in the form of khard t 
and the like as 'Umar has said while defending his 
position, "If I distribute now the lands of Iraq and 
Syria with their tenants, who will sustain the 
frontier settlements? And who will care for the 
children and widows of Iraq and Syria? "t" Indeed, 
guarding the frontiers, offering security for the 
youngsters and planting hopes for the widows and 
others are vital interests (maclahah) of the umma . 
For the survival of the ummah mainly depends on the 
integrity of the society. There can be no integrity of 
the society if there is one or two groups in the 
society had been ignored and deprived of their rights. 
There is a report attributed to 'Umar I that he 
says: "If it is not for later generations, I would 
distribute every town (place) that I have conquered as 
the Prophet had done to khaybar. But I would rather 
leave it as a treasure so that they can share it. 1115 
When 4Amr conquered Egypt, al-Zubayr demanded that 
the lands be distributed, '& 'Amr refused to distribute 
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until he received an instruction from the Caliph 'Umar 
I, the Caliph says leave it as it is. AbO 'Ubayd 
comments that (-Umar wanted it to be a trust for the 
Muslims to be inherited from generation to generation 
so that it becomes a source of strength for them. 17 
b. Distribution of Wealth to All Sectors 
It seems to be that if the practice of 
distributing the conquered lands continues, the wealth 
would circulate among a limited few, who have a means 
to join the battle, hence it would create a wealthy 
group, though it is not against the Islamic teachings, 
in the community; 1& whereas those who do not join the 
battle, or who came later would remain in hardship. 
This situation would be seen as unhealthy especially 
in the community which is still in the forming stage. 
Such a situation would also be incompatible with the 
spirit of the Qur' sin which says: 
That which Allah giveth as spoil unto His 
messenger from the people of the townships, 
it is for Allah and his messenger and for 
the near of kin and the orphans and the 
needy and the wayfarer, that it become not 
a commodity (circuit) between the rich 
among you. 19 
It was also fear that if the distribution continues, 
it would corrupt and deviate the motivation of the 
Muslims in fighting to seek material gains rather than 
for the specific course. 
Abo 'Ubayd reports that when Mu'ädh b. Jabal sees 
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some Companions keep asking GUmar to distribute the 
lands he says to 'Umar: "By God! then it would happen 
what we do not like. If you divide the lands, it 
incomes (benefits) will fall in the hands of a few. 
Then later people come, who would need some help, but 
find nothing. Therefore, look for an alternative that 
would accord both the first and the later 
generations. "2 0 
c. Continuous Cultivation of the Lands 
It is the intention of 'Umar I in his decision of 
kharra that the lands should remain in constant used, 
be it cultivated or otherwise, by its previous owners. 
This is because, generally speaking, its owners would 
be more experience and efficient in manipulating it as 
'Umar I says: "They would be land's developers, they 
have more experience and more energetic. "21 For being 
the owners, they know the lands better in terms of its 
soil, fertility and suitability to grow a crop on it. 
At any rate, the question of land exploitation 
should be dealt with in a separate subject. But 
suffice it to say here that in Islam one should 
exploit his lands at its maximum. It falls under a 
broad concept of al-tashkTr (subservient) and 
jstikhläf. (viceroyship) that God has given it to 
mankind. 22 It is pertinent that every man should use 
his land by all means available to him. There should 
82 
be no excuse for not using it under the pretext of 
busy with some other engagements or lack of experience 
or the like. This is true even using the expertise and 
fac. lities of non-Muslims. 
When the Prophet conquered Khaybar, there was not 
enough man power to exploit the lands. The Prophet 
handed it over to non-Muslims to use. The cultivators 
receive half of its crops. 23 CUmar therefore followed 
the same policy in leaving the lands under its 
previous owners for cultivation but he charged them 
kharg. 
So far we have seen the elements of public 
interests in the implementation of kharä. i both for 
Islam and Muslims, viz. a regular flow of incomes to 
the Public Treasury to be spent for the Muslim 
community, i. e. preparation for the army, defence the 
boarders, building infrastructure and realization of 
the concept of t akdf ul ilt imä'i (mutual or joint 
responsibility). It also manifests in a fair 
distribution of wealth in the society so that the 
wealth can be enjoyed by all, at all times, and 
finally, the lands in question continued to be 
exploited by the experts without interruption. It is 
one way of contributing to a state and society at one 
time. 
Moreover, AbQ Ynsuf himself explains those 
interests as follows: ' GUmar' s decision not to 
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distribute the lands amongst those who captured it was 
guided by God from what is written in His Book. It was 
of benefit to all Muslims. His decision in collecting 
kharä and distributing it amongst the Muslims was of 
a general interests for the public. For, had it not 
been for making a trust to be used for the payments of 
pensions and wages, there would be no troops in the 
frontier settlements, no sufficient armies to march 
for ii häd, and no security against the recapture of 
their towns by the armies. But God knows best. "2 " 
2. Consensus_ (11mal-) 
As we all aware that mä' is one of the main 
sources of Islamic law after the Qur' do and the 
sunnah. It operates in the form of i_itihäd, initially, 
by individual scholar or groups of scholars on certain 
legal issues. If that issue, which had been agreed 
upon, has no disagreement from another authority, it 
could be said that the issue in question enjoys a 
consensus from the community. In short, consensus 
means a unanimous opinions of the scholars on certain 
legal issues at any given time. 25 It should be noted 
that the issue in question must be the subject of 
iit1h8d, that is to say, it is absent from the text of 
the Qur'gn and the Tradition and it had not been 
resolved before. 
Bearing those points in mind, it is obvious that 
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kharä had never been the subject of ijtihäd. It was 
the idea of 'Umar I. as has been pointed out earlier. 
When CUmar forwarded his arguments, he managed to 
direct the attention of the Companions to his 
standpoint on certain aspects of public interests 
(maslahah) from the implementation of kharä_i. As a 
result, all Companions including those who opposed 
him, unanimously said, "The decision is yours, well 
judged! If all the frontier settlements and those 
places are not provided with troops and their needs, 
the enemy will capture them. 1026 It was an explicit 
support from the Companions including those who 
disagreed with him. Therefore, legally speaking, the 
legislation of khar9l. enjoys a consensus of the 
Companions of the Prophet. 
From what has been discussed above, we can 
conclude that the legislation of k rä , in the time 
of 'Umar, has its legal basis from the public 
interests and consensus. So the decision was not 
foreign to the principle of Islamic law. One may 
rightly ask however as to whether the act of 'Umar 
would not conflict with the practice (sunn ) or well 
established principle set by the Prophet and had been 
properly followed by his first Caliph. 27 This legal 
question should be construed thoroughly in the light 
of the socio-political economy of the time. According 
to Islamic legal theory the ruler has the power to 
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amend the rule in accordance with the public interests 
or to prevent the harm to society so long as it does 
not conflict with the general principles of the law. 
It falls under the general principle of tagheyyur al- 
ahkäm tab'an li taghayyur al-maralahah (changing the 
rules [law] in accordance with the changing of the 
interest). 28 In so doing, the jurists thus formulated 
a legal maxim such as "The act of imäm (for the 
people) dependent on maslahah (interest). 29 The case 
in point, 'Umar I as a ruler was of the opinion that 
public interests in his times requires that the 
frontiers, the orphans, and the widows should have the 
priorities and centres of attention from the state 
rather than the fighters who perhaps already received 
some fortunes from elsewhere. It was probable that 
those priorities were not immediate in the times of 
the Prophet as the community was not so complex and 
the borders were not so immense. But those situations 
have changed in the time of 'Umar I. All these 
considerations, inter alia, contributed to CUmar's 
decision. 
Although the theory above is correct and 
applicable to khar5 , it seems that 'Umar's decision 
has its legal basis from the sources of Islamic law as 
has been elaborated earlier. Therefore the decision of 
khar8 was not an application of the rule of changing 
the rules [law] under the changing of rnaclahah_ 
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(times). 
On the other hand, al-Ghazäll (d. 505/1111), a 
Shafi 'i jurist, invoked the legal principle of public 
interests (al-masälih al-murs-ilah) as a legal basis 
for the legislation of kharä. i. 30 This technical term 
connotes to the needs and general interests of the 
public, at any given time, where no specific 
injunctions could be derived from both the Qur'än and 
the sun a. But social needs and the interests of the 
ummah require the need for such an injunction. 31 
Thereafter, al-Shä&ibf (d. 790/1388), a Mdlikf jurist, 
held the same view as Ghazali's and accepted the 
legislation of kharal as an instance of the 
application of the principle of discretionary 
interests. 32 It is on the basis of this legal 
principle that the imäm has the authority to levy any 
new tax within the bounds of the interests of the 
Muslim community, hence k ark is an instance of this 
general rule. The payment of such taxes was regarded' 
as obligatory just as were the basic fiscal duties 
laid down by the Qur'an and the sunnah. Therefore, 
some contemporary Muslim jurists divide Islamic fiscal 
obligations into two categories; namely the Divine 
obligations (wä_iibät ilähiyyah) and discretionary 
obligations (wdlibät i. itihädiyyah). While kharä_1_ 
represents the latter, Gushr was regarded as an 
instance of the former. 33 It should be noted here that 
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there are substantial differences between the two 
categories because unlike discretionary duties, the 
Divine duties entail the elements of worship and 
devot _on. 
Thus, non-Muslims are not expected to 
perform those duties. 
D. Classification of Lands in Respect of Kharä. i . 
According to Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyyah, there are 
six categories of lands in respect of the rule of 
kharä :3" 
1. Land which the Muslims revive it (ihyä' ahe), 
after it had been uncultivated and "dead", and bring 
it to life by an active use of it. In juristic sense, 
this means that the employment of some efforts in 
order to make the unused lands become active lands; 
thus acquiring propriety rights over it. 3S The revived 
land is to be classified as Cushr land. Therefore, no 
kha ä (tax) would be levied on it. This is the 
opinions of all schools; 36 
2. Land whose owner voluntarily converts to Islam 
without using force. In this case, the ownership to 
the land is continue to be vested in him. There is 
also no k ark but Gushr would be collected from him 
since the Muslim pays 'ushr as a form of akät. This 
is the case of land ownership in Medina, Yemen, Tdif 
etc. after the conversion of their owners. 37 Mdwardi 
says that this category, according to Shaf i'S school, 
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was regarded as 'ushr lands and no kharä. i could be 
imposed on it. But Abo IHanffah held that the imäm 
still can decide whether to classify as kharä. i or 
'ushr. Once he decides it to be kharä. i. it could never 
be changed to cushr again. But the 'ushr is always 
changeable to kharä_; 3a 
3. Land which is acquired from non-Muslims by 
force (Ganwatan we a an). There are two opinions 
regarding this category. 39 One says that this land has 
become ghanimah (spoils of war). Therefore, it should 
be divided among the fighters as in the case of 
movable properties. The status of the land itself 
however is 'ushr proper not kh rä . It is just the 
land in the first category. 40 On the contrary, the 
other opinion held that the imäm has the right to 
choose (khiyär). He can either divide it hence, the 
land become 'ushr not khar5i: or he can also make it 
as a trust and charges kharä on it. In this case, 
khardl is considered as a rent for an unspecific 
period (of times). The land would be 'ushr and kharral 
at the same time, 41 namely, if it continues under 
non-Muslim hands, it would be liable for 1harr not 
'ushr regardless of whether he exploits the land or 
not. If he converts to Islam, kharä still continues 
to be charged, and 'us r would also be added. Thus, 
k rd and 1-us r would meet at the same time, on the 
same person, for two different reasons: the nature of 
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the land and being a Muslim. This is the majority 
view. On the other hand, Aba HanTfah maintains that 
kharä and 'ushr could not meet at the same time. It 
must be either one. 42 Ibn Qayyim says that this 
opinion apparently influenced by the false (batil) 
Tradition which says that, "There will be no kharal 
and 'ushr at one time; "43 
4. Land on which non-Muslims have made a peace 
agreement with Muslims. By virtue of the agreement, 
the land continues to be under non-Muslims possession 
in exchange for k arä . This kharä_i is, in fact, 
iz ah. This tax would be exempted should the 
proprietors become Muslims. However, the proprietor is 
at liberty to sell or lease together with its burden. 
The case will be different if the new buyer is a 
Muslim; 44 
5. Land whose owners fled without fighting. The 
rule of 'anwatan would be applied to this land, that 
is to say, it becomes wa! qf (not to be distributed) and 
kharä would be imposed on it. The status of land 
would never be changed whether it then falls under the 
hands of Muslims or non-Muslims. The imposed kharä_1 is 
regarded as rent. According to Ahmad b. Hanbal this 
category is fay' 45 and 
6. Land whose owners have transfered its title to 
the Muslims in the agreement. But the land is still in 
the hands of its previous owners for use and they pay 
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kharä from it. It is just like the case of the land 
that its owners have fled away, i. e. the rule of 
'anwatan is also applicable here. Conversion does not 
affect its status. The lease-holder, however, 
is 
alienable but not the title, so the new holder has the 
right to use it as he deems fit and proper. If the 
holder has become a dhimml. he then would pay iz ah 
and khar8 respectively. "6 
E. Category of Kharä_i 
There are two kinds of khard : 
1. Kharäi wazffah (Kharä1 on Land and Produce) 
This is the kind that the authority imposed in 
respect of the size of the lands and the kind of crops 
(product) from the individual piece of land. The tax 
becomes obligatory on the land holder after the land 
had been made available to him even though he does not 
actually cultivate it. This is because the land was 
under his disposal. The fact that he leaves the land 
idle is not an excuse for not paying harä . This is 
what 'Umar I had done to the land of al-sawäd in Iraq. 
He left the land to its previous owners and charged 
for every iarfb'7 of fertile land one a iz of the 
crops grown and one dir am for every jar lb of 
cucumber (or vegetables) five dirhams, and for every 
18r Tb of vineyard (grapes) ten dirhams. It is reported 




when GUmar charged these rates of 
2. Kharäi al-Mugäsamah (the Proportionate Khar&1) 
This kind of khar8_1 is levied on the proportional 
production of the land. For instance, it may be 
charged one-fourth, one-fifth, one-sixth or the 
like. 49 This means that the rate of khar&1 depends 
solely on the productivity of the lands itself. If the 
lands could not be used for reasons of war, flood, 
drought etc., the holder is not required to pay any 
kharä . At this point, it differs 
from wazifah in the 
sense that the latter its kharä_1 becomes mandatory 
when the land was made available to him regardless 
whether he cultivates the land or not. It was this 
kind of ark that the Prophet concluded with the 
people of Khaybar. 50 While kharä1 al-wafizah is only 
collected once a year, al-mugdsamah may well be 
collected several times a year depending on the 
frequencies of the crops and its seasons. It should be 
noted here that kaä may be paid in kind or in value 
as in the case of iz ah. 
F. Is the Rate of Kharä_i Changeable? 
Shdfi 'i and Hanbalt jurists held that the rate of 
kharA to be charged on the lands is subject to imäm's 
decision and his i. itih9d. 51 It is by no means could be 
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fixed a standard rate for all cases; rather, it varied 
from region to region depending on the condition of 
the land in question. It follows that the Muslim 
autt rity does not have to stick to what 
'Umar I had 
charged in his time. It may be increased or decreased. 
All it needs to do is to see the "potentiality and 
capability" of the lands to bear kharal as 'Umar I 
did 
to Iraq and others. This position is supported by the 
reports that when Iludhayfah b. al-Yamdn and 'Uthmän 
b. 
Hunayf conducted a survey of al-saw9d and charged the 
amount of k ark on 'Umar's order, the Caliph asked 
them: "Perhaps you charged it more than it could 
bear? " They said: "No, we just charged it according to 
its capacity. "5 2 This means that the amount of kaä 
to be charged is based on its capability. 
At any rate, before deciding the rate, the 
authority should always bear in mind several factors, 
to mention a few, the fertility of the land, the 
kinds of crops grown, a pro rata increase in prices, a 
cost of production, means of irrigation, whether the 
land is easily reached, the distance from town and 
market etc. These are factors, inter-alia. that the 
authority should take into consideration in the course 
of charging arä . S3 The authority also, in imposing 
ark , should overlook the lease-holder's socio- 
religious backgrounds. For, those elements should play 
no part in imposing kharä regardless of whether the 
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holders are Muslims or non-Muslims, friends or foes. 
The rule is therefore consistency and just to all. 
It could be concluded therefore that the rate of 
kharä is changeable. It is the subject of imäm's 
decision whether to increase or decrease it depending 
on the capability (al-jdgah) of the land in question. 
AbO YQsuf in upholding this position says that when 
'Umar I imposed kharä. i he did not say that this is 
what 'Umar charged khars to the people of kharä. i. the 
amount is fixed for them, thus neither 'Umar nor the 
" Caliph after 'Umar can increase or decrease it. 5 It 
seems that since the rate of kharal is determined on 
the basis of the capability of the land itself, it is 
logical therefore that the more the land is capable 
the higher the amount of kharäi is and vice versa. 
G. Conversion and Khardl 
We have pointed out earlier that khark is 
collected from the owner of the land whether the owner 
is a man, a woman or a minor. At this point, kharä. i is 
rather difference from iz ah, For k arä is simply a 
tax on land not on the person per se as in the case of 
jizyah . It is a tax on active and cultivated land 
regardless of who the entrepreneur is. When 'Umar I 
introduced khar8l he charged it on all owners. ss If 
the land has been used for a dwelling place, that 
portion of the land would not be charged khar& . This 
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is the position of Mdwardf5' and it is in line with 
the act of 'Umar I when he only collected kharäi from 
the cultivated land and exempted it from the dwelling 
spaces of a dhimmf. 57 
As regards the owner becoming Muslim, the jurists 
are not in agreement. Hanaff jurists held that the 
conversion of the owner has no effect on paying 
kharg . By contrast, Malik contended that kharä 
should be exempted. He maintained that khar6_1 is just 
like z ah which would be exempted by conversion. But 
Hanaff jurists argued that kharä. i is imposed initially 
on the product of cultivated land, as in the case of 
'ushr. The fact that he becomes a Muslim will not 
change, the original status of the land. This position 
is supported by the report that 'Abd Allah b. Mas 'Qd, 
al-H, asan b. 'Alf, and Shurayt? paid kharäi from their 
lands in Iraq. 58 It seems that Shäficl holds the same 
view as the Hanaf fs. S9 The same opinion was expressed 
by Hanbalite jurists. 60 It seems that this position is 
more relevant to the spirit of khar$ . It can not be 
compared with -iizyah as 
has been contended by Malik. 
For, k arä is, in fact, a fiscal tax on land which 
had been conquered by force. The kharä. i paid by the 
entrepreneurs, however, should be treated as rent 
notwithstanding that it has substantial differences 
with the law of rent (al-i_iärah) in Islamic law. 61 It 
should be borne in mind that religious differences has 
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nothing to do with paying rent. 
To support the above view there are several 
reports pertaining to the point. For instance, Yahyä 
b. Adam records that in the time of CUmar Ia man came 
and said to him: "I have turned Muslim, could you 
relieve me from paying khar&_1? " 'Umar replied: "Your 
land had been taken by force. ""2 This means that the 
criterion is the manner by which the land was acquired 
not by the faith of the people. It was reported that 
CAII had taken the same position when he was 
approached for the same purpose. 63 GAli says to those 
who have turned Muslims: "If you keep your lands you 
should pay what you used to pay otherwise we will take 
the lands from you. "64 
Another disagreement arises among the jurists as 
to whether a kb-ar-AJ--payer. after becoming a Muslim, or 
even a Muslim who cultivates kharä -land, should also 
pay, in addition to k arä 'ushr (tithe). Aba Hanifah 
and his Companions contended that there should be no 
double tax levied on the same land. It follows that if 
a Muslim cultivates k ar- -land, he should only pay 
khar8 and no Gushr would be imposed on him from the 
crops. "s But the majority of jurists, such as Malik, 
Thawrl, Awz6'i, Shdf i'i, and Abo Thawr maintain that 
he should pay both khar9l and 'ushr. 66 There should be 
no confusion between the two taxes; this is because 
kha S is a tax on the specific land, for its own 
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nature, whereas 'ushr is a adagah 
(a kind of zakdt ). 
Under no circumstances would the Muslim be exempted 
from zakät. It is a religious duty as well as the 
"financial worship" ('ibädah mältyyah). In upholding 
the majority's opinion, Abo 'Ubayd says that it was 
alleged that both 'Umar I and 'Ali did not mention 
about 'ushr when the Dingän 
(people of sawed) embraced 
Islam. b' The fact that 'Umar I and 'A11 did not 
mention it, according to AbQ 'Ubayd, is not sufficient 
to suggest that Gushr was precluded from them. For, 
'ushr is well established rule and it is an obligatory 
on every individual Muslim except when one does not 
meet its requirements. This principle is widely 
understood and self-explanatory. When the Prophet 
says: "Whoever revives dead land, it would belong to 
him. "66 The Prophet also did not mention "provided 
that he pays 'ushr. " Taking the meaning of that 
Tradition, no authority rejects the Gushr over that 
case, says AbO 'Ubayd. 69 
Finally, we can conclude that the conversion of 
dhimmi to Islam does not exempt him from paying kharä 
provided that the land under his possession is of 
khargi in nature. The conversion also would entail 
double taxation on the same person over the same land. 
This rule also applies to Muslims who cultivate 
kag -land. 
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H. Expenditure of Khardl Revenues 
In terms of expenditure, the jurists have not set 
a clear demarcation line between kharäl and fay' as in 
t case of fay' zakät and ghanfmah. 70 For the 
expenditure of fay' is totally subject to, with due 
regards to the prescribed shares in the Qur'än, the 
personal legal judgements of imäm provided that the 
decision is for the interests of the community 
according to its scale of priorities. As for zak8t it 
is to be expended according to the prescription of the 
" verse of Sadagah (alms-giving) which reads: "The alms 
are only for the poor and the needy, 71 and those who 
collect them, and those whose hearts are to be 
reconciled, 72 and to free the captives and the 
debtors, and for the cause of God, and (for) the 
wayfarers; a duty imposed by God. God is Knower and 
Wise. "73 As for the expenditure of khar6j according 
to the prevailing view, it should be used on the 
common interests of the Muslim community such as: 
1. The strengthening of the religious activities 
('imärah al-Oa), i. e. building the mosques, and other 
religious institution, commanding goods and forbidding 
evils; 
2. The strengthening of the army and the 
protection of the frontiers; 
3. Paying the salaries of the government 
officials, the army, judges, jurist-consults, and 
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collector of khar§_1: 
4. Building infrastructures viz. roads, bridges, 
dams, and restitution of rivers; 
5. Pensions for judges and those who in charge of 
religious functions; and 
6. Any expenditure that the imam deems fit and 
proper according to the exigencies of the times. 74 
According to Awzä'1 (d. 157/773), the early jurist 
of Syria, 'Umar I and the Companions of the Prophet 
have made fay, and kharä for the sole use of the 
army. So it became the established precedent for 
subsequent rulers. 75 Some HanbalS jurists however held 
that khard is to be expended as fay' . In other words, 
it is for the Muslims rich and poor alike. It appears 
that this is also the position of al-Hasan b. ! ýäliI? 
and Shäf i'i. 76 It is clear therefore that kharal 
revenues are to be expended for the interests of the 
Muslim community. As for the means and ways of 
expending it, it is agreed that it should rest on the 
discretionary power of the imam in accordance with his 
personal legal judgement (i_itihäd). Since the decision 
to apply the rule of kharL. i itself belonged to him, so 
it is appropriate and logical therefore that the 
decision to use kharä_i revenues should also belong to 
him. 
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I. Purchasing of Kharäi Land 
As has been discussed above, khar&_i-land occupies 
a special position in Islamic law. It unique position 
reflects the fact that although the land belongs to 
the ummah (state), jurists as well as historians still 
refer to the land-holders as owners. 77 This is because 
some of them were the previous owners before their 
lands was declared kharä , after it had been 
conquered, and they were permitted to continue holding 
the lands. 78 Others were new holders (owners), whether 
they were Muslims or non-Muslims, taking possession 
with the consent of the Muslim authority. 
However, according to the Islamic law of contract, 
kharä j-holder, in theory, by no means can sell or 
transfer the title of the land without the agreement 
of the authority; since he is only a lessee, or merely 
a de facto owner. It is an established legal principle 
that one can not engage in any transaction over the 
property which does not legally belongs to him. This 
complex legal question has led to differences of 
opinions among the jurists who were trying to resolve 
and justify its position in accordance with the 
Islamic legal point of view. It is beyond the scope of 
this inquiry to discuss that question. 
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III. 'Ushr (Tithe ) 
A. Basic Notion of 'Ushr 
The tenth or tithe is imposed as a financial 
obligation on the property which dhimmi or musta'min 
used for trade. It is a trade-tax which is levied only 
when the goods are transported from one country to 
the other whithin the Islamic state. The rate charged 
for the dhimmi is a half-tenth. ' As for the musts' min 
the tax is levied on the goods imported into the 
Islamic state for trade purposes. The rate was, as a 
general rule, a tenth though, for musta' min, it may 
be increased or decreased depending on the rule of 
reciprocal treatment. 2 It is also levied on a Muslim, 
at the quarter of the tenth, on the trade commodities 
when goods are crossing from one region to the 
other within the Islamic state. But for the Muslim 
this tax is considered as zak6t proper. 3 It is charged 
on all kinds of merchandise whether it is textiles, 
livestock, including pigs and liquor, or grain. ' 
However, the goods must reach a specific amount of 
value (niräb), as in the case of zakät. in order to be 
liable to taxation. The taxable amount was fixed at 
the value of every two hundred dirhams or twenty 
mithgdl (in gold). Therefore, the chargeable amount 
will be five dirham for the Muslims, ten for the 
di ml and twenty for arbf respectively. 5 The 
majority of the jurists held that it is to be charged 
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once a year regardless of the frequency of the 
crossing by the same merchant. ° But Mäliki and Hijäzi 
jurists contend that it is to be charged for every 
crossing. For, to them, the tax is not to be 
considered as and should not take the rule of alms- 
giving. ' In like manner, the musts' min will definitely 
be charged for every new entry into the Islamic state 
provided that the goods are of chargeable value. 6 
B. The Legitimacy of 'Ushr. 
In fact, this kind of tax had prevailed in Arabia 
and the surrounding areas before the advance of Islam. 
It was imposed by several rulers for a variety of 
reasons. 9 It was not known in Islam, however, until 
the time of CUmar I. 10 This is, perhaps, because there 
was no need for such a tax in the early stage of the 
Islamic state. 11 
The jurists are of the opinions that there are two 
legal basis for the imposition of 'us r: namely the 
practice (sunnah) of 'Umar I and the consensus of the 
Companions. It was reported that cUmar I appointed 
both Anas b. M9lik and Ziyäd b. i; iudayr to collect 
Gus r from the merchants when they crossed the 
checking point. 12 Anas says: "The Caliph instructed 
me to collect from the Muslims the quarter of the 
tenth, from the dhimmi the half of the tenth, and 
from the barbi the tenth respectively. "is The fact 
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that the said appointment occurred coupled with the 
instruction from 'Umar I, in the presence and 
acknowledged by the Companions, was sufficient for the 
act to be considered as a consensus of the Companions. 
There was no dissenting opinion reported. 14 The act 
therefore constituted legal basis and set a precedent 
for a subsequent Muslim authority to follow its 
rule-15 
On the other hand, there was no agreement among 
the jurists as for the justification of the tax as 
well as the rate collected from dhimmi. AbU 'Ubayd 
says that it is to be implied from the peace 
agreement. 16 For the dhimmi' was neither Muslim nor 
barbi where the former is charged for the rate of 
zakat whereas the latter is charged for the reciprocal 
basis which could be less or more depending on their 
charge on the Muslim traders. '? AbU 'Ubayd concluded: 
"I think that 'Umar I took from the dhimml (merchants) 
in accordance with the term of agreement. Thus, it 
became the right of the Muslims over them. "Is On the 
contrary, when Ibn Shihäb al-Zuhrf (d. 124/741), a 
tabi'i jurist, was asked as to why 'Umar I charged 
the tithe from the dhimmi, replied that the practice 
had existed since pre-Islamic time, so the Caliph 
decided to retain it for the interest of the Islamic 
state. But Abn 'Ubayd preferred the first view which 
was also the opinion of Malik. t9 Hanaft jurists, 
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however, explain that the tax is levied in return for 
the protection of the goods as the needs of the dhimmi 
merchant for protection is more obvious than the 
Muslims because the threat to the goods of the dhimmi 
is more likely to happen than that of the Muslims. 20 
It is also argued that in doing the trade the dhimmis 
have used all facilities including infrastructures 
provided by the state. it, therefore, would be 
reasonable if they could contribute to the state some 
of their profits from the trade. 21 
These various justifications and views given by 
the jurists was, in fact, are the result of no 
specific text dealing with the matter. It was rather 
the act of 'Umar I based on his i_itihäd for the 
interest that he perceived, in his time, in accordance 
with the rule of al-siyasah al-shar'Iyyah (Islamic 
rules of polity). 22 
Perhaps the acceptable interpretation of the tax 
is the one given by Zayddn who says that the dhimmi 
has no financial obligation on his property except on 
the one used for trade. 23 Apart from that, there is 
no financial burden on his property whether on the 
property uses for trade within his own region or on 
any other income from livestock, grains etc. This is 
not the case of the Muslim where he has to pay zakät 
on almost any kind of his property when the value 
reaches the taxable amount. 24 The iz h imposed on 
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the dhimmi however is by no means parallel to zakät 
in terms of its requirements and amounts. The same 
applies to kharä where the payment or the burden is 
on the land rather than on the person, so that, in 
some cases, the Muslims are included. 25 
In conclusion, it can be said that the jurists 
agreed that the dhimmi has to pay 'ushr on his trade 
property when it crosses one region to the other; but 
for the immovable property, is not subject to 
taxation. That was the state of the affairs in the 
Islamic state. If, for one reason or another, the 
situation of the dhimml is changed, where he has to 
pay tax equally on all kinds of his properties like 
the Muslims, then both dhimmi and Muslims will be 
paying the same amount of tax. 26 For the state may 
decide, its taxation policy, in accordance with its 
need which varies from time to time. At times, GUmar 
I, as reported by Abü 'Ubayd, reduced the rate to half 
if the musta' min carries the food-staffs to Medina in 
order to encourage the merchants to bring more food to 
Medina. 27 This is a clear illustration of the changing 
policy in accordance to the needs and the interest of 
the state. 
IV. Observance of Some Aspects of Islamic law 
Besides financial obligation, a dhimmr. as well 
as, musts' min are required to observe some aspects of 
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Islamic law. For by virtue of the contract, the dhimmi 
has become an integral part of the Islamic state. 
Hence, he is expected to abide by the Islamic law 
except in certain cases involving the beliefs and the 
freedom to practise them. I For instance, he is not 
required to pay alms-giving or participate in ii had or 
any other similar instances which involve purely 
religious or ritual in nature. By the same token, the 
dhimmi is free to perform whatever act allowable 
according to his religion though the same act is 
prohibited, by Islam, for the Muslims such as 
consuming pork, wine, or the like. 2 The same is true 
with regards to his practices in religion and personal 
laws concerning marriages, divorce etc. For the 
position of Islam, in this respect, is clear in a 
maxim which says: "Leave them with whatever they 
believe. 113 Hence, in no case, can the Muslim authority 
intervene in this domain of the so-called "social and 
religious autonomy of the Protected People. "" 
Nevertheless, if a dhimmi takes his case to the Muslim 
court, in these matters, the Muslim judge has no 
choice but to hear the case and judge among them 
according to the provision of the Islamic laws For it 
is inconceivable for the Muslim court to rule with 
the law, if any, of the non-Muslims. 6 The Qur'an has 
instructed 
"So judge between them by that which God 
hath revealed, and follow not their 
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desires, but beware of them lest they 
seduce thee from some part of that which 
God hath revealed unto thee.... "? 
However, some jurists held that the Muslim judge, 
in this case, can either rule or disclaim 
jurisdiction. This option was based on the following 
injunctions: 
If then they have recourse unto thee 
(Mub}ammad), judge between them or disclaim 
jurisdiction. If thou disclaimest 
jurisdiction, then they can not harm thee 
at all. But if thou judgest, judge between 
them with equity. Lo! God loveth the 
equitable. 
How come they unto thee for judgement when 
they have the Torah, wherein God hath 
delivered judgement (for them)? Yet even 
after that they turn away. Such (folk) are 
not believers. 
Lot We did reveal the Torah, wherein is 
guidance and a light, by which the Prophets 
who surrendered (unto God) judged the Jews 
and the rabbis and the priests (judged) by 
such of God's Scripture as they were bidden 
to observe, and thereunto were they 
witnesses. So fear not mankind, but fear 
Me. And barter not my revelations for a 
little gain. Whoso judgeth not by that 
which God hath revealed: such are 
disbelievers. 
Let the People of the Gospel judge by that 
which God hath revealed therein. Whoso 
judgeth not by that which God hath 
revealed; such are evil-livers. 8 
From these verses, two principles are explicitly 
established namely: judicial autonomy is prescribed 
for non-Muslim subjects according to their respective 
religions; and Islamic jurisdiction is, however, 
applicable to non-Muslim whenever one of the parties 
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takes the case to the Muslim court as above. 9 However, 
the exegetes and jurists have differed whether the 
verse "Judge between them or disclaim jurisdiction" 
had been abrogated by the later-revealed verse, "So 
judge between them by that which God hath 
revealed ...... 10 At any rate, 
the question of 
abrogation is not a matter of opinion or i_itihäd by 
individual person; it rather a matter of tawqif 
(handed down from the Prophet), thus, Ja$r? äs and 
others prefer that it was properly abrogated as 
reported by Ibn 'Abbäs, 'Ikrimah and others. 11 
In cases of conflict of laws which might be 
arised, whether between any dhimmi code and Islamic 
law, or between different d immi codes, the judicial 
autonomy should be the basis. Therefore, the Islamic 
jurisdiction is the state jurisdiction except in 
matters for which there are applicable rules in non- 
Muslim religious codes, even if the latter conflicts 
with Islamic law. 12 
Apart from what has been discussed above, non- 
Muslims are required to abide by the Islamic law 
whether in matters of civil, criminal, contract or 
even in personal law (in cases where there is no 
provision in non-Muslim codes). For in those areas of 
laws the non-Muslims will be treated like the Muslims. 
As the jurists say: "For them is whatever for us and 
against them is whatever against us. "13 
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In Saudi Arabia, the Muslim court has the 
jurisdiction to try all cases involving all persons 
living in its territory. Hence, there is no different 
treatment accorded between Saudis or non-Saudis in 
terms of its liability towards the same court of law 
or judicial power. This means that the courts apply 
the Islamic law over all cases whether it be a family 
or otherwise. To this end are some provisions 
contained in the Act of Regulating the 
Responsibilities of the Muslim Courts (mahäkim al- 
shar'iyya ) 1372 A. H. 14 As we have seen Saudis Arabia 
follows I; Ianbalr school of law. ss 
Moreover, as subjects of the Islamic state, the 
d immi are not expected to stir up the sensitivity of 
the Muslims. The non-Muslims should also respect the 
dignity of the Islamic state where they live in. 
Hence, it is not proper for them to abuse God, Islam, 
the Prophet and the Qur' än. 16 This is, in fact, apply 
to the Muslims as well. It follows that whoever abuses 
the Prophet, Muslim or non-Muslim, man or woman, he 
will be killed. '? This is the consensus of all 
scholars and jurists of all schools. iB For to commit 
such an act is clearly an infringement of the contract 
and undermine the religion of the state. The same rule 
applies to musts' min. 19 
The d imm as well as musta'min are also not 
allowed to openly indulge in buying and consuming 
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wine, pigs, and other prohibited items in Islam in the 
Muslim areas and transport these items openly. For 
these activities are considered as undermining the 
Muslim feelings and sensitivity. Since in the Muslim 
city it is the place for the Muslims to exhibit the 
Islamic activities. 20 However, in non-Muslim areas, 
the dhimml can publicly engaged in those activities 
since they are allowable for them. 21 We also believe 
that in the Muslim areas, the non-Muslims should not 
eat or drink publicly during the day of Ramac n where 
the majority are engaged in fasting. 22 
Finally, the dhimml and musta'min should abstain 
from committing any act which is prohibited in his 
religion such as adultery or any abominable act. This 
prohibition runs concurrently both in Muslim and non- 
Muslim areas. 23 
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Islamic viewpointI the acts or practices which are 
permitted under some provisions of the Qur' an and the 
sunnah and the juristic interpretation thereof. It 
involves the beliefs, actions, opinions etc. of the 
minority which might differ from the established or 
prescribed religion of a country. It also defines 
their rights to life, responsibilities in the 
community by the virtue of human dignity as recognized 
by Islam. ' Tolerance in this sense therefore is not 
something that can be formulated by human beings. But 
it is rather the prescription of Islam vis A vis non- 
Muslims as had been demonstrated by the Prophet and 
his Companions. It is a binding force that no 
authority can defy or ignore, for the concepts and 
principles of Islamic tolerance are embodied in the 
texts and sources of Islamic law. It implies that if 
the adherents of different faiths residing in a 
Muslim country insist on following their own beliefs, 
personal statutes and practices derived from it, they 
may do so provided that their liberty should not be 
considered as absolute; for liberty if it is not 
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properly used it would conflict with the rights of 
others. So non-Muslims' rights will be questioned if 
they fail to respect or undermine the law of the 
country, vilify its principles, or if they tend to 
disturb the peace and general security of the 
country. 2 The matter becomes more complex if the 
teaching of two different religions contradicts each 
other as we shall see. 
In short, religious tolerance implies that every 
person in society has the right to belief what he 
thought to be right; that he has the freedom to 
exercise his religion as he wishes and that all 
adherents of different religions are equal before the 
l aw. 3. 
II. Some Principles of Tolerance 
The Islamic conception of tolerance towards non- 
Muslims can be based on these major principles: 
A. Human Dignity . Every human being irrespective 
of his religion, race or colour should be respected 
and protected. This principle is manifest in the 
Qur' dn. It says: 
Verily We have honoured the children of 
Adam. We carry them on the land and the 
sea, and have made provision of good things 
for them, and have preferred them above 
many of those whom We created with a mark 
of preferment. " 
The verse clearly recognises the supremacy of 
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mankind over all other creatures. It is a priori that 
man has been chosen to rule the world and to build up 
civilization, at any given time depending on his skill 
and technology, so that he can acknowledge the power 
and greatness of God. Therefore, it is appropriate 
that God has appointed man to be his vicegerent on the 
earths Since this subject is too vast to be handled 
here, it is beyond the scope of this work. 
In relation to the verse above, there is a 
Tradition narrated by Bukhdrf from Jdbir ibn 'Abd 
Allah that the , 
Prophet stood up when a funeral 
procession was passing in front of him. A man said to 
him: "The dead man was a Jew". He said: "Was not he a 
human being? ". The man said: "Yes". Then the Prophet 
said: "Every human being in Islam has a place and 
dignity (which should be respected). "6 This Tradition 
clearly shows that the Prophet has demonstrated 
personally, by his action, that every human being 
regardless of his religious background should be 
respected not only when living but also when dead. 
That is why according to the Islamic law of ii had it 
is prohibited for the Muslim soldiers to disfigure, 
mutilate, or show of disrespect to the dead body of 
enemy soldiers. We know that every action of the 
Prophet is an example and model for the Muslims to 
follow. 
It should be noted that this idea of human dignity 
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stems from the concept of unity of mankind in Islam. 
For Islam considers that all human beings came from 
the same origins, i. e. Adam and Eve. 8 It is also the 
subject of all revealed Books. 9 The fact that men are 
from the same origins implies they should be treated 
equally. Thus men are in reality, on equal footing in 
the context of reality of mankind. There is no reason 
whatsoever to discriminate, enslave, restrict their 
liberties let alone to treat mankind on the basis of 
class-system or on any social background. For the 
noblest and honoured man in the sight of God is the 
one that is the best in conduct. 10 
It follows that since mankind came from the same 
stock,. it should have one standard or unified values 
that is acceptable to all. This universal values, so 
to speak, must be able to suit all peoples at all 
times in all places irrespective of religion, colour, 
or any social backgrounds. Needless to say however 
that some local customs or norms which would be more 
suitable to local needs has its own role to play and 
should not be neglected. These common values such as 
honesty, sincerity, justice and the like are the 
subject of common good of mankind. Therefore, they 
have become the common principles of all revealed 
religions for the interest of all mankinds. 
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B. Differences of Religion Is a--Sign of the Will 
of God. This idea of tolerance towards different 
religions stems from one of the main principles of the 
Islamic teachings namely, unity of religion. For, 
according to Islam all revealed religions beginning 
from the message of Adam down to the Prophet Muhammad 
were series of revelations that God has sent down, 
because of His Mercy, from time to time, in order to 
guide mankind to the path of God. The central theme of 
these religions, however, or its basic faith remained 
the same that is to believe in the existence and the 
unity of God (al-tawhfd ), and to acknowledge His 
entire creation including mankind. The purpose of this 
creation was to serve and worship Him. " Despite the 
fact that the fundamental teachings of these religions 
are the same, the branches of law which regulate the 
mode of people's life may differ from time to time 
depending on the situation and the need of the people 
at the time. 1z It seems therefore the terms religion 
(al-din) and sheri'ah, in this context, have two 
different meanings. For one thing religion is devoted 
to the main principles of basic faith which is fixed, 
perpetual, and is not subject to alteration or 
abrogation. This basic faith remains the same though 
religions are changeable with the changing of the 
prophets. This is the messages of all prophets of 
God. 13 
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On the other hand, sharr'ah is a body of rules 
mainly dealing with the practical aspects of human 
life at the time which may be subject to alteration or 
abrogation. It also deals with branches of law or 
modes of worship which may differ from time to time 
among the revealed laws. This is because each law has 
to suit each generation and its local needs. The 
common values, however, remains the same. l" According 
to the Qur'än all prophets of God conveyed the same 
message to their peoples. As God says: 
And who forsaketh the religion of Abraham 
save him who befooleth himself? Verily We 
chose him in the world, and lo! in the 
Hereafter he is among the righteous. 
When his Lord said onto him: Surrender! he 
said: I have surrendered to the Lords of 
the worlds. 
The same did Abraham enjoin upon his sons, 
and also Jacob, (saying): 0 my sons! Lo! 
Allah hath chosen for you the (true) 
religion; therefore die not save as men who 
have surrendered (unto Him). 
Or were ye present when death came to 
Jacob, when he said unto his sons: What 
will ye worship after me? They said: We 
shall worship thy God, the God of thy 
fathers, Abraham and Ishmael and Isaac, One 
God, and unto Him we have surrendered. 15 
The verses above have sum up the faith that based 
on the unity of God in terms of worship and the 
surrender and sincere devotion to God. The fact that 
the term Isl6m (surrender in this sense) is repeated 
in the verses above is to emphasize the real religion 
of God in order to exclude religions adhered to by the 
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Arabs and the surrounding peoples. ib This is a 
fundamental belief in Islam, i. e. belief in all Books 
revealed by God, and belief in all Prophets of God. 
The Qur' än commands: 
Say (0 Muslims): We believe in Allah and 
that which is revealed unto us and that 
which was revealed unto Abraham and 
Ishmael, and Isaac, and Jacob, and the 
tribes, and that which Moses and Jesus 
received, and that which the Prophets 
received from their Lord. We make no 
distinction between any of them, and unto 
Him we have surrendered. i7 
But this series of revelations should stop at 
somewhere when mankind has matured enough with 
reasonable civilization so that the final message, 
which is comprehensive and includes all the previous 
teachings, will suit all humanity and generations to 
come. Such a complete teaching will not be subjected 
to anymore abrogation or alteration except its details 
or branches of law that require some adaptability 
according the exigencies of the time. This is the 
meaning of the Qur' än which says: 
"This day have I perfected your religion 
for you and completed My favour unto you, 
and have chosen for you as religion al- 
Islam. "se 
The Prophet Muýammad himself has demonstrated a 
practical example of this unity of religion. Bukhdrf 
narrated from Ibn 'Abbas that when the Prophet arrived 
in Medina, the Jews were performing a fasting in the 
day of 'ÄshOrd'. 19 The Prophet asked: "Why are they 
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fasting? " They said: "This is the victorious day of 
Moses over Pharaoh. " The Prophet said to his 
Companions: "You are more deserving of Moses than them 
so you should fast. "2 ° This means that Islam is the 
religion of all prophets and Messengers of God. Since 
Moses was one of the leading prophets, so the people 
who adhere to the religion of Islam would be more 
worthy to respect the anniversary of the Day of his 
victory and preserve his legacy. It is also because he 
was one of the advocate of Islam, as those prophets 
and Messengers that had been sent by God. 
As to the position of the Prophet Muhammad among 
the Messengers of God, Bukhärl narrated from AbO 
Hurayrah that the Prophet once said: "To compare 
myself with the prophets before me is like a man who 
builds a house with all its perfection except one 
missing brick at one corner. While onlookers are 
walking around and praising its beauty, they keep 
asking: 'What happen to that missing brick? ' I am that 
brick, and I am the seal of the prophets. "21 This 
Tradition obviously speaks about the unity of religion 
hence, there is a sort of brotherhood among the 
prophets because of the unity thereof and the position 
of the Prophet Muhammad as a concluding chain of the 
prophets of God. 
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C. The Muslim is not held responsible for the 
disbelief of non-believers. nor could he punish those 
who go astray for their errors in this world. For 
those will be held accountable on the Day of Judgement 
by' God alone. Therefore, it is not the business of 
this world and man has nothing to do with it. Bearing 
these principles in mind, the Muslim's attitude should 
be one of peace. There would be no more conflict in 
his mind between his belief of the infidelity of 
disbelievers and his duty to act justly to them in all 
- dealings. As God says: 
"Allrah will judge between you on the Day of 
Resurrection concerning that wherein ye 
used to differ. "22 
D. The Muslim believes that God loves justice and 
fairness and would prefer to see noble mindedness 
even to non-Muslims. On the contrary, God hates 
oppression, and would punish the despot though those 
acts were committed by Muslims to non-Muslims. God 
says in this respect: 
"... and let not hatred of any people seduce 
you that ye deal not justly. Deal justly, 
that is nearer to your piety. "23 
The Prophet also is reported to have said: 
"The prayer of the oppressed,. though from 
non-Muslim, will be no barrier (for God to 
accept it). "2 " 
Those are at least four principles upon which the 
Muslims should rely in the application of the concept 
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of tolerance towards non-Muslims. These principles 
actually contribute to some extent to the co-existence 
and co-operation between the Muslims and the peoples 
of other faiths. The degrees of co-operation, however, 
vary from time to time and from place to place 
depending on the situation at the time. The ruler, 
generally speaking, plays a major role in the 
application of the principle of tolerance, which is 
envisaged in the Qur'dn and the Traditions of the 
Prophet. It is therefore a divine Will and should be 
observed by the Muslim authority as well as the Muslim 
community. Thus, the Muslim authority can not force 
non-Muslims to become Muslims, for that act alone 
would. contradict the very principle of tolerance that 
has been laid down by God. 
On the other hand, non-Muslims should not take 
this tolerance as a weakness of the Muslims. If the 
concept is not properly observed, it will be a 
disaster to all; as has frequently occurred in the 
past. This is a situation which no one would like tO 
see it. Mutual understanding can bring about peace and 
prosperity to all. 
III. Aspects of Tolerance 
Perhaps the most significant area of tolerance 
offered by Islam to the adherents of different faiths 
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is the prohibition of compulsion in matters relating 
to religion. The Qur'an unequivocally says: 
"There is no compulsion in religion. The 
right direction is henceforth distinct from 
error. '2s 
Thus the Qur'än recognizes the existence and the 
adherents of different faiths. They should be allowed 
to adhere to their beliefs. It is a matter of one's 
own choice. Hence compulsion is against the spirit of 
Islamic teachings. It follows that the practice of 
one' s own religion, whether in the forms of cults, 
creed, modes of worship, rituals, personal statutes 
etc. should also be tolerated even though those 
practices contradict the teaching of Islam. This 
attitude should always be consistent by maintained 
towards all revealed religions or man-made religions 
though Islam has special relations with the two 
revealed religions, i. e. Judaism and Christianity to 
the extent that the adherents of these two religions 
are called "the People of the Book. " 
According to YGsuf al-Qara¢&wi there are three 
stages of tolerance: a6 
A. The non-Muslims would be allowed freedom of 
religion and its faith. He would not be forced 
physically to change his religion. But he would not be 
allowed to practise the teaching of his religion. This 
is the lowest stage of tolerance; 27 
B. The non-Muslim would be allowed to freedom of 
121 
religion and he would not be forced to act anything 
against the teaching of his religion, or to refrain 
from anything that he believes he should do. For 
instances, if the Jews believe that it is forbidden 
for them, according to the teaching of their religion, 
to work on Saturdays, the Muslims therefore should not 
force them to work on that day. The same case would be 
applied to the Christians who believe that they must 
go to the church for congregational prayers every 
Sunday. Any attempt to stop these practices would 
undermine the spirit of religious tolerance in Islam. 
This is the middle stage of tolerance; 28 and 
C. The highest stage of tolerance is to allow them 
to practise what they believe to be right and lawful 
according to their religion even though that 
particular practice contradicts the teachings of 
Islam. 29 This stage of tolerance was offered by the 
Muslims to the dhimmi. It follows that the Muslims in 
so doing, show tolerance to whatever non-Muslims 
believe to be lawful according to their religion. The 
Muslims have never said that it was forbidden and 
unlawful for the dhimmf, albeit the Muslims could 
forbid and make it illegal in accordance with the law 
of the land (Islamic law) and its religion. s° This is 
because the permissible thing in any religion does not 
necessarily mean that it is an obligation that 
requires everyone to conform with it. If, for 
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instance, the religion of Magian permits a man to 
marry his mother or his sister, he could marry someone 
else. Likewise, if the Christianity allows its 
followers to consume pork, he can take something else. 
The same applies to the consumption of alcohol. 31 
If Islam requires the dhimmr not to marry close 
relatives, or to drink alcohol and consume pork in 
order to respect the teachings of Islam and preserve 
the feelings of the Muslims, it would not cause them 
any religious hardship. For in abstaining from doing 
those things, they would not be considered as 
committing an unlawful act and neglecting of 
performing sacred duty. However, the teachings of 
Islam -do not wish to forbid practices that are 
believed to be lawful by non-Muslims. Rather, they say 
to Muslims: "Leave them and what they believe. "32 
Another feature of Islamic tolerance towards non- 
Muslims is that Islam allows Muslim to marry a non- 
Muslim women from among People of the Book 
(kitäbiyyet ). For Islam is not exclusive. As a rule, a 
Muslim must not get married except to Muslim women and 
vice verse. 33 But special consideration is given to 
dhimmi women that a Muslim can marry them. Conversely, 
under no circumstances can the Muslim women marry a 
non-Muslim men. The Qur' do says: 
And so are the virtuous women of the 
believers and the virtuous women of those 
who received the Scripture before you 
(lawful for you) when ye give them their 
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marriage portions and live with them in 
honour, not in fornication, nor taking them 
as a secret concubines. 34 
According to the majority view of the Muslim 
jurists this verse clearly expressed the permission 
for the Muslims to marry a free kitabi women. It may 
indeed be recalled that one of the Prophet wives was a 
Jewish woman. 35 The jurists also argued that CUthmän 
ibn 'Affen got married to Na. 'Llah al-Kalbiyyah, the 
Christian, and also Talhah bin 'Ubaydulläh married to 
a Jewess from Syria. The majority contended that there 
was no objection from the Companions of the Prophet 
about those marriages hence, the Companions were in 
agreement about the marriage to kitäbiyy t. But there 
was a_ report that ibn GUmar said it was reprehensible 
(karähah). The same was the opinion of Malik, and some 
jurists said it was forbidden. 36 They argued with the 
verse which says: 
"Wed not idolatresses till they 
believe.... "37 
But the majority rejected the view that the above 
verse was a general prohibition of marrying non-Muslim 
women, which was properly specified by the verse in 
Stirah al-Ma' i dah (5: 6). It is also contended that this 
verse was revealed later than the above verse (2: 221). 
So these two apparent contradictory verses, which 
speak on the same issue, should be construed under the 
rule of "specification of the generality" (takhrrf§ al- 
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' mm). 36 It is worthy noting that from among the 
Companions who agreed to mixed-marriages were 'Umar 
I, 'Uthmän, Talt? ah, Hudhayfah, Salman and Jäbir. 
Nevertheless, according to Ibn Quddmah 'Umar I at one 
time, ordered those who married kitäbiyyät to divorce 
them. 39 Finally, the permission to marry kitabivyat is 
include all kitabiy whether they are dhimm3 mu'ähid 
or harbr women except the opinion of Ibn 'Abbas who 
says that the Muslim is not allowed to marry ha+ rbf 
woman. "0 
As for the marriage to Magian women the majority 
says that it is prohibited to have such a marriage 
since the Magians were not considered as "the People 
of the. Book". However, Zdhiri' s jurist says that it 
is allowable because they were "the People of the 
Book" proper. "1 The same was the opinion of AbO Thawr 
(d. 240/854) who based his opinion on the Tradition of 
the Prophet which says: "Treat them (Magians) as you 
have treated People of the Book. " Abo Thawr also 
argued that the fact that the Prophet took iz ah from 
them is sufficient to include them as "the People of 
the Book. "4 2 However, the Qur' sn says: 
"Lest ye should say: The Scripture was 
revealed only to two sects before us 
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Had the Magians been "People of the Book" it would 
have mentioned three groups of "People of the Book" 
which would be contrary to the general understanding 
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and the prevailing view of the concept itself. As far 
as the Tradition is concerned it is because the 
Magians were not "the People of the Book" that had led 
the Prophet issued specific instruction, to his 
Companions, as to the rule regarding the Magians. The 
instruction was to include them under tributary 
people, i. e. paying iz ah. To support this argument 
the majority invoke the full text of Tradition which 
says: 
"Treat the Magians as you have treated the 
People of the Book but not marrying their 
" women and consuming their slaughtering. "44 
On the question of marrying ! ýä'ibah (Sabean) women 
there was also no unanimous agreement among the 
jurists. while Abu Hanifah says that it is allowable, 
Abü YUsuf and Muhammad al-Shaybäni held that it is 
forbidden. The central issue rests on whether al- 
Sä'ibah was considered as the "People of the Book" or 
otherwise. For those who say they were "People of the 
Book" then marriage to their women is permissible and 
vice versa. 4s 
For the rest of non-Muslim women such as the 
polytheists, the idolaters, the worshippers of any 
image and those who confess no religion, the Muslim 
jurists unanimously agreed that marrying them is 
forbidden. 46 According to some jurists the fact that 
they remain in their religions is self-evident that 
the bond of marriage, if it is occurred, could not 
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survive because of the prevailing misunderstanding and 
antagonistic in the husband-wife relationship rather 
than peaceful and harmonious environment. The case 
would be different, perhaps, if marriage relationship 
occurs between Muslim and kitäbi women. For one thing 
the woman already confesses and believes in some 
tenets in common, that is to say belief in Book and 
prophets of God. In that sense, it is hoped that she 
would be eventually be attracted to the teachings of 
Islam which is not so much at variance with her 
existing belief. 47 It is worthy noting that according 
to Islamic law, any man or woman, of any race or 
faith, may, on accepting Islam, freely marry any 
Muslim woman or man, provided it be from motives of 
purity and chastity and not of lewdness. 
One immediate impediment that intermarriage 
enc<-unters is the fact that the wife would be denied 
her share in the inheritance in the case of her 
husband predeceasing her. This involves the doctrinal 
application of the Islamic law of inheritance which 
says: "The infidel cannot inherit from the Muslim. 1148 
The principle is a corollary from the concept of 
ikhtiltif at-din. different of religion, as one of 
obstacle for inheritance in Islam. 
In the matter of food, the Muslim is not allowed 
to consume any slaughtered animal except one that is 
properly slaughtered by the Muslim. As an exception to 
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this rule, the Muslim is granted permission by God to 
consume an animal49 slaughtered by the 
"People of the 
Book. " The Qur' än says: 
"This day are (all) good things made lawful 
for you. The food of those who have 
received the scripture is lawful for you, 
and your food is lawful for then. '" so 
The Qur'an introduces the term al-tayyibät. that 
is, good, pure and beneficial. 5s The rules of Islam 
in this respect being analogous to those of the 
"People of the Book. " This is in order to oppose the 
meat killed by pagans with superstitious rites. 
In 
this regard the Christian rule is as follows: 
"That ye abstain from meats offered to 
idols, and from blood, and from thing 
strangled, and from fornication". 52 
Unlike inter-marriage this matter posed no legal 
issue among the jurists. All schools of law, 53 except 
ShS'i school, unanimously agreed that the food of the 
the "People of the Book" is lawful for the Muslims 
except pork and its derivatives in food and liquor. 54 
It should be noted that there is no differences in 
terms of permission whether the food is from dhimmi. 
barb and mu'Shad provided that they are kitäbi and 
whether they are itdbi Arab or non-Arab. ss 
IV. Some Archetypes of Muslim Tolerance 
Bat Ye'or in her discussion of Muslim tolerance 
states that: 
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It is this context of a perpetual and 
universal religious war that gives to 
Islamic toleration its peculiar 
characteristics. Indeed, the Prophet's 
protection granted to the the "People of 
the Book, " his prohibition of compulsion in 
matters of religious belief, encouraged 
throughout the centuries a current of 
religious toleration that proved to be an 
important check to fanaticism in times of 
darkness and prejudices. It is sufficient 
to mention here this positive, permanent 
aspect that projects a brighter light upon 
the dhimmr condition. " 
She continues to write: 
"According to a hadTth, the Prophet is 
reported to have said: 'Whoever kills a 
tributary will not inhale the scent of 
Paradise. ' "5 7 
T. W. Arnold while discussing the position of 
Christians under Arab rule says that: 
Living under this security of life and 
property and such toleration of religious 
thought, the Christian community - 
especially in the towns - enjoyed a 
flourishing prosperity in the early days of 
the Caliphate. Christians frequently held 
high posts at court, e. g. a Christian Arab, 
al- Akhtal, was court poet, and the father 
of St. John of Damuscus, counsellor to the 
Caliph 'Abd al-Malik (685 - 705). In the 
service of the Caliph al-MuGtacim (833 - 
842), there were two brothers, Christians, 
who stood very high in the confidence of 
the Commander of the Faithful: the one, 
named Salmoyah, seems to have occupied 
somewhat the position of a modern secretary 
of state, and no royal documents were valid 
until countersigned by him, while his 
brother, Ibr&hfm, was entrusted with the 
care of the privy seal, and was set over 
the @ayt al-Mai or Public treasury, an 
office that, from the nature of funds and 
their disposal, might have been expected-to 
have been put into the hands of a Muslim; 
so great was the Caliph's personal 
affectation for this Ibrähfm, that he 
visited him in his sickness .... Na$r ibn H8rün, the Prime Minister of 'Ac1Dd al- 
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Dawlah (949 - 982), of the Buwayhid 
dynasty of Persia, was a Christian, and 
built many churches and monasteries. For a 
long time, the government offices, 
especially in the department of finance, 
were filled with Christians and Persians. S8 
When Jerusalem submitted to the Caliph 'Umar I and 
conditions were drawing, 'Umar, in company with the 
patriarch, visited the holy places, and it is said 
while they were in the church of the Resurrection, it 
was the time for appointed hour of prayer, the 
Patriarch bade the Caliph to perform his prayer there, 
but he thoughtfully refused, saying that if he were to 
do so, the Muslims might henceforth claim it as a 
place of their worship-s9 
The Caliph Mu' wiyah (661-680), rebuilt the great 
church of Edessa at the intercession of his Christian 
subjects. 60 In the case of the great Cathedral of St. 
John in Damuscus, it was divided between the 
Christians and the Muslims and for eighty years the 
adherents of the two religions worshipped under the 
same roof. Some Caliphs wanted to convert the whole 
into a mosque, but abstained on finding the fact that 
the terms of agreement forbade it. It was not until 
about A. H. 90 when the Caliph Wälid effected by force 
what others had sought to gain by fair deal and at 
times, by a large sums of money. When 'Umar II took 
his office, he listened to the complaints of the 
Christians against the injustice that had been done 
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and gave them, in exchange, those churches of the city 
and its suburbs that had been confiscated at the time 
of his predecessors-61 
From the examples given above of the toleration 
extended towards the Christians Arab by the victorious 
Muslim of the first century of the Hijrah and 
continued by succeeding generations, with the 
exception of particular period such as perhaps in the 
reign of the Caliph al-Mutawakkil (232-247/847-861), 
we may surely infer that those Christians tribes that 
did embrace Islam, did so of their own choice and 
u 
freewill. 62 The Christian Arabs of the present day, 
dwelling in the midst of Muslim population, are a 
living testimony of this toleration: ' 
Furthermore, it was under the principles of 
justice, toleration and moderation that the Caliph Abts 
Bakr advised his army of the first expedition to Syria 
as follows: 
Be just; break not your plighted faith; 
mutilate none; slay neither children, old 
men nor women; injure not the date palm nor 
burn it with fire, nor cut down any fruit 
bearing tree; slay neither flocks nor herds 
nor camels, except for food; perchance you 
may come across men who have retired into 
monasteries, leave them and their works in 
place; you may eat of the food that the 
people of the land will bring you in their 
vessels, making mention thereon of the name 
of God; and you will come across people 
with shaven crowns, touch them only with 
the flat of the sword. Go forward now in 
the name of God and may He protect you in 
battle and pestilence. "64, 
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In fact the co-existence today of Judaism, 
Christianity and Islam, in the Muslim lands, is due in 
no small measure to the concept of tolerance in Islam. 
As the last and most comprehensive of the three it did 
not seek, in an age of intolerance, to eliminate its 
predecessors. Not only had it no positive policy of 
suppression, when it was at the peak of its political 
power, it had in fact a positive one of co- 
existence. 65 According to Tibawi: "The notion of 
religious equality is of fairly recent origin, and 
even in our own times it is still an ideal which is 
seldom attained. But barring concession of equality to 
other religions Islam was tolerant of them, both in 
theory and in practice. It is true that practice had 
occasionally fallen below the standards of theory, but 
its validity was irrevocable because it is enshrined 
in the divine revelation itself. It is clear then that 
the doctrine of religious tolerance in Islam has an 
idealistic origin. When it was first proclaimed and 
practiS. ed in the seventh century A. D. it must have 
appeared in sharp contrast to the contemporary 
fanaticism, interdenominational strife and persecution 
amongst the Christians themselves in the Byzantine 
Empire. As a measure of practical politics the Islamic 
doctrine of religious tolerance was amply vindicated 
by the ready welcome of the Muslim armies by the 
Christians and Jews in Syria and elsewhere in the Near 
132 
East. "6 
Ti! 441 argues that, "Hence. it is fallacious to 
allege, as it has recently become fashionable to 
allege, that ' the People of the Book' were treated by 
the Islamic state as 'second-class citizens. ' The 
allegation is fallacious not only because it projects 
into the distant and different past the comparatively 
modern notion of equality of citizens irrespective of 
their religious beliefs, but also because it ignores 
the view which non-Muslims, at the time, held of 
their status under Muslim rule. Could they have had a 
better status elsewhere? ""7 
It was reported that 'Umar I, in demonstrating the 
spirit of toleration, once met a blind old man begging 
and asked him how he came to that state. Knowing that 
he was ad immS Jew, 'Umar took him by his hand to his 
house and gave him something and then ordered the 
Treasury officials to look after the welfare of the 
man and the likes. He said: "We have not been fair to 
him by taking (something) from his youth and neglected 
him when he is old and then he cited 'The alms are 
only for the poor and the needy. 1611 'Umar explained 
that this is the ' needy' of ' the People of the Book. '" 
He then ordered iizyah to be remitted from him and his 
likes. 69 Moreover, despite the fact that he was 
stabbed by adi mi it did not hamper him to advice 
his successor to look after the welfare of ahl al- 
133 
dhimmah. On his deathbed, 'Umar delivered this 
statement: "I recommend the Caliph after me to look 
after the welfare of ahl al-dhimmah. to fulfil the 
pact to them, to protect them and not to over-burden 
them. "''7 0 
It was reported that when the Prophet passed away, 
his armour was still with a Jew which he had deposited 
it as a security (mar on) in order to get something 
for his family maintenance. 71 The Prophet did so, we 
believe, in order to teach his ummah how to interact 
with non-Muslims in matters relating to daily life. 
Such a practice was also a clear evidence as to the 
permissibility of interaction with non-Muslims in 
mundane matters. The Qur'Sn laid down a rule as 
follows: 
All h forbiddeth you not those who warred 
not against you on account of religion and 
drove you not out from your homes, that ye 
should show them kindness and deal justly 
with them. Lo! Allah loveth the just 
dealers. 72 
Fair treatment and some rules of toleration 
towards non-Muslims has been very well defined by a 
Mcilik! jurist, Shihab al-Din al-Qaraff in the 
following words: 
Fair treatment consists of showing kindness 
to their weak and helping their poor and 
destitute, and feeding their hungry, 
clothing their naked, and uttering kind 
words to them - from the position of grace 
and mercy and not from the position of fear 
and disgrace - and removing their hardship 
as their neighbours if you have power to 
remove it, praying for their guidance so 
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that they can become the happy and 
fortunate people, giving them good advice 
in all their affairs - the affairs of this 
world and the next world- and looking after 
their interest in their absence. If any one 
hurts them and deprives them of their 
property of family, possessions and their 
rights, you should help them by removing 
their persecution and make sure to restore 
all their rights to them.... 73 
These are general outlines which the jurist such 
as Qardfl was trying to elaborate of the term birr as 
indicated in the verse above. Nevertheless, generally 
speaking. law is always in the hands of the authority. 
" It is natural phenomenon that we see in any society, 
no matter how ideal the law is, the application of 
such a law always rests with the degrees of the 
ruler's piousness and statesmanship. The oppressive 
measures of some unjust Muslim rulers should not 
undermine the original objective of the law which 
reflected a genuine spirit of toleration and provided 
safeguards for the non-Muslim subjects who preferred 
to adhere to their own religions. In this regards 
Maid Khadduri has made his conclusion: 
If a spirit of intolerance had at times 
been shown, it was the symptom of a growing 
oppressive rule which caused the Muslim 
populace at large to suffer no less than 
the non-Muslims. Mob violence may have been 
at times focussed against non-Muslims, but 
mob violence indicates a dissatisfaction 
and unjust rule under which neither Muslims 
nor dhimmis could live with prosperity and 
security. 
If certain Caliphs and governors were harsh 
and brutal, others were inclined to show 
magnanimity and generous spirit. Under 
reckless rule the dhimmts may have suffered 
persecution, but the Muslim were not much 
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better off.... The general' treatment of the 
dhimmis under Muslim rule, however, must 
be measured not in terms of such a 
suffering at the hands of careless Caliphs 
and individual Muslims but in the spirit of 
tolerance embodied in the law and in the 
general spirit prevailing in each age and 
generation, and this must also be judged in 
terms of the relative prosperity and 
security enjoyed by the majority. 7' 
Thus far we have dealt with theory of tolerance in 
Islamic law in an attempt to understand its main 
characteristics and underlying principles. To this end 
Islam demands the realization of its basic truth, to 
" show respect to all prophets of all monotheistic 
religions, and prohibits fighting for no cause other 
than God, persecution and oppression. In the meantime, 
it urges mankind to establish justice, law, and order. 
To achieve this summum bonum Islam invites all mankind 
to come to the same terms. The Qur'än says: 
Say: 0 people of the scripture! Come to an 
agreement between us and you: that we shall 
worship none but Allah, and that we shall 
ascribe no partner unto Him, and that none 
of us shall take others for Lords beside 
Allah, and if they turn away, then say: 
Bear witness that we are they who have 
surrendered (unto Him). 7S 
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'CHAPTER FOUR 
THE DHIMMPS JUDICIAL STATUS 
In this chapter the dhimmi's position as well as 
his rights and obligations in all major branches of 
Islamic law viz. criminal, family, and contract will 
be surveyed in detail. In criminal law, although its 
provision is clearly articulated, as to the modes of 
offence and its punishments, in the major texts of the 
Islamic law, the jurists nevertheless, in their 
interpretations of the law, in some cases are in 
disagreement in the course of its application vis ä 
via the dhimmi as will be seen. In other areas of 
laws, however, the disagreement is almost nil. 
I. Criminal Law 
In Islamic law, as in other positive laws, there 
is a body of rules pertaining to crimes and its 
punishments. ' This body of rules is equivalent to 
modern notion of criminal law. In Islamic law, the law 
of punishments is based on the divine revelation 
embodied in the Qur'9n and the Tradition of the 
Prophet Muhammad. As in other field of Islamic law, 
different interpretations of legal scholars and 
jurists of the Qur'6n and the Tradition, as well as 
varied social, economic, and political circumstances 
have led to the establishment of various legal 
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theories on almost all the key issue not excluding the 
Islamic Criminal Law. 
A. Is Islamic Law a Universal or a Territorial Law? 
In theory, Islamic law is universal in character 
and its scope. It appeals to all mankind, Muslims and 
non-Muslims, and governs the inhabitants of the 
Islamic state and non-Islamic state. 2 This is the 
position of the Qur'an as it declares: "We sent thee 
not, but as a mercy for all universe 
(mankind). "g But 
Islam has not been accepted by all peoples and the 
imposition of it would contrary to its very teaching; 
hence its law, though it is universal, could only be 
implemented within the domain of Islamic territories. 
For, to enforce the law it needs sovereignty. The 
circumstances therefore necessitated Islamic law being 
territorial rather than universal. " Consequently, it 
entails two vital legal questions as to the extent of 
its territorial jurisdiction, namely could the Islamic 
law be applied to all its citizens or could it be 
applied only to some of its citizens? If Islamic law 
is applied to all criminal cases within its territory, 
could it be applied also on crimes committed by its 
own citizens outside its territory (ddr al-barb)? 
Theoretical speaking, Islamic law should be 
applied to all inhabitants irrespective of their own 
social backgrounds-5 Thus, it is necessary for all 
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citizens to conform with Islamic law, except in some 
cases as will be seen, not only in its own territory 
but outside its territory as well. According to 
Islamic legal principles therefore it should be 
applied to all criminal cases committed within its own 
territory regardless of the culprit, and over the 
crimes committed by its own citizens outside its 
territory. The legality of this principle reverts to 
its nature. But for practical reason its applicability 
has to be confined to dar al-Islam and to those who 
reside therein, though the criminal is alien to it and 
the crime committed outside its realm (in the "case of 
its own citizens). This is because the Islamic law 
could not be enforced in dar al-herb for lack of 
jurisdiction-6 These are the general principles of 
Islamic law pertaining to our subject of inquiry at 
this point. 
However, according to 'Awdah, the jurists differ 
as to the applicability of it into three theories in 
respect of territorial jurisdiction of Islamic 
Criminal Law. 7 
1. The First Theory 
It is the opinion of Abü iianlfah who says that the 
Islamic law is applied only to any crimes which occur 
in dar--al-Islam regardless of whether the criminal is 
Muslim or d immi for there is no law for the Muslim 
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except SharS'ah; likewise the dhimml who supposedly 
accepted the Islamic law by virtue of concluding 
permanent contract with the Islamic state ('aqd al- 
dhimmah ). 
As for those who resides temporarily (musts' min ) 
in dSr al-Isl8m, the Islamic law is not applicable to 
them if the crime committed is something to do with 
the rights of God; 9 but if the crime is touching on 
the rights of human being, he should be punished. to 
Abu HanSfah maintains that tnusta'min lives in dar al- 
Islam temporarily for specific reason, i. e. trade, 
tourism, transit etc. But for the crimes of i 
(retaliation) and ! Qadhf (false accusation of 
unchastity), he should be held responsible because of 
the severity of the crimes. He is also responsible for 
stealing or illegal seizure and destroying one's 
property, for these crimes are concerned with the 
individual's right. It 
If the crime is committed by a Muslim or dhimmi 
outside Islamic territory the Islamic law is not 
applicable, even if the criminal is now living in dar 
al-Islam. 12 For Abts HanTfeh the question is not 
whether the Muslim or d mmf should abide the Islamic 
law wherever he is, but the question is whether the 
Muslim authority has the power to exercise its 
jurisdiction. Since it has no jurisdiction in dar al- 
barbs then it would not be responsible for 
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punishment. The case would be different if the crime 
committed by a Muslim or a dhimmi or even a musts' min, 
who then fled to där al-barb. The criminal still be 
held responsible because the crime had been committed 
within the Islamic territory. 14 In like manner, if the 
crime occurred in the camp of the Muslim army in dar 
al-barb it takes the same rule as applies to Islamic 
territory. But if it occurred outside the camp, it 
takes the rule of being a crime in dar al-barb. 1s 
Abu Hanifah says that the crimes committed by 
Muslim soldiers while they were on their expedition 
should not be punished until they have returned to dar 
al-Islam. This opinion is based on the Tradition which 
says: "Do not cut off the hands of the soldiers 
(during their expeditions). "1e 
Furthermore, AbQ ý; Iantfah maintains that when the 
Muslim and d immi enter dar al-herb as musts' min. 
legally and peacefully, they can perform a contract 
based on rib& (usury) or other voidable ( äsid) 
contracts with the h"arbr or the Muslim resident of dar 
al-harb. '7 For such a contract is conducted based on 
consent and eventually would weakening the position of 
barbi. As for the Muslim residents of d&r al-barb, his 
property in such a territory is in the state of 
uncertainty. This opinion, however, is rejected by Abü 
Yasuf who maintains that the Muslim and dhimmi should 
abide by Islamic law no matter where they are. On the 
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other hand, Muhammad al-Shaybäni agrees with Abo 
Hanifah in the case of ribä contract with a harbi but 
dissents if the same contract is made with a Muslim. Ia 
It should be noted that the Muslim by no means can 
conclude a ribä contract with the dhimmi even though 
they were abroad as it is invalid at home. 
Another case from Abü IIanlfah' s point of view is 
that if the Muslim or d immf enters dar al-harb as 
musta'min. then he got a loan from ha, rbf or vice 
versa; the transaction can not be heard by the Muslim 
judge, though both parties are now in dar al-Islam 
because the deal had taken place outside the realm of 
Muslim jurisdiction. 19 It was also presume that the 
assets of the inhabitants of dar al-Islam is 
permissible to »erbt and vice versa. 20 
We can conclude that the crimes committed by the 
Muslim or dhimmi on a arbS in dar al-herb. according 
to Abo Hanifeh, cannot be punished for lack of 
jurisdiction. This is also true even if the victim, 
Muslim or dihimml, is from dar al-Islam: but the victim 
or his family in dar al-Islam can ask for remedy in 
the form of money or the like. This means that the 
Muslim court cannot impose physical punishment on the 
culprit but can ask for compensation, for the blood of 
the Muslim is inviolability and should not be shed in 
vain. z1 
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2. The Second Theory 
This theory was formulated by AbO YQsuf, " he 
maintains that the Islamic law should be applied to 
all people in dar al-Isl6m whether their residence is 
permanent such as the Muslims or dhimmi or temporary 
in the case of musts' min. This opinion is based, 
besides the Muslims and dhimmi. on the ground that 
musts' min should also abide the rules of Islam by the 
very fact of temporary peace agreement (amän) which 
enables him to stay in dar al-Islam temporarily. 22 The 
fact that he applied to stay in dar al-Islam. even for 
a short period, clearly implies that he accepted the 
law of Islam. Hence, his status is just like a dhimmi 
in this respect. Therefore, a musts' min is liable to 
the same punishment as other residents, in the event 
of committing a crime, in dar al-Isl8m regardless of 
whether the crimes is concerned with the rights of God 
or the rights of his fellow human being. 23 
So the dispute between AbO YQsuf and AbO Hanffah 
is on the criminal responsibility of musts' min in dar 
al-Islam. On the other hand, he agrees with Abo 
H. anifah that the Islamic law is inapplicable to any 
crime committed by the citizen of dar al-Islam abroad 
with two exceptions: 24 
a. It is not permissible for the Muslim or dhimmi 
to conclude a contract based on ribe whether with the 
haarbi or Muslim abroad even though such a contract is 
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deemed lawful. by foreign law. This is because Islamic 
law is binding on the Muslim and dhimmi wherever they 
are. Nevertheless, if they defy the law, there will be 
no punishment for them because the court has no 
jurisdiction at the time of the offence. 25 Hence, the 
legal issue between Abo Yosuf and Abo HanTfah over 
this case is that the latter does not see the act per 
se as forbidden whereas the former looks upon the act 
as unlawful; 2" 
b. In the event of a Muslim prisoner of war being 
killed by a Muslim or himmi in där al-harb. Aba 
fianifah says no qirýdc (retaliation) or diyah (blood- 
money') liable on the killer because being a prisoner, 
the victim has lost his 'ismah (inviolability); 
whereas AbO YQsuf maintains that diyah is still liable 
on the killer because despite being a prisoner, the 
victim still retains his 'ismah. 27 AbO Yüsuf argues 
that the Muslim court, though having no jurisdiction 
for giccan still hear the case for compensation for 
the crime committed abroad if both parties are the 
citizens of dar al-Is18m. This is because the court 
does have jurisdiction over the two parties at the 
time of the request. Thus, the legal issue over this 
case between the two great jurists is the same as 
above. 2$ 
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3. The Third Theory 
It is the positions of Mälik,. Shäfi' i, and Ahmad 
b. Hanbal who express the opinion. that the Islamic law 
is applicable over- every crime committed in där al- 
Islam by any person; Muslim, dhimmi. or musts' min. To 
them the musta'min is treated like the dhimmi in terms 
of criminal responsibility. The rule applied to the 
dhimmi will be applied to him. If the musts' min flees 
after he has committed a crime, he remains liable to 
be punished whenever possible. 29 Up to this point this 
theory seems to be in-harmony with that of Abü Yüsuf. 
But the majority argues further that the Islamic law 
is also applicable over a crime committed by the 
Muslim or d mmi abroad; but not on harbi who has 
become a musta'min. 30 It is precisely because prior to 
become a musta'min, he did not abide by the Islamic 
law during his stay abroad. 31 In the case of a Muslim 
or dhimmi the concept of different domicile (dar) has 
no effect over their liability for a criminal act. 
Therefore, the punishment will be the same no matter 
where the crime has been committed. So the criterion 
is whether the act is lawful or forbidden according to 
the Islamic law not according to the law where he 
resides (during the commission of the crime). For 
example, the Muslim or d immT is liable to punishment 
if he concludes a ribä contract abroad even though 
such a contract is lawful in that country. 32 The same 
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rule would be applied if he committed any other 
criminal act. 33 
If the dhimmf had left där al-Ir-19m for good and 
all and then committed a crime in där al-herb, he is 
not liable to punishment if he returns to dar al-Islam 
because he would be considered as ham rbr and no longer 
dhimmi, by the act of leaving dar al-Islam. The same 
rule applies to a Muslim who had turned apostate and 
left dar al-Islam even if he returns as a Muslim. 34 
The majority also considered the Muslim military camp 
as Islamic territory even though it is in dar al- 
harb. as 
Malik and ShAfi't say that there should be no 
delay in punishing the soldier who committed a crime 
except for sound reason. But Ahmad b. Hanbal says the 
punishment should be delayed until they all return to 
dar el-Islam. 36 
B. Islamic Criminal Law is a Branch of Public Law 
The view expressed by the majority seems to be 
more relevant to the letter and spirit of the Islamic 
law which is originally based its applicability on all 
peoples irrespective of their denominational so long 
as they are under its jurisdiction and readily 
accepted the authority of the Islamic state. In 
addition, the texts have made no distinction between 
the crime which occurred in där al-Is1äm or där al- 
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hharb. Thus, all citizens of d9r al-Isläm should work 
together to prevent the crimes, not to the contrary, 
because the crime is evil and immorality. 37 
Furthermore, the test of state' s sovereignty over 
its territory is whether its law is fully applied to 
all its inhabitants. It is also not in variance with 
the contemporary trend of legists who consider that 
Criminal law is a branch of public law. The Islamic 
Criminal law could be regarded, therefore, as a branch 
of Public law for reasons stated above. 38 To subscribe 
to Aba H. anifah's view would certainly undermine the 
sovereignty of the state and would open plenty of 
leeway for foreigners to abuse the law while there was 
no opportunity for the state to prosecute them. The 
same rationale could be said to Abo Yüsuf's view in 
the sense that it would give a tremendous chances for 
its citizens travelling abroad to commit a criminal 
acts and, at times, it could well be against the state 
itself. The fact that the Muslim judge has no 
jurisdiction, for the crime committed abroad, would 
not by itself deny the crime and its punishment. 
It should be borne in mind that those three 
theories are in agreement that the dhimm!. living in 
dar al-Islpm is liable to the same responsibilities 
for crime as his fellow country-men. Some exception 
for certain cases, in. a specific areas, however, would 
be extend to the dhimmi as will be seen. 
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In addition, the majority opinion which says the 
Islamic Criminal law is applicable for the crime 
committed outside där al-Isläm by its citizens is 
still in operation in Saudi Arabia because it follows 
Hanbalt school of law whose opinion concurs with the 
majority in this case. 39 
We can conclude from the above discussion that 
there are three major practical legal points which 
should be observed: 
1. The Muslims are now living under separate 
Muslim sovereigns. Each has its own system of 
government. Some are apply, to some extent, Islamic 
law; while many others do not. If, for instance, the 
Muslims, who are living temporarily in Saudi Arabia 
for the purposes of trade, labour, performing the 
pilgrimage etc. commit a crime, the Islamic penal law 
will be' applicable to -them, regardless of the 
citizenship of the convicted. 40 This is because Saudi 
Arabia enforces the view that the Muslims are obliged 
to observe the Islamic law no matter where they are so 
long as they are Muslims and the Muslims are but one 
nation. This territorial jurisdiction is now also 
applicable to non-Muslim residents in Saudi Arabia 
because it follows Hanball school of law. It is also 
the trend of the modern notion of sovereignty and the 
jurisdiction of its territorial law in the West; 
2. If the resident of Saudi Arabia, for instance, 
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living temporarily in Turkey, which has adopted 
European law, commits a crime of hum düd or Qisära, he 
will not be punished according to the Islamic law 
in 
Turkey; perhaps what he did is not a crime at all. 
When he returns to Saudi Arabia however the jurists 
differences of opinions that has been highlighted 
above is applicable here. According to the majority, 
he will be punished if convicted in a 
proper trial. 
For, the majority relies on the persona of the 
convicted not the territorial nor religious. If the 
law is deemed applicable, then it will be applied when 
he returns or wherever possible. By contrast, Hanafi 
jurists maintain that the law shall not be applicable 
on him for two reasons: a1 
a. The law will be applicable only when there is a 
de facto not just a de lure jurisdiction; and 
b. The Islamic state that applies the Islamic law 
is called där al-'adl proper; the other is quasi där 
al-baghy. 42 According to the opinion of the school 
the crime which occurred in dar al-baghy is not 
punishable in dar al-'adl even if the criminal has 
given his admission (i rär). For, to them, the 
requirement for punishment is the ability to carry out 
the execution of the punishment at the time of-the act 
even though it may be possible at a later time. "3 
3. If there is an agreement between a state which 
applies Islamic law and a secular Muslim state to the 
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effect that the former shall not apply the Islamic law 
on the latter's residents if they are guilty, the 
agreement is null and void and. takes no legal effect. 
For such an agreement is obviously against the Islamic 
law itself because it has a clear provision to 
obstruct the execution of hudüd let alone its ruling. 
The Prophet is reported to have said: "The Muslims are 
to abide by their requirements (agreement) except to 
allow the forbidden and to forbid the permissible. """ 
C. Classification of Crimes4S 
According to Islamic penal law there are three 
main categories of criminal acts the violation of 
which constitutes a punishment. They are: 
1. Crimes of hur dOd (s. hadd a fixed punishment )4 6 
such as al-zinä (adultery), al-gadhf (false accusation 
of unchastity), shurb al-khamr (drinking wine), al- 
sarigah (theft), al-hiräbah or qat' u al-tarfq (highway 
or armed robbery), al-riddah (apostasy); and al-baghy 
(rebellion against lawful government ). 47 This category 
of crimes can be considered in terms of its impact on 
the state; 
2. Crimes of gisa (retaliation) and diyah (blood- 
money) such as homicides and injuries which include 
bodily harm or parts thereof viz. limb, nose, ears, 
fingers etc. The punishment for these crimes are 
gisäs, diyah or kaffärah (religious expiation). "a 
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Qisäc means to inflict, as an act of retaliation, on 
the culprit (exactly) the same act as he did on the 
victim. 49 This category of crimes and its subsequent 
category can considered as against individual; and 
3. Crimes of ta'zir (discretionary punishment). 
This is a punishment for offences which has no 
specific provision from the Qur'Fan and the sunnah but 
the authority and judges are empowered to deliver a 
sentence on the offender in order to maintain law and 
order in the society. 510 It is not a punishment per se 
rather, a disciplinary measures (ta' dfb). Perhaps it 
is for this reason that led al-Mäwardf defined ta'zir 
as a disciplinary action on offences that God has not 
prescribed by huda . The kind of punishment, however, 
varies depending on the nature of offences and the 
circumstances of the culprits. 51 Therefore, ta' zir is 
a forbidden act that neither God nor the Prophet has 
fixed a specific punishment for it whether it be over 
the rights of God or the rights of human being. For 
instance, not performing a prayer (al-ralät ), or 
fasting, abusing the people, taking usury, breach of 
trust etc. 52 
It is the prerogative of imam. his deputy, or 
judges to decide the case of ta'zir. In discharging 
his duty, the judge should bear in mind several 
factors i. e. the severity of the crime and its 
circumstances, the harm inflicted upon the victim as 
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well as the society, and the circumstances of the 
criminal as to his past, his social background etc. 
All these elements should be considered in passing the 
sentence of ta'zir. 
Finally, it is worthy to note that ta'zir is 
liable on every man or woman who has attained puberty 
Muslim or non-Muslim and whether the victim is Muslim 
or non-Muslim. 53 
D. Crime Against the State 
Generally speaking, morality and law are 
essentials for the stability of political and social 
life of the state. Since Islam seeks to build a 
society and a political community concurrently based 
on its ideology, s" it behoves every citizen to conform 
to its standards and morality, the violation of which 
would certainly upset the whole mechanism of the 
state. It follows that every major crime which 
occurred on its soil, though there is no pure society 
in any age, would be considered as against public 
interest because of its evil and the transgression of 
the security and the stability of the society. ss For 
this reason every crime is deemed to be harmful to the 
security and integrity of the state as well. 
Therefore, the state would do its best to uproot the 
crime and punish the responsible person. But the crime 
and the criminal continue to exit; some are severe and 
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some are minor offences. 
In Islamic law however, all crimes are regarded as 
against the public interest, the security of the state 
and its well-being. S6 But some crimes have a rather 
more direct impact on the security of the state than 
others in terms of its nature and consequences such as 
armed robbery, rebellion and espionage. " These are 
the crimes that jurists have dealt with as crimes 
against the state. This is not to exclude some other 
crimes which may have the same effect and might occur 
from time to time. It is the duty of the authority to 
decide it in the light of the concept of ta'zTr 
because the crimes have not been classified as budod 
since there is no textual provision dealing with it. 
1. Armed Robberyse 
Kasani defines this crime as "Waiting by the way 
or highway to rob a traveller of his property using 
the force of arms so as to obstruct the public on the 
road. " It is immaterial whether the act is committed 
by an individual or a group and whether they are 
equipped with the arms or not. 59 The central element 
of this crime is the act of taking someone's property 
by force; whereas in theft the basic element is the 
taking of someone else's property by stealth. The 
original provision for this act is to be found in the 
Qur' än as follows: 
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The only recompense of those who make war 
upon God and his Messenger and strive after 
corruption in the land will be that they 
will be killed or crucified, or have their 
hands and feet on alternate sides cut off, 
or will be expelled out of the land. Such 
will be their degradation in the world, and 
in the Hereafter theirs will be an awful 
doom; 
Save those who repent before ye overpower 
them. For know that God is Forgiving, 
Merciful-60 
The Qur'än labels the culprit of this crime as 
muhe rib (pl. muhäribOn). The punishment for it is in 
the add category as stated above. 
" It is reported that a group of people from the 
tribes of cUkal and 4Uraynah came to Medina and 
subsequently felt ill. The Prophet advised them to go 
to the, place where the camels of $adagah (charity or 
alms-giving) were grazing and have some of its urine 
to cure the disease. Soon after their recovery, they 
brutally killed the guard of the camels and took the 
camels away. The Prophet sent some of his Companions 
after them and they were captured. Then the Prophet 
punished them by cutting of their hands, feet and 
gouging out their eyes, exactly as they had done to 
the camel's guard. '' 
There are two conflicting views concerning the 
link between this case and the verses above. According 
to Tabart these verses were revealed to inform the 
Prophet how to punish such a crime after the Prophet 
had made his own decision. Tabari further reports that 
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there is a view saying that the Prophet did not gouge 
out the eyes of the culprits. Qurýubl says that the 
punishment of the Prophet was before the revelation of 
hum verses. 62 On the other hand, the majority held 
that those verses were revealed after the punishment 
had been carried out to reaffirm the decision of the 
Prophet. 63 At any rate, the decision of the Prophet 
was in conformity with some of the general rules of 
the qur'An in the law of retaliation. 6' 
Some jurists, particularly the Hanafis, claim that 
in order for the muhe rib to be liable for punishment, 
the victim must be the Muslim or dhimmf. If the victim 
is musta'min there will be no hadd punishment for 
robbery but ta'zir would be imposed on him. 65 Their 
rationale, as has been stated above, is that the 
inviolability of musts' min's property is in the state 
of quasi permissibility from the fact that he is the 
citizen of dar al-harb. 66 For the majority of Muslim 
jurists however, this view is not only weak but 
baseless. It is inconceivable that the musts' min, who 
had been given an aman pact by the Islamic state and 
thus enjoys the inviolability as to his life and 
property, would be in the state of uncertainty and no 
protection from the state. Further, once the amen had 
been granted it must be respected by all citizens of 
the Islamic state, and it is comprehensive including 
the property. Had he not been given the amän and lived 
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outside the Islamic territory, the case certainly 
would be different. 67 
The majority opinion is also in line with the 
concept of justice in Islamic law. Above all, it 
implants the credibility and the trust in the pact 
given by the Islamic state. As a result, it can 
promote international relations, trade, and facilitate 
the relationship between citizens of different 
countries. 6a 
a. Punishment for Armed Robbery 
From the verses quoted above, 69 the jurists have 
agreed that there are four prescribed punishments for 
the crime of hiräbah, i. e. capital punishment, 
crucifixion , cutting off the 
hands and feet on the 
opposite sides (the right hand and the left foot, or 
vice versa), and banishment or exile. However, the 
jurists differ concerning inflicting these 
punishments. But they are in complete agreement about 
the death penalty-70 
If the muharib murders and robs the victim, he 
would be killed or crucified; if he just murders 
without robbing, he would be killed; in the event of 
robbing without killing, his hand and foot would then 
be cut off on the opposite sides; and if he obstructs 
on the road or the highway so as to cause fear about 
the safety of the travellers but neither kills nor 
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robs the people, he would be banished. This is the 
view of the most jurists including Shafi'f, Ahmad b. 
Hanbal, and the tendency of Hanaf f school. 71 As for 
Mäliki jurists, after agreeing that the criminal must 
be killed if he murders his victim, they tend to give 
a freedom of choice to the imam 
(or judges) in 
determining the kind of punishments in the event of 
robbing, that is to say, the judge has an alternative 
among the three punishments, i. e. killing, 
crucifixion, and cutting off the hand and foot; if the 
criminal posing a threat on the road, without killing 
nor robbing, the judge has an alternative among the 
four punishments namely, killing, crucifixion, cutting 
off the hand and foot, and banishment. 72 In short, the 
purists differ as to the imposition of punishment 
according to the nature of crime not according to the 
nature of the personal character of the criminal. 
: ýdhiri jurists such as 
Ibn Hazm held that the judge 
had an absolute choice among the four punishments. 73 
In addition, Ibn Hazm maintains that crucifixion is a 
separate punishment which should not run concurrently 
with the rest of punishments. Therefore, if the judge 
decides to impose this punishment, the criminal would 
be crucified alive, left until he dies and then 
buried. 74 When Malik was asked about this punishment, 
he replied: "I have never heard of anyone who was 
crucified except a man called al-Härith who was 
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crucified in the time of the Caliph 'Abd al-Malik b. 
Marwän (65/685-86/705) after claiming to be a 
Prophet. 75 This observation of Mälik indicates that 
this punishment was prescribed solely to deter the 
potential criminal in order to prevent the commission 
of this grave crime by the threat of unusual 
punishment. 74 Nevertheless, though it is the most 
severe of all prescribed punishments, the Prophet did 
not inflict it upon the people of 'Ukal and 'Uraynah 
as we have pointed out above. 
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b. Punishment for non-Muslims and its Implications 
We have seen earlier that the sphere of criminal 
responsibility includes both Muslims and non-Muslims 
alike provided that the act committed is deemed 
criminal and punishable by law. The criterion is 
therefore whether the act, not the person, is 
punishable. This is in addition to the fact that Penal 
law is the Public law which governs the relationship 
between the state and individual. When we look upon 
the act of armed robbery, whether it is against 
individual or public, it is clear that the crime is 
against peace and tranquillity of the society as well 
as the security of the state resulting from the 
turmoil of public order. 
Moreover, there is no proviso as to the religion 
of the criminal in the verse in question. Hence, 
religious background is not a criterion in punishing 
the criminal and it can not be a defence. 77 It is 
logical therefore that the dhimml as well as the 
Muslim will be liable for punishments of hirabah 
should he commit the crime. This is the view of the 
majority of the jurists. They held that the dhimmi is 
obliged to observe the Islamic law because he is the 
resident of dar al-Islam. Hence, all huudOd punishments 
are applicable to him except in certain cases such as 
hadd for liquor. 7& 
It entails a fundamental legal question as to the 
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status of dhimml after committing this grave crime, 
i. e. would it impair his contract? The jurists' view 
are not in agreement over this issue. The Mäliki, 
Eianaf1, and Shöfi'i schools held that the contract 
remains intact. 79 According to Shäfi'i, in his drafted 
proposal of the contract, the act by itself would 
invalidate the contract. 80 This is also the position 
of Abts Thawr8 s as well as the : ýdhirf school. 82 On the 
other hand, there are two views from the Hanball 
school. The first is that the contract is null and 
void hence, the dhimmi's life and property would 
immediately, as a result, become permissible. For, his 
status is now just like that of ha, rbf. The other view 
held that the contract remains in operation; thus the 
dhimmi would liable for punishment like the Muslim. 83 
It would seen appropriate that the contract should 
remain intact because it had been concluded primarily 
as a permanent one and the dhimmi, by virtue of the 
contract, has become a permanent resident of dar al- 
Islam. Hence, any liability, if any, should be treated 
and punished in the same way as for a Muslim. a+ 
As for the musta' min, who commits the crime of 
hir äbah during his stay in dar al-Islam, the }Ianafi 
jurists, as we have stated their position earlier, are 
split among themselves as to whether the musta'min is 
punishable or not. According to al-Awzä'i the 
musta'min is liable for punishment depending on the 
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nature of crime he committed. as It seems appropriate 
that the musts'min should be liable for the same 
punishment as the Muslim because the 
Islamic Penal law 
is applicable to all people living in dar al-Islam. 
In 
addition, the crime occurred within the 
jurisdiction 
of the Muslim court. 86 Moreover, crime of any sort is 
an evil and threatening the stability of society, 
therefore it is pro bono publico to prevent and punish 
such a crime, otherwise the society would live at the 
mercy of the criminals. 
2. Rebellion (al-Baghy )8 7 
Legally speaking, the crime of rebellion is an act 
of organized armed resistance by a group of people to 
challenge the authority of. the lawful imam 
(government). 6° They may or may not have a Justifiable 
reason. But from constitutional point of view they are 
against an established government. It is a political 
manoeuvre seeking the replacement of the imam through 
the use of force, hence imposing their will by force 
rather than peaceful means. Therefore, it is a 
dangerous crime that could jeopardise the stability of 
the state. In short, al-baghy means opposing the imam 
by armed struggle. 
According to 'Awdah there are three elements of 
crime in this act namely, opposing the imam; using the 
force of arms; and criminal intention, i. e. the 
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intention of bß"89 Those three elements must be 
clearly seen from their activity in order 
for them to 
be judged as bughet. The act of opposing however, may 
not be necessarily against the imäm 
himself, but it is 
sufficient to establish it 
if they oppose his 
representatives or his orders. 90 
The law regulating this act is as follows: 
And if two parties of believers fall to 
fighting, then make peace between them. And 
if one party of them doth wrong to the 
other, fight ye that which doth wrong till 
it return unto the ordinance of God; then, 
if it return, make peace between them 
justly, and act equitably. Lo! God loveth 
the equitable. 
The believers are naught else than 
brothers. Therefore make peace between your 
brethren and observe your duty to God that 
. 
haply ye may obtain mercy. 91 
There are five principles can be drawn from the 
verses above: 
a. They remain to be the believers despite of the 
fact that they are bughät: for the Qur'än called them 
the believers; 
b. They should be oppressed by any means; 
c. If they stop their activities; the operation 
must be ceased; 
d. There will be no additional charge against 
them if during the fighting they have caused to damage 
the lives or properties; and 
e. The verse permits fighting against those who 
disregard their duties. 92 
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(i) The Punishment for Bughät 
According to the verse cited above the punishment 
for bughät is to fight against them if they overtly 
show disloyalty or resist the imam, disregard their 
duties and prepare to launch resistance. It is the 
same punishment whether they have appointed their imam 
or not. 93 The }ianafl school held that the imam should 
fight them immediately even though they have not 
started the attack. For, the fact that they have 
assembled and doing necessary preparation for the war 
is a prima facie to demonstrate their intention. Thus, 
it is necessary to launch the attack on them before 
they become stronger and eventually would be difficult 
to annihilate them. 94 However, before launching the 
attack, the im8m should warn and call on them so that 
they may return to the fold. 95 This is precisely what 
'Ali b. Abt TBlib has done to Khawdrij96 when he sent 
'Abdalldh b. 'Abbas to try to mediate them. As a 
result, some of them withdrew to 'Ali. For those who 
remained unconvinced 'Ali said: "We still honour you 
three things: we shall not stop you entering the 
mosque; we shall not begin fighting (you); and we 
shall not deprive you of your share of fay' so long as 
you are with us. "97 
Al-Mdwardi suggests that the imam while in the 
course of fighting bughät, should not get the 
assistance from non-Muslims whether mu'ähid or 
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dhimmi. 98 
If for any reason, the bughät return to the fold 
(jamw ah) and pronounce their loyalty to the imäm, the 
operation against them must be ceased. 99 
(ii) Punishment for-non-Muslims 
In the event of the dhimmi being involved in the 
crime of baghy there can be two separate cases namely; 
either they commit it by themselves or they join 
Muslims bugh9t. It is immaterial here whether the 
Muslims have recourse to their assistance or vice 
versa and the degrees of their assistance. 
The First Case 
The opinion of the schools are almost unanimous 
that by the commission of the act, the contract is 
dissolved. This view was held by Hanaft, Shsfi 'i, and 
HanbalI schools. 10° As for the opinion of the Malik! 
school they express two separate cases for the dhimmis 
viz. if the d mm s fight against injustice, their 
contract is not dissolved; but if they fight for no 
cause, their contract certainly will be dissolved. 1°1 
The Second Case 
The Hanaf i jurists held that the dhimmi would be 
punishable according to the provision provided for the 
crime but his contract would remain unaffected. They 
contend that the position of dhimmi in this case is 
just like that of Muslims. Since the Muslim remains in 
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his faith despite his act so does the dhimml with 
respect to his status. 102 
There are two opinions reported from Shäfi' i and 
Hanbali schools respectively. The first view is that 
the contract is void as in the case of the dhimml 
fighting the Muslims by their own. Consequently, the 
dhimmi will revert to his status of haarbf. 103 They 
further contend that if the dhimmis claim that they 
have been forced to join the rebels, the contract is 
not void. The same applies if the dhimml: believe that 
they have to join the rebels. 104 By contrast, the 
second view held that the contract is unvoidable 
because the dhimmi. in so doing is not in the position 
to know who is right and who is wrong in the conflict; 
in other words he is actually in the state of doubt 
(shubhah). It is an established principle that in 
criminal matter, or in any legal judgement, the 
accused can not be prosecuted if there is a doubt 
about the case in question. The principle derived from 
the Tradition of the Prophet which says that: "Ward 
off the hum by doubts. "i °s It follows that according 
to this second view, the punishment for the dhimml is 
identical to that of Muslim rebels (ahl al-baghy as 
opposed to ahl al-' adl or ahl al-hagg ). However, this 
view argues that the dhimmf. in this case, is 
responsible for any damage that he has done to the 
Muslims during the fighting or without the fighting 
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whether it be civil or criminal damages, be it to 
life, bodily injuries or properties. lob 
It seems appropriate that the dhimmi should be 
treated as the Muslim rebels in this case since he is 
the inhabitant of dar al-Islam and the contract, once 
concluded, is for life. The famous saying of 'All c'an 
be cited here that "For him (dhimmi) whatever 
[things] 
for us and against him whatever [things] against 
us". 107 Therefore, there should be no room for unequal 
treatment between the Muslim and the dhimmi rebels in 
whatever aspect it might be. 
As for the must a' min, if he renders assistance to 
the Muslim rebels, whether he is asked or otherwise, 
his pact will be voidable and he would become ham rbi. 
If he claims that he is forced to join the rebels, the 
burden of proof is on him. This is the opinion of the 
Shafi'I and Hanball schools. 108 On the other hand, the 
Hanaft jurists held that the contract is unvoidable 
like the position of di mi' above. However, if the 
musta'min fights the Muslims alone all schools agreed 
that the am8n pact is void. 109 
It should be noted that Saudi Arabia, whose 
official school is Hanball, has made a provision that 
whosoever, has been granted Saudi nationality by 
naturalization, and commits, or is an-accomplice to, 
a crime against the security of the state or has been 
convicted of criminal act, will loss his nationality 
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if the government deems proper, within the period of 
five years from the date of his naturalization. 'I'D 
This provision clearly conforms with the law of baghy 
according to Hanball school in respect of 
dhimmi. 
3. Espionage Crime (t a_i assus 
It can be defined as an activity seeking to obtain 
secret information about the affairs of the Muslims 
and the Islamic state and pass it to the enemy. tit 
There is no doubt that this clandestine activities is 
a grave crime that will jeopardise the security and 
safety of the state especially during the war-time. 112 
In the modern context this can involve the use of 
sophisticated technological means not only in military 
affairs but also in economic, trade, and industrial 
matters. Many new developments in spying have taken 
place including using the satellite as a medium of 
spying activity. 113 
In Islamic history however, there was a report 
from several authorities that when the Prophet decided 
to take over Mecca, H. Faýib b. Abi Balta'ah sent the 
message to Quraysh informing them about the Prophet 
preparation through a woman. The letter was 
intercepted, and he confessed the truth. Thinking that 
H. 8tib was a traitor, GUmar asked permission from the 
prophet to cut his head off. But the Prophet disagreed 
and replied: "How do you know 'Umar? Perhaps God looks 
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favourably on those who joined the battle of Badr 
(häb al-Badrý and said, 'Do as you please, for, I 
have forgiven you. '" " According to some authorities, 
the Prophet's reluctance was in order to acknowledge 
Hätib's participation in the decisive battle of Badr. 
He was forgiven as he told the truth and his motive 
did not appear to be heinous and a hypocrite. it5 
However, the Prophet's decision gave rise to a 
conflict of opinions among the jurists as to what to 
do with the Muslim spy. 
The Qur'dn warns the Muslims not to engage in the 
spying activity. It says: 
0 ye who believe! Shun much suspicion; for 
lol some suspicion is a sin. And spy not, 
neither backbite one another. Would one of 
you love to eat the flesh of his dead 
brother? Ye abhor that (so abhor the 
other )l And keep your duty to God. Lo! God 
is relenting, Merciful. 114 
The Qur'an condemns those who engage in that 
activities and used a metaphorical language in order 
to appeal to man's emotions as well as his reason. 
Clearly that the act of espionage is forbidden in 
Islam. The verse above speaks clearly to this effect. 
The jurists are not in agreement as to what punishment 
should be inflicted on the Muslim if he is caught 
spying against the Islamic state. The Hanaff school 
held that the man should be punished by torture and 
long imprisonment until he repents. 117 On the other 
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hand, MdlikS jurists such as Ibn Qäsim and Sahnon are 
of the opinions that Lman should be killed and no 
repentance should be sought from him. 118 Shäf i'i 
maintains that since the crime is not under hudüd 
category, it certainly would fall under ta' zir and it 
will be left to the i_itihad of imäm to decide the 
proper punishment-119 
a. Punishment for non-Muslims 
It is understood that the non-Muslims who are the 
residents of the Islamic state, whether dhimmi or 
musta' min. are bona fide residents. If a dhimmi is 
caught or involved in the espionage activity against 
the Islamic state the jurists have expressed two views 
with respect to his contract. 
The first view is that his contract becomes void 
thus, he will be treated like ham rbz. This is the 
opinion of 'Awzd't, Mäliki and some Hanbali 
jurists. 120 'Awzä'i says that the imäm could either 
kill or crucify him. 1a1 
On the other hand, the second view held that the 
contract is not void. He is punishable like the Muslim 
spy and should not be killed. This is the opinions of 
Hanaff and Shdfi'f schools. 122 They maintain that 
since the Muslim spy has not lost his faith the same 
is the case for the dhimmi with respect to his 
contract. It would seem appropriate that the dhimm! 
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should be treated and punished like the Muslims as has 
been stated above. But, it should be recalled that 
since there is no prescribed punishment for the crime 
in the texts, i. e. the Qur' än and sunnah, the crime 
would certainly fall under ta'zir punishment. The area 
of tazir however is so broad that the imäm can 
exercise his power, according to the principle of 
public interest (maclahah), ranging from killing to as 
light a punishment as a reprimand. 123 There are two 
reports saying that the Prophet used to order his 
Companions to kill the spy who had been arrested and 
fled. 124 
The jurists are also split concerning the 
must a' min who happens to be a spy. While Iianaf f and 
Shdfi'i held that his aman is not affected because the 
musts' min takes the rule of a dhimmi; 125 Mäliki says 
that his am6n pact is void. 126 For the contract is 
concluded on the understanding that he display good 
conduct and not pose a threat to the state. As for the 
punishment of musta' min spy, it seems that the view of 
Abfl Yasuf, that is to be killed, is more relevant to 
the present situation where we find that most modern 
legislations treated spying as a capital crime. 127 
Finally, it should be noted that the ultimate 
objective of the Islamic law, including the penal` law, 
is to preserve the five necessities in human life, 
namely, religion, life, mind, property, and 
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progeny. 128 So, if one examines closely into every 
piece of Islamic law, it should be found that the law 
is promulgated either to promote or to preserve one of 
these five necessities. 
E. Crimes Against Individual 
The jurists divide these crimes in a variety of 
categories. But all agree that at least there are 
three kinds of homicide namely, al 'amd (deliberate 
intent or murder), shubh al-'amd (quasi-deliberate 
intent or manslaughter), and kha a' (accidental or 
mistake). 129 In Islamic law, the crime of homicide is 
considered as a major crime. In religious terms it is 
one of the grave sin (kabä' ir). The first homicide in 
human history as revealed by the Qur'än was between 
the two children of Adam. 130 The punishment ordained 
in Islamic law for homicide and the infliction of 
injury or wound is called gi$ä or acýwad (retaliation) 
that is to inflict exactly the same act on the 
convicted as he did to the Victim. 131 Alternatively, 
there is diyah (blood-money) or kaffärah (religious 
expiation). 
1. Historical Background 
The concept of retaliation, however, was not a 
product of Islam. It prevailed in pre-Islamic Arabia 
where every tribe was busy fighting each other for 
171 
vengeance (tha'r)132 and for the sense of tribal 
pride. Revenge was taken not only against the killer 
but also against any member of killer's tribe. This 
state of affairs would continue even resulting from a 
trivial reason and would take years of enmity. 133 It 
was under this circumstance that Islam introduced the 
law of gisär- 
The Qur'än radically altered the legal incidents 
of homicide. Henceforth, only one life, the life of 
the murderer himself, was due for the life of the 
victim. The term tha'r therefore being replaced by 
that of i2ä (just retaliation). 134 This is not the 
only case, particularly in the domain of law, where 
the Qur'an came to modify the existing practice of 
pre-Islamic Arabia in order to align it with its 
standards of ethical justice. Hence, the status quo is 
tacitly amended unless it is expressly ratified. In 
this case the maxim of a life for a life itself stems 
from the broader religious principle that all Muslims 
are equal in the sight of God. 135 It follows that the 
requirement for just retaliation allows only one life 
to be taken, the life of the murderer, irrespective of 
the social status of the victim. 136 This is also the 
position of Islam with respect to diyah. Although, it 
was known among the Arabs as a peaceful alternative to 
continuous revenge, the amount agreed upon varied 
depending on the individual's position in his 
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tribe. 137 Such a practice was not only unjust, it was 
also immoral. Therefore, according to Islam, the 
maximum amount of money should be fixed for all 
persons irrespective of his social status. 
It is a major departure, brought by Islam, from 
what had been practiced by the Arabs with respect to 
the concept of gisäs. In addition, in the law of 
as an alternative to the pre-Islamic practice, 
Islam allows the victim or his nearest relative three 
options: first, the right to demand the execution of 
qip against the murderer; second, the right to 
pardon the murderer in return for his paying the fixed 
amount of blood-money; and third, the right to pardon 
him for the sake of God. 138 For the Muslims believed 
that the true reward, in this situation, is the reward 
from God in the Hereafter. The Qur' än and the Prophet 
have repeatedly encouraged the parties concerned to 
resort to this last choice. 139 This will illustrate 
the bond of continuity between the temporal life and 
the life to come. Alternatively, the least of all, the 
combination of diyah and forgiveness produces a 
powerful material and spiritual inducement to forsake 
Zä . '4° However, if the culprit is pardoned in 
accordance with the principles discussed above, he 
probably would still facing ta'zir punishment from the 
authority. It is for this reason, perhaps, that Malik, 
Layth, and Awzä' i say that the accused despite having 
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been forgiven, should be flogged one hundred lashes 
and jailed for a year. 141 It should 
be noted that the 
concept of pardon in the Islamic penal 
law is not in 
harmony with the modern notion of Western oriented 
legal systems. It appears to be that Islamic penal law 
of homicide is a crime purely against individual; the 
remedy for which is the concern of the victim and his 
relatives. But as has been pointed out earlier, at the 
outset of this investigation, that every crime in 
Islam is considered as against society. Hence the 
state, for a simple reason, that it is not only 
interrupt the personal life of the victim and his 
family, but it threatens the peaceful and harmonious 
life of the society as a whole. 142 For it is the 
primary message of Islam to bring peace and order, and 
to enjoin good and forbid evil. It was under these 
principles that the Islamic penal law was prescribed 
and it should be understood accordingly. 
2. The Law of Homicide 
As has been said earlier, the punishment- for 
homicide and the inflicting injury in Islamic penal 
law could be either i är,! 143 whether for homicide or 
maiming, or diyah and kaffärah. The last two usually 
are used in cases of accidental homic ide. 
The law concerning the qis for deliberate 
homicide is as follows: 
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Q ye who believe! Retaliation is prescribed 
for you in the matter of the murdered; the 
freeman for the freeman, and the slave for 
the slave, and the female for the female. 
And for him who is forgiven somewhat by his 
(injured) brother, prosecution according to 
usage and payment unto him in kindness. 
This is an alleviation and a mercy from 
your Lord. He who transgresseth after this 
will have a painful doom. 
And there is life for you in retaliation, 0 
men of understanding, that ye may ward off 
(evil). 1"" 
As for the accidental homicide we read: 
It is not for a believer to kill a believer 
unless (it be) by mistake. He who hath 
killed a believer by mistake, must set free 
a believing slave, and pay the blood-money 
to the family of the slain, unless they 
remit it as a charity.... 145 
From the verses above, the jurists laid down the 
principle that there will be no , as the verses 
suggest, for accidental homicide, but the blood-money 
and penance, or kaffärah is required. 1'6 
i can only be executed in the case of 
deliberate or intentional homicide. 147 According to 
Käsäni the amount of blood-money in the time of the 
Prophet was one hundred camels or one thousand dinar. 
The dIyah of the woman being half of the man. This 
proportion, however, was also the consensus of the 
Companions including 'Umar I, 'Ali, Ibn Mas'üd, and 
Zayd b. Thabit. According to Hanafi school there is no 
disparity as to diyah of non-Muslims with that of 
Muslims-146 In the case of accidental or quasi- 
deliberate homicide, the blood-money is to be paid by 
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the family ('ägilah) of the killer in three years. 'a9 
The kaffärah. however, mixtures a sense of 
penitence and repentance and it usually takes in the 
forms of manumission (' it ä4 ), in the past, of the 
Muslim slave, if one can afford it. 150 Alternatively, 
fasting for a period of two months consecutively. is' 
It is a unanimous agreement of the jurists that 
kaff9rah is prescribed for accidental homicide 
together with diyah. 152 
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3. The Power to Carry Out the Execution of Qic 
The Qur' än says: 
And slay not the life which God hath 
forbidden save with right. Whoso is slain 
wrongfully, we have given power (authority) 
unto his heir, but let him not commit 
excess in slaying. Lol he will be 
helped. is3 
According to Zamakhsharl the verse above clearly 
indicates that the power to demand the execution for 
gisäs against the murderer rests with the victim's 
heir or next of kin; if the victim has no legal 
heir, 154 then the imam acts as his heir or legal 
guardian and carries out-55 the i äc against the 
convicted. 156 Therefore, it is the right of the 
victim's heir to exercise his power or authority 
(sul än ), as expressed by the Qur' än, to demand gi räß 
otherwise Wir cannot be legally executed. On this 
the jurists have no disagreement. Further, the jurists 
say that when qiraac is demanded and the murderer is 
properly convicted, it is the right of the heir to 
carry out the iß52 and he should not be deprived of 
this right if he is capable of doing so, in the proper 
way, except in the case of i, ý of the injuries. For 
it needs a special skill to carry it out. It is for 
the best interests of both parties to delegate it to 
the surgeon in the case of injuries. This is the 
opinions of the four schools. 1s7 
However, the relatives of the murdered person can 
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delegate the power of iq to someone else. But all 
of them should be present to witness the execution. 
For, it is hoped that they or one of them would 
declare pardon at the last moment. Or, perhaps the 
absent (relative) has already given his pardon. Is8 For 
the right to forgive belongs to every member of the 
victim's family including husband and wife. If anyone 
of the heirs, who has sound judgement, pardons the 
murderer, the rest of the family must concur and gi 
is no longer carried out on the convicted. 159 This is 
the majority view of the jurists including 'Atd, 
Nakha'i, Thawrl, AbO Han1f ah, Shäf i'i., Ahmad b. Hanbal 
and others-160 
The question to be decided now is whether the 
state, rather than the grieved party, should have the 
power to carry out the qirearit It has been stated that 
the jurists have expressed their concern about the 
viability of the heirs, as to the experience and the 
skill, in carrying out the qirac, though it is 
primarily their right, especially in the injuries. The 
prevailing view (r&. iih) among the jurists is not to 
allow the heir to carry out the injurious gisa. s6s It 
is this reason, perhaps, which gave rise to the idea 
of delegation which has been recognised by most 
jurists. Delegation (wikälah) is by no means an alien 
concept in Islamic law. The party to be entrusted, 
therefore, in this respect is the state as an agent 
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for the heirs. All they need to do is to give their 
consent to the agency of the state, as the law 
enforcing power, in carrying out the iFä on their 
behalf. This solution is not against the spirit of the 
verse above. On the contrary, it is the necessity of 
the time where it is observed that all the means of 
the execution is in the hand of the state. In the 
past, everyone knew how to use weapons but that 
situation hardly exists now with the restrictions 
against having weapons imposed by the state. Therefore 
in one way or another the state has to intervene in 
the execution of qi! 26 through its machinery. 
Therefore, according to 'Awdah it is the necessity of 
the day to prevent the heirs of the victim from 
carrying out gis62 by their own. 162 It is the state's 
responsibility to appoint experts to carry it out. The 
heirs should give their consent for ica or pardon if 
they wish. 143 According to Shäf i 'i the experts should 
get their pay from the state as the judges do. 164 It 
is clear that the task of the execution itself has 
become the state's responsibility for reasons stated 
above. This view is held by all the contemporary 
writers on the subject. 265 According to El-Awa, "the 
strongest evidence used to support this view is that 
in the Qur'ön gicar, is described as the duty of the 
Muslim community, which cannot be carried out except 
through a representative, who would be, in this case, 
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the judge or ruler. "166 To support his argument, El- 
Awe quoted the opinion of Shaltüt who says that, "the 
duties of the community in Islam are two-fold. First, 
there are the duties obligatory for each individual 
(fard 'ayn) such as prayer, fasting, and alms-giving; 
second, there are those carried out by a 
representative acting on behalf of the community 
(far 
kifäyah), since it is impossible for each Muslim to 
perform them individually. One of these duties is the 
carrying out of girpäs when it is demanded. 167 
4. Some Disputed Points 
In the matter of Qirýä c. there are several disputed 
points among the jurists such as the execution of 
Qýsas_ against a father who kills his son, against a 
group of several people who kill a single person, and 
against a Muslim who kills a non-Muslim or vice versa. 
Since our subject of enquiry is only concern the 
relationship between Muslim and non-Muslim, we shall 
only deal with the last point. 
a. Qicar Against a Muslim for killing a non-Muslim 
In the event of a Muslim intentionally killing a 
dhimmi or musts' min, the jurists are split as to 
whether the law of gisär is applicable to him. Their 
opinions can be summarised into three groups: 
(i) The Muslim is not liable to qi rä2 whether he 
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kills a dhimmi or musta'min. This is the majority 
opinion of jurists including Malik!, Shäfi'z., Hanbali, 
7ahari and others. 168 
(ii ) The Muslim is liable to 5. This is the 
view of Hanafi school. But AbO Yüsuf holds that the 
Muslim is also liable for gisä if he kills musts' min. 
It is a major departure from the opinion of the 
school. 169 
(iii) The Mälikf school and al-Layth say that if 
a Muslim kills a dhimmf by way of deceit (ghflah), 
only then would the Muslim be killed. The punishment 
in this case is solely for his evil not for qisär,. 
They further contend that if the victim's relatives 
have forgiven the killer, the forgiveness is not 
considered, and the killer would still be killed. 170 
It appears that in cases of hg fleh the musts' min also 
should be considered, in this context, as a dhimmi for 
the term non-Muslim (k6 fir) usually denotes a 
Lnusta' min but not aý rbi as has been discussed 
above. 17s 
The majority view is supported by the Qur'änic 
verses which declare that non-Muslims are not equal to 
Muslims172 and by the tradition which says that the 
Muslim should not be killed for the killing of non- 
Muslim. 173 The majority further contends that there is 
a consensus among the scholars that the Muslim will 
not be prosecuted if he murders musta'min. Therefore 
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the same condition is applied to dhimmi. 174 To support 
their arguments the majority quoted a Tradition which 
says that "the bloods of Muslims are equal". Hence, it 
implies that there is no equality between the blood of 
a Muslim and a non-Muslim. For one of the requirements 
of aiýjäs is equality between the two parties. Since 
there is no equality in this case; the gisära should 
not be carried out. 175 
On the other hand, the HanafT jurists maintain 
that the tradition in question, which forbade the 
giT säs of a Muslim for non-Muslim, is meant for killing 
of non-Muslim barbi whose blood is not inviolable and 
a subject of agreement among the schools. Therefore, 
what is meant by the tradition was the killing of 
barbi because the dhimml is to be killed should he 
kill another himmi but not in the case of haý rbl 
killed by a Muslim or dhimmf. As to the consensus 
alleged by the majority, it has been pointed out 
earlier that Abo YQsuf says otherwise and the opinion 
of Hanafl school tend to consider the inviolability of 
musta'min as temporal which is by no means tantamount 
to that of a dhimmT with respect to his contract. 176 
In terms of inequality raised by the majority, the 
Hanaff jurists hold that difference of religion stands 
no barrier in iqSc. In other words the faith of the 
party is not a prerequisite for carrying out qi§ä5 . 177 
This could be seen from the fact that if a dhimm! 
182 
murders another dhimmi. the murderer would still be 
liable for gicä though he has become a Muslim despite 
the fact that the religions of both parties are now is 
not identical-178 Therefore, the equality in all 
aspects is not a. condition for icaa as in the cases 
of learned and ignorant, male and female, handicapped 
or otherwise etc. As to the tradition which says that 
the blood of Muslims is equal, the IIanafi jurists say 
that the equality rendered in the tradition was among 
the Muslims themselves so as not to be treated 
differently between the rich and the poor, the noble 
and the common or the like. There is no evidence to 
suggest that it was to discriminate between Muslim and 
d mmi. 179 
In addition to their response to the majority 
view, the Hanaff jurists support their position by 
arguing that in the application of the general meaning 
of the Qur'dnic verses pertaining to cisäý there is 
no discrimination between a Muslim and a dhimmi. 180 
The faith of the party, however, plays no role in the 
application of gicc. Further, they contend that the 
Prophet is reported to have said: "The life of a 
Muslim can only be taken in three cases: the case of a 
married person who commits adultery; one who has 
killed a human being; and one who has forsaken his 
religion and left his community". 181 From this 
tradition, one can conclude that the Prophet simply 
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mentioned, the victim was a human being including 
Muslims and non-Muslims alike. 182 In addition, it was 
reported that the Prophet ordered the prosecution of a 
Muslim for the killing of a dhimmi. 183 The same was 
reported from 'Umar I, GAli, Ibn Mas'üd and CUmar 
11.184 It is further argued that the implementation of 
aisäs was, among other things, for the preservation of 
human life. This end could also be achieved by the 
application of qu a as between Muslims and dhimmi. las 
On the other hand, it was reported that Mälik 
said, "What is done in our community is that a Muslim 
is not killed for a non-Muslim unless the Muslim kills 
him by deceit. Then he is killed for it. "1 a6 
Having exposed all arguments and evidences of each 
school, it seems that the opinion of the Hanafi school 
is more relevant to the general spirit of the Qur'än 
especially the verses pertaining to gicä!. To confine 
the application of aisäs to cases involving the 
killing of Muslims alone would contradict the 
principle of the law of itself, for this law was 
made in order to protect human life, and if one 
imposes such a limitation on it, it is a clear 
contradiction of its purposes. 187 Moreover, the IHanaff 
school rightly holds that the equality, in this 
context, means that both parties must be human being; 
therefore, if any human being kills another human 
being, the killer is liable to giraäs irrespective of 
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the faith of the victim. As for the Qur' änic verses 
cited by other schools to support their position that 
there is inequality between the Muslims and non- 
Muslims, they all relate to the Hereafter, hence none 
of them is relevant to the issue in question. 188 In 
addition, the Tradition cited by the majority needs an 
explanation. According to Ja$$äq the explanation given 
by IHanaff school is harmonious with the general spirit 
of Islamic law rather than that given by the 
majority. "°9 
Moreover, another argument which supports the 
HanafS's view is that there is a complete consensus 
among the jurists that if a Muslim steals a non- 
Muslim's property and he is convicted, the Muslim's 
hand is to be amputated. 190 The reason was for the 
protection of non-Muslim's property and the 
prohibition of stealing. It is a paradox that the 
majority would favour and grant more protection to the 
property of a non-Muslim than his life. 191 It may be 
defended on the grounds that the punishment for theft 
is the right of God whereas gisäs is the right of 
human being. 192 Such an objection is not valid for 
the simple reason that the prescription of theft 
punishment, besides being the right of God, is 
essentially for the protection of property. 193 It 
seems that by upholding the contract of dhimmah, it is 
sufficient to prosecute anyone who kills a dhimmf for 
185 
no reason. It is also a major deterrent to safeguard 
the life of the dhimmi against unwarranted homicide. 
This is the trend of the contemporary scholars who 
advocate consistency in applying the rule of law to 
all parties-194 The difference of opinions among the 
jurists however is no more than a matter of difference 
interpretation of the texts in question. Finally, it 
should be noted that the view of Hanaf t school, in 
this respect, is in line with modern legislations 
which make no difference in punishment among the 
people of different religions. 19s 
5. Oic&r for Killing 
-a 
Must a' min 
It has been pointed out earlier that it is only 
AbO YUsuf, in variance with his school and majority's 
opinion, who says that the Muslim would be liable for 
gib if he deliberately kills musta' min for no valid 
reason. 196 Abo YOsuf strongly defends his position by 
saying that once an amdn has been granted to an 
alien, his inviolability, as to his life and property, 
is guaranteed by the state. If he is murdered, during 
that period and within the Islamic territory, he still 
enjoys this inviolability at the time of the act. This 
is sufficient, according to AbO Yüsuf, to prosecute 
his murderer even though the culprit is a Muslim. But 
the majority holds that the musta'min enjoys only 
temporary inviolability during his stay in dar al- 
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Isiäm hence there is no equality in terms of 
inviolability and no gi1s is prescribed. 197 In fact, 
Abü YOsuf' s view commands considerable weight. 
According to Zayddn, AbO Yasuf's view should outweigh 
that of the majority for these reasons: 
a. The standpoint of Hanaff school is that no 
equality is required in the punishment of girp92 
b. The must a' min has been granted amen status. By 
virtue of the pact, he will be protected by the state. 
if there is no gisäg, for him, the protection is not 
conclusive. Consequently, his life is always insecure 
and would be contrary to the principle of amän itself. 
On the other hand, if qi252 is applicable the state 
has naturally fulfilled its commitment which is 
required by Sharl 'ah. 
c. It is in the interest of the state as well as 
the requirement of the doctrine of siyäsah198 in the 
present situation to apply cI in this case though 
the murderer is a Muslim. This is in order to promote 
stability, preventing the spread of crime and to 
implant the sense of credibility in the Islamic state. 
All these elements would certainly contribute to the 
public interest which is enjoined by the Shari 'ah. '99 
d. As has been said earlier, there can be a wide 
range of punishment under the provision of ta'zir. 
Some jurists such as Mdlik and some Hanball jurists 
say that the punishment of some crimes under taGzlr 
187 
could also be as severe as killing. 200 So if the 
Muslim kills musts' min. the authority could very well 
punish the murderer by death penalty not on the basis 
of qi but to'ztr and siy sah. 201 
6. Qicär Against Dhimml 
There is a complete agreement among the jurists of 
different schools that if a dhimmi deliberately kills 
another dhimm or a Muslim, the murderer is liable for 
_ . 
202 This is because the inviolability of the 
dhimrn IT: is forever so long as he remains as a 
dhimmr. 203 There is no difference in punishment 
whether the victim is male or female and whether the 
parties come from the same faith. 204 It was reported 
the Prophet ordered the killing of a Jew who had 
killed a female slave from an är. 205 The Qur'dnic 
provision also has made no distinction in the matter 
of gigä between male and female. 206 
As for the life of a Muslim it is generally 
accepted that its inviolability is absolute. It is 
argued that if ad imml is killed for a dhimml the 
gI for a Muslim is more discernible. 207 According 
to the Zdhirl view the killing of dhimmi in this case 
is not really for gic but for the breach of a 
contract by the act of killing a Muslim. 208 
If admf kills an apostate, the jurists say he 
will not be killed, for the apostate has lost his 
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inviolability. His status is now like that of 
haarbi. 209 The dhimmi however should be held 
responsible under ta'zir punishment because of the 
fact that he has taken the law into his own hands. 210 
If the imam has issued an instruction prohibiting the 
killing of the apostate, but the dhimml: deliberately 
kills the apostate despite the instruction, it seems 
that the dhimmi. in this case, should be killed. 211 
If a dhimmi kills a musta' min, the majority holds 
that he is liable for gic . For the musts'min enjoys 
the protection under the amän pact. 212 On the 
contrary, the Hanafi says that the dhimml could not be 
held responsible because the inviolability of 
musts' min is not absolute but depends on the period of 
his stay in dar al-Islam. 2t3 On the other hand, Abü 
Yasuf, together with the majority, maintains that the 
musts' min enjoys the inviolability at the time of the 
commission of the crime. 21 + The fact that he enjoys 
temporal inviolability does not make any difference, 
for his status might become permanent if he becomes a 
d immi. The criterion of inviolability therefore 
should be based on the time factor rather than on the 
status of the parties concerned. Furthermore, to 
subscribe to HanafI view would jeopardise the life of 
musta'min and would therefore be contrary to the 
concept of aman which had been given to him by the 
gym. 215 
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If a dhimmS kills a herb who has no amän. there 
will be neither gi4Els nor diyah nor kaffärah against 
him. This is the opinion of all schools. According to 
Ibn Qudämah, "We know of no disagreement among the 
jurists over this issue. "216 
Finally, if a musta'min deliberately kills a 
Muslim or dh mmi or musts'min, there is no 
disagreement among the jurists as to the liability of 
the murderer for i arR. This is because each victim 
enjoys his own inviolability whether by faith or 
amän. 2 " According to the Hanaf5 jurists the musta'min 
presumed to have accepted the rule of Islam 
pertaining to the right of human beings. Since qIc 
falls within those rights, the musts' min is therefore 
liable for g1¢ac. 21' 
On the other hand, if a musts' min kills a barb!. 
there will be no is against him because there is no 
amen for erbt. In the event of musta'min killing an 
apostate, it appears that the rule for the dhi mmf 
would be applicable to him since both of them live in 
dSr al-Isl8m. 219 This would mean that the musta'min 
would not be liable for but he would probably 
face taczir punishment from the authority. 220 
Finally, the law of gins, pertaining to injuries 
will not be dealt here because of its similarities in 
principles and applications to gicggfor the taking of 
life. 
190 
F. Unlawful Sexual Intercourse (al-zina)221 
Generally speaking, in a modern penal system 
sexual intercourse outside marriage by consenting 
adults is not considered as a crime. Such sexual 
freedom is completely unknown to all revealed laws. 
The Mosaic, the Christian, and the Islamic laws all 
forbid all types of sexual relations outside marriage 
and in the case of Judaism and Islam there is also 
punishment for it. 222 
In Islamic law however, where most of its rulings 
signified moral values, unlawful intercourse is one of 
the graves crimes which falls under huudüd punishment. 
This is a basic difference between Islamic law and 
Western legal system. In view of its evil and the 
chaotic consequences which come from it, the Qur'än 
not only prohibited the act per se but any 
circumstances that leads to it was also prohibited as 
we read: "And come not near unto adultery. Lo! it is 
an abomination and an evil way. 10223 For it leads to 
many evils. It destroys the family structure and it 
works against the interests of the children born or to 
be born. 
The jurists differ as to the definition of zinä 
but they all agree that the main element in this crime 
is unlawful intercourse. Perhaps the most 
comprehensive definition is the one that is given by 
the Hanaff school: Unlawful sexual intercourse which 
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takes place between a consenting man and woman in dar 
al 'adl when committed by those who abide by Islamic 
law, when there is no legal right (to it) or the 
semblance of such a right (al-milk or shubhat al- 
milk). 224 It follows that any sexual relationship 
between a man and a woman which does not involve 
intercourse does not constitute a zing hence, it is 
not punishable by hadd but it would involve another 
category of punishment. 225 
1. The Punishment of Zing 
The Qur'Sn laid down its punishment as follows: 
The adulterer and the adulteress, scourge 
ye each one of them (with) a hundred 
stripes. And let not pity for the twain 
withhold you from obedience to God, if ye 
believe in God and the Last Day. And let a 
party of beli evers witness their 
punishme nt. 226 
The earlier revelation concerning the crime of 
zz1n was as follows: 
And as for those of your women who become 
guilty of immoral conduct, call upon four 
from among you who have witnessed their 
guilt; and if these bear witness thereto, 
confine the guilty women to their houses 
until death takes them away or God opens 
for them a way (through repentance). 
And punish (them) both of the guilty 
parties; but if they both repent and mend 
their ways, leave them alone: for, behold, 
God is an acceptor of repentance, a 
dispenser of grace. 227 
According to some commentators these two verses 
have been abrogated by the verse 24: 2 above which 
192 
henceforth becomes the only basis for punishment of 
zinä. 226 It is clear therefore that the punishment for 
zine in the beginning of Islam was a form of ta'zir 
and it evolved and remained to become a hadd 
punishment at later stage. The form of add however 
varies depending on the marital status of the 
culprit. 229 This opinion expressed by 'Ubddah, al- 
I; iasan b. al-Bari and Mu j chid. 230 As for the kinds of 
punishment for zing it can be summarised as follows: 
a. Flogging 
One hundred lashes is prescribed for the 
unmarried male or female who commit fornication. This 
is in accordance with the verse 24: 2 above. There is 
no disagreement among the jurists over this issue. 231 
b. Stoning to death (al-raim> 
This was prescribed by the sunnah for the married 
male and female. Hence it became the consensus of the 
Companions. It is a subject of agreement among all 
schools except those of khawäri_1.232 It was agreed 
among the scholars that the punishment of stoning is 
only prescribed on the married (muh2an) male or female 
and there are some requirements to be a mu an which 
are the subject of disagreement among the jurists. 233 
Moreover, the Qur'dn commands that the execution 
of these two punishments, i. e. flogging and stoning, 
should be carried out in public by the authority in 
order to deter potential offenders. This can be 
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understood from the last portion of the verse which 
says that "let a party of believers witness their 
punishment. " Apart from that it should be borne in 
mind that in all cases of alleged sexual 
transgressions or misbehaviour the Qur'än stipulates 
the direct evidence of four witnesses, instead of two 
witnesses which is required in all other judicial 
cases, as a sine qua non of conviction. 234 
On the other hand, if stoning has been decided the 
majority held that flogging is no more required; 
otherwise it would cause double punishments on the 
same person for the same offence, something that would 
contrary to the principle of punishment-235 But the 
Hanball and 7%hiri maintain that the culprit should 
still be flogged and then stoned to death. 236 
c. Banishment 
This punishment is prescribed for the unmarried 
offenders. It means that the culprit should be 
expelled from the place where he had committed the act 
for a period of one year . 237 Again this issue of 
banishment together with flogging is a matter where 
there is a difference in opinion among the jurists. 
The majority held that it is prescribed by the Sunneh 
in addition to flogging. This opinion was reported 
from the Four Guided Caliphs and later shared by al- 
ThawrT, Ibn Abt Layla, Shafi CY, AbO Thawr and 
others. 238 The Hanaff jurists held that there should 
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be no banishment together with flogging except in the 
cases where the imam deems there is an interest in the 
banishment. In this case it would be ta°zir rather 
than hhadd. 23' On the other hand, Mäliki jurists and 
Awzä't maintain that the banishment is only for the 
male. This is because female would need special care 
and protection. 240 After examining the evidences of 
each school, it seems that the majority view is more 
acceptable. However, according to some, the idea of 
banishment, as in the case of hirýabah_, could signify 
and properly include imprisonment as the term 
literally implies. 241 
2. The Punishment for DhimmT 
According to Hanaft, Shafi'i, Hanbali, and 7rähirt 
jurists if ad immi commits adultery with a Muslim or 
a dhimmi woman, he will be punished according to the 
punishment of zind above. While some Hanaff jurists 
rely on the generality of the verse 24: 2 which does 
not specify Muslim or otherwise, the others quoted 
the incident that the Prophet ordered two Jews to be 
stoned. 242 It was not certain however whether the 
Prophet ordered that punishment in accordance with 
Judaic law or Islamic law. However, the fact that the 
punishment had been carried out `could imply that the 
d immi is liable to the same punishment as the 
Muslim. 243 On the other hand, MAliki jurists held that 
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the punishment of zinä is not applicable on non-Muslim 
but the culprit would be referred to his own people to 
be punished in accordance with their law. z"" Perhaps 
this view which was expressed by the Mäliki school, 
who were known as the traditionists, was in order to 
follow the foot-step of the Prophet in this matter. 
But Hanaff jurists245 held that the Prophet himself 
ordered them to be punished. It is further argued that 
the dhimmi has become inhabitant of ddr al-Isläm hence 
all hu, ý 
dOd punishments will be applicable to him except 
the punishment of liquor. 246 Therefore, he is expected 
to know that adultery is prohibited. Despite that if 
he committed the act, he would be punished as a Muslim 
would in order to wipe out all evils from där al- 
Islam. 247 It seems that since the crime committed 
within the Islamic territory by its inhabitants, it is 
within the jurisdiction of the Muslim authority to try 
them. It is inconceivable that the Muslim judge would 
apply any other law than the law recognized by the 
court in criminal matters. 2"8 To do so would be ultra 
v es for the court and would be deemed 
unconstitutional. This is the prevailing opinion of 
the jurists which is in complete harmony with the 
practise of the Prophet. 249 
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3. The Punishment for a Must a' min 
As has been pointed out earlier the punishment for 
a musta'min is a matter of disagreement again among 
the jurists. The key question is whether or not a 
musta'min. during his short stay in dar al-Isläm, 
liable for all punishments including the offences 
related to the rights of God. In other words, the 
jurists differ over his legal status in där al-Islam. 
Those who view the must a' min as not being a member of 
dar al-Islam and hence not abiding by all Islamic 
law, except in cases pertaining to a man's rights, 
held that the punishment of zinse is not applicable for 
him. The leading advocate for this view are of course 
Abi] Hanifah and Muhammad al-Shaybäni. 250 Malik and the 
F, ianball jurists however agree with them if adultery is 
committed with non-Muslim. But if he committed 
adultery with a Muslim woman, he should be killed 
because his amen is void by the act. It appears that 
the popular (mashhür) view of Shdfif-i school is in 
harmony with Abo Hanlfah for it held that musts' min 
does not abide by the right of God unless there is a 
clear provision in the agreement to the contrary. 251 
The second view held by Abo Yasuf and Awzä'f 
maintains that all udUd punishments except that for 
liquor are applicable for musta'min during his stay in 
d6r al-Isl6m. 252 It is presumed that he is aware that 
adultery is prohibited by the law of the land. He is 
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therefore in no position to defend his case, for 
"ignorance is not a defence". Moreover, the imam can 
employ his power to prosecute him since he is now 
under the Muslim jurisdiction, for the hudOd is 
instituted in order to protect the community at large. 
To say that he is not to be punished would undermine 
the whole institutions in the state whereas the amän 
is granted for the contrary purpose. 253 
It seems that the position of Abu Yüsuf is more 
acceptable in this issue as in other issues that have 
been discussed earlier, because adultery is prohibited 
by all revealed religions; and the Prophet had 
punished the dhimmi for the same offence. This 
punishment is obviously applicable for a musta'min 
since both of them are non-Muslims. 254 It is also 
contended that Islamic law, in this case, is 
applicable on all residents regardless of their faith 
and there should be no discrimination or favouritism 
to any group of residents, let alone people within its 
jurisdiction. In addition, to say that a musts' min is 
not obliged by the right of God is irrelevant, for the 
right of God is also the right of society as has been 
suggested by the Hanafis themselves. Therefore the 
right of the public should not be undermined. 255 
Finally, it is worthy to note that if the Muslim 
commits adultery with a dhimmi or musta'min there will 
be no doubt that he will be punished accordingly. 
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There is no view or evidence which suggests to the 
contrary. 256 
G. Punishment of Rape 
Mä1ik said: 
"The position with us about a woman who is 
found to be pregnant and has no husband and 
she says, 'I was forced', or she says 'I 
was married, ' is that it is not accepted 
from her and the hadd is inflicted on her 
unless she has a clear proof of what she 
claims about the marriage or that she was 
forced or she comes bleeding if she was a 
virgin or she calls out for help so that 
" someone comes to her and she is in that 
state or what resembles it of the situation 
in which the violation occurred. " He said, 
"If she does not produce any of those, the 
hadd is inflicted on her and what she 
claims of that is not accepted from her. " 
. 
Malik said, "A raped woman cannot marry 
until she has restored herself by three 
menstrual period. " 
He said, "If she doubts her periods, she 
does not marry until she has freed herself 
of that doubt. "257 
With regards the punishment for rapist according 
to Ibn Qayyim what he found from the view of Ahmad b. 
Hanbal was that if ad mmr commits a zinä with Muslim 
woman, he will be killed because he had breached the 
contract and the badd is inflicted on the woman. But 
if she was forced then no Ladd is carried out on 
her. 258 When Almad b. Hanbal was asked what to do with 
ad immi who has committed adultery with a Muslim 
woman, he replied the man was to be killed. When he 
was asked about the evidence, in terms of legal ruling 
or precedence, or the like, he replied it was reported 
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that 'Umar I used to order the man to be killed for 
the same offence. 259 It appears that this is also the 
view of the Shafi 'f school except that Shafi 'I holds 
that such a provision should be clearly stated in the 
agreement. 260 On the other hand, Abo Hanifah holds 
that commission -of the crime does not affect the 
contract. But the culprit is still liable for hadd 
punishment with its varying degree depending on his 
marital status. 261 According to Ibn Qudämah when the 
contract is deemed void, the imam is empowered to 
punish the criminal ranging from killing him to 
setting him free, for his status is now just like the 
8rb .262 
It seems that since the act of force <ikrdh) per 
se is a crime, the proper punishment for a rapist is a 
hadd of zinn together with ta'zlr punishment for using 
the force against one's free will. This conclusion is 
reached in view of the fact that most jurists, with a 
few exceptions, were not concerned, according to our 
investigation, discussing the punishment of the rapist 
but they were rather interested in whether the victim 
should be punished or not. 265 This is perhaps, because 
in the past, raping as a crime hardly occurred or if 
there was a case, the punishment of adultery was 
probably deemed sufficient to deal with it. 
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y, The Punishment for Homosexuality and Similar Cases 
According to Ibn Qudämah all scholars agreed that 
homosexuality (al-liwät) is forbidden (haräm) in 
Islam. The practise of it would be liable for 
condemnation from God and his Apostle. 264 It is an 
abnormal behaviour but the act by no means a new 
phenomenon in human history. It is therefore a 
manifestation of moral decadence in a permissive 
society. According to the Qur'an: 
And Lot! (Remember) when he said unto his 
people: "Will you commit abominations such 
as none in all the world has ever done 
before you? Verily, with lust you approach 
men instead of women: nay, but you are 
people given to excesses! " 
And the answer of his people was only that 
. they said 
(one to another): Turn them out 
of your township. They are folk, forsooth, 
who keep pure. 
And We rained a rain upon them. See now the 
nature of the consequence for evil- 
doers! 265 
There are three opinions regarding the punishment 
of homosexuality. According to Malik, Hanafi jurists, 
Ahmad b. Hanbal and a popular view of Shäfi 'i both of 
the culprits should be killed whether they are married 
or not married. This view was reported from Abi Bakr, 
CUmar I, Ibn CAbbäs, CAli and others. Hence, the 
punishment has become a consensus of the 
Companions. 26 
Another view was reported from ShäfiCi and another 
opinion of Hanball schools that the punishment of 
homosexuality is identical to the punishment of zing. 
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This opinion is attributed to some followers of the 
Companions such as 'Aý ä, Nakha'I, Sa' fd Ibn al- 
Musayyab and others. 267 On the other hand, Abo Ilanifah 
and the 7dhirl school maintain that the act is not 
liable for hadd but ta'zir punishment; for to them the 
act is not constitute a zing proper. 268 
As for the punishment of lesbians (sib8q), it was 
agreed that the act is forbidden. The Prophet was 
reported to have said: "If a woman commits an act of 
sexual relationship with another woman they are 
adulterers". 269 Despite the fact that the act is 
considered as immoral, the jurists agree that there is 
no badd for it. But the act is considered zing which 
has no badd because there is no element of penetration 
as a basic requirement for zing. However the jurists 
agree that both of them would be subjected to ta'zir 
punishment. z70 
If anyone, man or woman, was found to be engaged 
in sexual intercourse with animal, the majority of 
jurists271 agreed that there is no hradd for the act 
but ta'zir. As for the animal, whether it is edible or 
not, it is to be killed. 272 
With regards the punishment of dhimmi who engaged 
in the act of homosexuality it should be first 
determined the nature of the punishment applicable to 
this offence. AbU I, Ianifah and the Zdhiri jurists held 
that the punishment of to 4zir is applicable since the 
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offences do not meet the requirements of zing. 273 On 
the contrary, Shäfi'i and the Hanbali jurists maintain 
that the act is zing hence its punishment is 
applicable to the offenders. 274 It follows that when 
it is so decided, the views of jurists on the 
punishment of d immi in relation to zing is adopted as 
has been discussed above. 275 As to the position of 
musts' min in this regard, it could also referred to 
the jurists' views in the previous discussion. It 
seems that this later view is more relevant because of 
the nature of the offences and the degrees of its 
obscenity, abomination and repugnance to the Islamic 
values which have always been upheld by the state. 276 
As for those who engaged in sexual intercourse with 
animal and lesbianism, the punishment for them is 
ta'zir with its varying degrees depending on the merit 
of the offenders. It should be recalled that according 
to the jurists a' it is applicable to both Muslims 
and non-Muslims. 277 
Finally, it can be concluded that the Islamic 
treatment of the offence of zing and its similar cases 
appears to be rather unusual. This is because the 
Islamic law is based entirely on morality. Any moral 
transgression is seriously condemned by means of 
severe punishments. Its philosophy and world-view are 
not identical to that of the Western society. It 
follows that the concept of personal freedom, hence 
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sexual freedom, is entirely opposed 
to that of the 
post-war generation in the 
West. Personal freedom 
according to the Islamic concept 
is permissible only 
in matters not regulated by the injunctions and 
prohibition laid down in the Qur'än and the Sunnah. 
By 
contrast, the imposition of such limitation by the 
supreme authority is completely absent from the 
contemporary Western image of the relationship between 
law, society, and the individual. This different sense 
of the source of authority may, perhaps, explain many 
of the differences between the Islamic and Western 
legal systems-276 It follows that the whole concept of 
punishment, as a result, would naturally be different 
to that of the Western concept. Any attempt to compare 
the two systems using the balance sheet of one at the 
expense of the other would eventually cause more harm 
than serve the interest of the both systems. This 
approach, it seems, has led Schacht, to his conclusion 
while discussing the Islamic law of punishment that 
there exists no general concept of penal law in 
Islam. 279 
I. False Accusation of Unchastity. (al-Qadhf) 
It is an unproved allegation that someone has 
committed a zins. 280 This is forbidden by a clear 
injunction from the Qur' än. Its punishment, if the 
accuser is unable to produce witnesses, is eighty 
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lashes. Hence, the punishment is in someway a 
reparation for the ignominy suffered by the accused. 
The Qur' än says: 
And as for those who accuse chaste women 
(of adultery), and then are unable to 
produce four witnesses (in support of their 
accusation), flog them with eighty stripes; 
and ever after refuse to accept from them 
any testimony- since it is they, they that 
are truly depravedl excepting (from this 
interdict) only those who afterwards repent 
and made amends: for, behold, God is much- 
forgiving, a dispenser of grace. 281 
According to the exegetes, although the text above 
clearly speaks about chaste women it is also should be 
construed as to include men as well. This is the 
consensus of the jurists. 282 The view that the future 
testimony of the accuser will not be accepted unless 
he has repented was held by all the jurists except Abo 
Hanifah who insisted that the accuser's testimony will 
not be accepted forever even after he has repented. 
However, if he repented before the punishment, his 
testimony will be accepted. 283 
The Qur'An stipulates that the accused, man or 
woman, should be muh, an. In this context, unlike in 
the case of zinc, ib2dn means chaste. 28' Another 
condition put by the jurists are that the accused must 
be a sane adult Muslim who is known to be a chaste 
person. 2$S On the other hand, the Zdhiri jurists held 
that Islam is not a condition for ih än. He maintains 
that the Qur'an only stipulates ihran as a condition. 
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Hence, with that generality expressed by the Qur'an, 
it should include Muslim and non-Muslim women 
alike. 286 But the majority rely on the 
following 
verse: "Lol as for those who (falsely, and without 
repentance) accuse chaste, unmindful believing women 
..,. 287 
The verse clearly stipulates that Islam is a 
condition for ihm än. It was also reported that the 
Prophet said: "whoever associates (anything) with God 
he is not mubrRan. "2 ° 
It should be noted here that the terms of 
accusation should be understood as nothing less than 
zinc in order to be liable for hadd. The expression 
used for slandering and defamation which is not 
clearly or expressly associated with zin6289 does not 
fall under badd al-gadhf but would make the accuser 
liable for a 'zir punishment which will be decided by 
the authority. 290 
To sum up, it can be concluded that there are two 
gadhf- in Islamic law namely, a false accusation of 
zing to a chaste person (mut an) which would be liable 
for hadd or the process of negation of the child as 
between husband-wife relationship (al-li'an); 291 
another gad is a mere accusation which does not 
amount to zinc including using abusive or insinuative 
expression which would make the accuser liable to 
to(, zir punishment. 292 
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1. The Punishment for Dhimmi 
If a dhimml accuses a Muslim man or woman provided 
that all the conditions set above are met, he would be 
liable for hadd. for Islam was not a condition for 
the eligibility of the punishment. This is the opinion 
of the majority schools of law. 293 On the other hand, 
the ; rdhirl jurists say 
that the man should be killed 
for the violation of his contract unless he becomes a 
Muslim in which case he would be liable for hhadd. 294 
If a dhimmr accuses another dhimmi: or musta'min 
the majority says that there will be no hbadd for him 
because they held that one of the conditions of add 
al-gadhf was that the accused must be a muh$an. It is 
agreed that Islam is a condition for ihn in the view 
of the majority. 295 But the Zahirls held that he would 
still be liable for Ladd since, to them, Islam was 
neither a condition for the accused nor the 
accuser. 296 According to SaCid b. al-Musayyab and Ibn 
Abi Laylä in the case of the accused being a dhimml 
woman who has a Muslim child, the accuser should 
receive with the add. 297 This, perhaps, is because 
they considered him as accusing a Muslim. On the other 
hand, when he was asked, M&lik held that the man 
should be inflicted with exemplary punishment. For he 
considered the act as undermining the husband and her 
children who are Muslims. 298 In addition, the majority 
held that though the dhimmi is not to be punished for 
207 
accusing non-Muslims, he would still be liable for 
tpCzir. 299 The same punishment would be inflicted on 
the d immi in case of making accusation against a 
Muslim or a non-Muslim which did not amount to 
zinä. 300 
2. Effect on Dhimmr' s Testimony. 
Generally speaking, the punishment of the false 
accusation would effect, as a result, the future 
testimony of the accuser. According to the HanafI 
" school, who accepts dhimmi's testimony for a dhimmi or 
musts' min, 3 01 if the dhimml had been punished, his 
future testimony will be rejected. 302 However, if he 
becomes a Muslim his testimony will no longer be 
rejected. Consequently, he can testify for Muslims and 
non-Muslims as well, for the capacity to testimony is 
achieved by becoming a Muslim. Therefore, it is not to 
be rejected. 303 Furthermore, it should be recalled 
that the Qur'än stipulates the rejection at the time 
of making accusation. Therefore, this newly gained 
capacity should not exclude him from his future 
testimony. 3114 This is because according to Islamic 
point of view conversion obliterates anything before 
it. "30$ 
As for the position of musts' min. in the case of 
q, adhf. it appears that his position is the same like a 
dhimmi's in liability to the punishment. In other 
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words, if he accuses a Muslim, man or woman, he will 
be punished. This is the opinion of all schools 
including Hanaff and Awzä'T. For according to the 
jurists since this offence involves the right of human 
beings, the musta'min should be held responsible for 
it. 306 However, if he accuses non-Muslims there will 
be no badd on him except in the opinion of the nähirr 
jurists as already discussed. The same rule is 
applicable with regard to his future testimony after 
the punishment. 
3. The Punishment for a Muslim Who Accused a non- 
Muslim 
As has been discussed above one of the conditions 
of hhaadd al-gedhf is that the accused must be a muhcan. 
One of the requirements of ih$an however is Islam. 
This is the view of the majority with the exception of 
the Zdhiri jurists. Hence, according to the majority 
if a Muslim accuses a non-Muslim he is not subject to 
the hadd punishment but would be liable for ta'zlr. 307 
This is the only criminal cases that the Muslim, in so 
far as this investigation is concerned, is not liable 
for the hadd punishment with regards to his relation 
with non-Muslims. Nevertheless, as stated above, 
according to Ibn al-Musayyab and Ibn Abi Laylä if a 
Muslim accuses a dhimmT woman who has a Muslim child, 
he will be punished. 308 
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If a Muslim accuses a dhimml or musta' min with an 
expression not explicitly understood as zing, the 
Muslim will be liable for to'zlr. 309 For that kind of 
vituperation has no specific punishment in the texts. 
But neither the Muslim nor the non-Muslim can vilify 
one another; this is in order to promote and maintain 
good relationship between the two communities. 
Finally, in Saudi Arabia, which follows Hanbalf 
school, the Islamic law of aq dhf is still in 
operation. It punishes the accuser, Muslim and non- 
Muslims alike if the conditions of the punishment are 
met. So does the law of li'än between a non-Muslim 
couple because Islam is not a condition of being a 
husband and wife according to Hanball school. The 
punishment of ta'zfr is also applicable for the 
offences relating to slandering or the like. 310 
J. The Crime of Theft (al-Sarigah) 
Theft is defined as "taking someone else's 
property by stealth. "31' This definition is acceptable 
by almost all jurists. The crime falls under the 
udOd. Its punishment is the amputation of the hand as 
the Qur' do commands: "As for the thief, both male and 
female, cut off their hands. It is the reward of their 
own deeds, an exemplary punishment from God. God is 
Mighty, Wise. "312 As the text unequivocally speaks to 
that effect, the punishment of the theft is agreed 
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among the scholars. 313 The central element of this 
crime, however, should be established namely, the act 
is committed in a quite or secret manner as to avoid 
being detected otherwise it would fall under another 
category of offences. 3i" Therefore, the element of 
stealing should be proved in order to prosecute the 
thief. 
1. Some Disputed Points on the Punishment 
The jurists are not in agreement over the value of 
the stolen property (ni db al-sarigah). They differ on 
the determination of the minimum amount. According to 
the Hanafi school the punishment for theft cannot be 
inflicted unless the value of the stolen property is 
not less than ten dirhams or one dinär. 315 Whereas 
Nakha'I says that it must be forty dirhams; Ibn Abf 
Laylf says that it should be five dirhams. 316 Maliki, 
ShIlfi'i317 and Hanbali schools hold that the amount 
must be three dirhams or a quarter of a dinar or 
above. 31e The 7ähirl jurists maintain that there is no 
fixed minimum amount required for the punishment. This 
opinion was shared by Hasan al-Bacrl who expressed the 
same view. Hence, for them the hhadd can be carried out 
for any amount of stolen property because the Qur'an 
does not suggest to the contrary. 319 
Thus, the majority of Muslim jurists, consisting 
of three schools, agreed at the fixed minimum value of 
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three dirhams of the stolen property for the liability 
of hadd punishment. 320 They rely on the Tradition 
which was reported from 4A4ishah that the Prophet has 
said: "The hand is amputated for a quarter of a dinar 
and above. "321 This punishment was carried out several 
times in the time of the Prophet and it was reported 
that he prohibited any mediation in the executing of 
the hhadd. 322 
The attempts by the jurists to determine the 
minimum value of the stolen property is vital in view 
of the severity of the punishment. For humid could not 
be carried out if there exists some elements of 
uncertainty about the fact of the case. 323 If, at any 
case, the value of the stolen property is worth less 
than the said amount, there will be no hadd for the 
culprit but he may nevertheless be liable for to'zir 
punishment. 32" 
It should be borne in mind that the jurists' 
discussion pertaining to the fixed minimum value of 
the stolen property, hence its liability for hadd 
punishment, is no longer relevant to the present 
situation. This is simply because the value of money 
and the cost of commodities has changed now and 
varies from place to place. But it may, however, 
serves as a guideline for today's lawmakers in each 
Muslim country to decide, as they see fit and proper, 
the minimum value, in the light of the present cost of 
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living, to be liable for the hadd punishment. 325 Due 
consideration should be given to the minimum value set 
by the Prophet and compare it with our time. 
Moreover, the jurists also disputed over how the 
hand of the convicted should be cut off and whether 
the stolen property should be kept in a proper place 
(al-hirz). However, these two points are beyond the 
scope of this investigation. 
On the other hand, it should be recalled that 
among the inalienable rights of every member of the 
Islamic society, Muslim and non-Muslim alike, is the 
right to protection by the community as a whole. 
Everyone is entitled to a share in the community's 
economic resources, for, Islam envisages and demands a 
society that provides not only for the spiritual needs 
of man, but for his bodily and intellectual needs as 
well. But if the available resources of a community 
are so unevenly distributed that certain groups within 
it live in affluence while the majority of the people 
are forced to use up all their energies in search of 
their daily bread, poverty becomes the most dangerous 
enemy of spiritual progress, and occasionally drives 
the whole communities away from consciousness of God 
into the arms of soul-destroying materialism. If the 
society is unable to fulfil its duties, it has no 
right to invoke the full sanction of criminal law 
( add against the individual transgressor, but must 
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confine itself to milder forms of administrative 
punishment 
(taczir. It was in correct appreciation of 
this principle that the Caliph 'Umar I waived the hedd 
of hand-cutting in a period of famine which afflicted 
Arabia during his reign. 326 
2. The Punishment of Dhimmi for Theft 
Jurists of different schools agreed that Islam is 
not a condition for the liability of the punishment of 
theft. Hence, Muslim or non-Muslim, if convicted, is 
liable for the cutting-off of a hand because of the 
generality of the text. 327 
If a dhimmi steals from a dhimmf or Muslim, 
provided that all the conditions of the Dadd are met, 
the punishment is inflicted on him. There is no 
disagreement over this issue among the jurists. 328 For 
the dhimmi as previously pointed out, by virtue of 
the contract, is obliged to follow the law of the 
land. 329 However, the jurists split over the question 
of whether the dhimmi could be held responsible if 
he 
steals from a musta' min. According to the Mdlik5: and 
E, ianbal l schools he is liable for punishment. 
The 
Hanball jurists say that since the Muslim is held 
responsible for stealing the property of musaý 
in 
which is in the state of inviolability, so, 
by 
analogy, the d imml is also would be held responsible, 
for, the dhimmi is treated, in this respect, equslly 
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before the law. 330 As for Shafi9 jurists they contend 
that there should be no add on dhimml as well as no 
hhadd on musts' min if he steals from a Muslim or 
dhimmi. 331 HanafI jurists, however, except Zufar, 
maintain that no hadd would be inflicted on a thief of 
a property of musta'min because his property is 
considered as semi-permissible as also the case of his 
blood. It is for this reason that if he is killed 
there will be no gic 8s against the killer. For, the 
enjoyment of amän is temporary and does not, by any 
means, change his status as ham rbT from the legal point 
of vi ew. 332 
It seems that the view of the Mäliki, Hanbali, and 
Zufar, a Vanafl jurist, is more relevant in this case, 
for, by virtue of am9n, even temporary, the protection 
must be all-inclusive including his property. To say 
the contrary would not only undermine the concept of 
amen itself but also it would ruin the credibility of 
the Islamic state. 3s3 
On the other hand, the majority of jurists agreed 
that there is no add on the one who steals pigs and 
liquor. This is true whether the thief is a Muslim or 
d mmi and whether the property belongs to a Muslim or 
di mi. The rationale for this is that among the 
conditions of liadd the stolen" property must be a 
considerable value. Since both commodities are 
valueless, from the Muslim legal point of view, there 
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will be no hadd on the thief. 33" Nevertheless, he may 
face ta'zir punishment, as in any offence. By 
contrast, according to the Zaydl school the thief 
should be punished if he steals them from a dhimmi or 
must a, min. This is because pigs and liquor are 
commodities that can be possessed and valuable for 
non-Muslims335 
It should be noted that for any offence against 
the property other than theft and hir bah, the 
offender will be punished under taGzir rather than 
hadd punishment whether he is a Muslim or non-Muslim, 
dhi mmi or must a' mi n. 336 
As for musta'min if he is involved in stealing and 
convicted the position of jurists are divided in two 
groups, as in previous cases concerning the liability 
of musts' min. The Hanafl jurists and some Shäf i 4f 
jurists held that he is not liable for punishment. 
This is because the punishment for theft is related to 
the rights of God which are more obvious than man's 
rights which in no case could a musta'min be held 
responsible for. 337 Conversely, Ibn Abi Layla, Abo 
Yosuf, Awza'I, Malikt and Hanball jurists held that 
the musts' min is liable for h,? add. They maintain that 
the musts'min is obliged to obey the law during his 
stay in d9r al-Islam. His position is like that of 
dhimml in this respect. Further, theft is a crime by 
its definition and should be punished to deter the 
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others and protect property. 338 Ibn Qudgmah added that 
if an apostate steals and found guilty he will be 
punished accordingly because Islamic law is applicable 
to him. 339 
It seems that the majority view is preferable in 
this case simply because the law is applicable to all 
people and the jurisdiction or rather authority of där 
al-Islam is over all its inhabitants. It is 
inconceivable to let the musta'min commit a crime of 
theft without punishment and the amän is granted on 
the condition that he shall stay in a good conduct and 
not break the law. It should be recalled that the 
right of God is also the right of society as has been 
claimed by the Hanaff jurists themselves. 340 
On the other hand, if a musta'min steals liquor or 
pigs, he will not be punished as in the case of 
dhimmi. This is the view of the majority of jurists 
including the }Hanaff jurists except for the view of 
the ZaydT school as has been pointed out above. 3+1 
3. The Punishment of Muslim Who Steals from non-Muslim 
There is no doubt that if a Muslim is found 
guilty of stealing from a dhimmT he will be punished 
accordingly. For the property of d immf is treated as 
the property of a Muslim. 342 There is no differences 
of opinions among the jurists about that except when 
he steals a pig or liquor from a dhimmi. Then the 
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majority held that he will not be punished, for, those 
commodities are treated as valueless from the Muslim 
legal point of view. 343 Some jurists however held that 
the Muslim should pay compensation while others say 
the contrary. 344 The Zaydi school held that the 
Muslim thief should be punished if he steals from a 
dhimmf within the locality of dhimmT's residence. This 
difference of opinions also arises in case of a Muslim 
stealing both commodities from a musta' min. 345 It has 
been suggested that the view of Zayd5 school is more 
acceptable because both commodities are considered 
valuable for non-Muslims. This is also the view of 
'Atg who says that whoever steals a liquor from 
'People of the Book' the hadd is inflicted on him. 346 
To say to the contrary would be enhance disorder and 
crime in society. 
On the other hand, the jurists are also split 
whether the Muslim should be punished if he steals the 
property of a musts' min, According to Shafi'I Jurists 
the Muslim will not be punished because the musts' min 
is also not liable for punishment if he steals from a 
Muslim or dhimml. 3"7 The Eianaft jurists are split over 
the issue, s"a whereas the Hanball school says that the 
man must 6epunished because the property of the 
musta'min is in the state of inviolability. 349 This 
latter opinion is preferable, for, the property of the 
musta'min is under the protection of a state as has 
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stated above. 350 
Finally, this law of hadd punishment pertaining to 
theft is still in action in Saudi Arabia. The 
punishment is applicable, if convicted, to both Muslim 
and non-Muslim whether he is a citizen or non-citizen. 
As for other offences of property, other then theft 
and hir9bah, the punishment of to-zi'r is applicable 
depending on the 11tih6d of a i. 351 
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I I. Family 1 aws1 
Perhaps one of the most greatly discussed 
subjects, in Islamic law, treated by divine texts and 
later, developed by the jurists of different schools, 
is the law pertaining to marriage and its related 
subjects (munAkahät). It is the only survival area of 
Islamic law with some exceptions, which still 
dominates the daily life Of the Muslims throughout the 
Muslim countries. For the vital role of a family as a 
basic structure of Muslim society, at least in its 
ritual and legal forms, is still well-maintained even 
by the most nominal and corrupt Muslims. It is for 
this reason, perhaps, that the Islamic family law, 
apart from dibBdrat (acts of worship), occupies much 
attention from the jurists hence, it becomes a 
positive law and has more opportunity to develop 
within its own operational areas. 
A. Marriage to Non-Muslims 
We have stated in the previous chapter that a 
Muslim is allowed to marry non-Muslim woman of 
ckitabiyy t? This is the majority opinion of the 
Muslim jurists of different schools except a view 
alleged to be attributed to Ibn 'Umar. 3 On the other 
hand, non-Muslims are not allowed to marry Muslim 
women. " This prohibition is a clear injunction from 
the Qur'an. s If there is a case of such marriage, 
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however, the jurists say that the couple must be 
separated and there will be no legal effect to both 
parties whether before or after consummation as the 
marriage was legally invalid in the first place. ' As 
for the Muslim, he may marry a Christian or Jew woman, 
dhimmS or non-dhimmi but not to marry any woman other 
than kitäbiyyst. This is the position of the most 
Personal Law Statutes in the contemporary Muslim 
countries including Saudi Arabia. 7 
B. Marriage Among non-Muslims 
With regard to the marriage of non-Muslims to each 
other, whether among the same or different religions, 
the Islamic family laws has left complete legal 
freedom provided that no Muslim is involved or they do 
not take the case to the Muslim court. Such a legal 
autonomy with its jurisdiction, in addition to 
religious and social, as will be seen, is based on 
these principles: 9 
1. Any valid and lawful marriage as between 
Muslims is likewise valid and lawful among non- 
Muslims. For it is held that since non-Muslims believe 
that their marriage is lawful, the Muslims would 
therefore take it as valid as well. 1O This principle 
was 'based on the Tradition which says that: "I was 
sent to the red and the black (all races)" 11 It is 
also contended that in the Qur'dn God mentions clearly 
a 
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about AbQ Lahab with his wife and Pharaoh with wife to 
suggest that they were recognised as husbands and 
wives and were legally married according to their 
beliefs. 12 Moreover, there was no report that the 
Prophet ordered his Companions to be re-married after 
they became Muslims. As for those who had more than 
four wives, the Prophet just ordered them to reduce 
them to four, the same case would apply as between two 
sisters married to one man. 13 
2. Any invalid marriage between Muslims, for lack 
of its necessary requirements, would be deemed valid 
among non-Muslims if they so believe. This is the 
views of ShIlf t' i and Hanbal i jurists. 14 For instance, 
if non-Muslims perform a contract of marriage without 
witnesses, such a marriage is perfectly valid for non- 
Muslims but not in the case of Muslims. 15H. anaf I 
jurists, however, are split over this issue. According 
to AbO Han! fah and his friends this marriage is valid 
even after the couple become Muslims. On the other 
hand, Zufar says that the marriage is left intact 
except when the couple come to a Muslim judge or 
become Muslims, then the judge should separate them. 16 
For according to the Qur'än: "So judge between them 
that which God hath revealed, and follow not their 
desires. 1117 This tolerant attitude is taken in view 
of the fact that they are "people of the pact". For by 
concluding the contract of (d immah) they become part 
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of dar al-Islam hence, obliged to observe Islamic law 
on matter of mu'ämalät. However, no action should 
be 
taken against them in order to honour the pact. Ia On 
the other hand, Abe Hanifah held that witnessing the 
contract of marriage is the right of God where non- 
Muslims are not required to fulfil it. It is also 
alleged that some Muslim jurists such as Ibn Abi Laylä 
say that the marriage is valid without witnesses. 19 
Further it was agreed that the Muslims were ordered 
not to interfere with the belief of non-Muslims, to 
leave to them (non-Muslims) whatever they believe 
except in some cases like zing and rib9.20 The case of 
wine and pigs is a clear example of that attitude of 
non-interference. Therefore if non-Muslims believe 
that marriage without witnesses is valid then it is 
lawful for them. That validity is true and 
uninterrupted even after the couple take the case to 
Muslim judge or become Muslim. For the necessity of 
witnesses is a condition for initiation not for 
continuation. 21 
Another form of invalid marriage among the Muslims 
but not so as among non-Muslims is a marriage of a 
non-Muslim to a divorcee during her waiting period. 
AbQ Hanifah says this marriage is valid if they so 
believe but his colleagues, as well as Zufar and 
Shlifi'i, hold to the contrary. 22 For, it was agreed 
that marriage during waiting period is null and void 
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for the Muslims and non-Muslims alike. But the Muslim 
authority will not interfere since the couple enjoys 
the immunity of 'aqd al-dhimmah unless they come to 
the Muslim judge or become Muslims thereafter, they 
will be separated in accordance with the Islamic 
law. 23 As for the position of Aba IIanffah it was 
contended that the waiting period was not required for 
a dhimml as it was required for a Muslim. For its 
requirement is either for the right of God or her 
former husband. As for God the dhimmf is not obliged 
to it. The same applies to the right of the former 
husband since he does not believe in it. Since there 
is no waiting period, therefore the marriage is valid 
and lawful for dhimmf even after they take the case to 
the Muslim judge or become Muslims. 24 
3. Any prohibited marriage for Muslims, as between 
maharim (plural of mahram) 25 such as mother, daughter, 
sister and the like, is allowable for non-Muslims 
hence eligible for maintenance. This is the opinion of 
Abo Hanifah but his colleagues hold to the contrary 
except that the Muslim judge, even if he knows the 
fact, will not separate them unless the couple came to 
the Muslim court or became Muslims, thus the Islamic 
law would be applicable. This is because of the 
existence of the dhimmah contract. 26 It is clear" 
therefore, that in the realm of personal laws non- 
Muslims enjoy almost absolute autonomy from the 
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interference of the Muslim authority. It follows that 
any dispute among them emanating from these 
relationships, can be settled in their own court. The 
court however, is fully competent to try and deliver a 
judgement in accordance with their laws or beliefs. 
But if one of the parties involved is a Muslim or they 
take the case to the Muslim court, the case will be 
decided in accordance with the Islamic law. 27 This is 
precisely what the Cairo Primary Court of Family Laws 
decided in its decision involving inter-marriage of 
different sects. 28 The court refused to declare the 
nullification of the marriage between a Catholic woman 
and an Orthodox man. The wife took the case to the 
court and argued that according to the Family Laws of 
Coptic Catholic the marriage between the Catholic and 
non-Catholic is invalid. But the court in its 
judgement held that its law which applied in these 
cases, where the two parties were of different sects, 
is the Islamic law which regarded that the marriage is 
perfectly valid because all the conditions concerning 
the contract are fulfilled. 29 This case illustrates 
clearly the position of Islamic law which sees no 
impediment to the marriage of different religions, 
even though it is deemed invalid in accordance with 
non-Muslim laws, provided that the contract meets the 
conditions of marriage in Islam. This position is in 
line with the views of the jurists. According to 
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Käsänl: "the marriage among dhimmf is allowable even 
from different religions, for non-Muslim are 
considered as one religion. 0130 The same opinion is 
expressed by Sarakhsl: when he writes: "The marriage 
among the (dhimmis) such as between a Jew and 
Christian is allowable. For it is like the marriage of 
Muslim from different schools of laws. "3t 
Finally, the marriage of non-Muslims, in 
contemporary Muslim countries like Egypt, is being 
concluded in accordance with the relevant family laws 
of each respective religion, However, in any dispute 
arising from two parties of different religions or 
sects, the Islamic law of the Hanaff school is 
applicable. 32 The provisions pertaining to witnesses, 
waiting period, non-marriageable persons etc. are 
observed among non-Muslims. We can say therefore that 
most conditions of valid marriage of non-Muslims are 
in agreement with that of Muslim. 33 
C. The Effect of Conversion on non-Muslims Marriage 
1. In Där al-Islam 
If both husband and wife, who are legally and 
validly married, become Muslims, the bond of marriage 
continues and there is no reverse effect whatsoever to 
`their connubial relationship. But if the wife, in the 
first place, happens tobeanon-marriageable person, by 
birth or suckling, all scholars say that they have to 
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be separated. 34 This ruling is taken in view of the 
fact that in the time of the Prophet the conversion 
took place en bloc. The Prophet acknowledged their 
marriages without asking as to how and when they got 
married. 3S This fact has become common knowledge and 
acceptable to all. 
In the case of only the husband becoming a Muslim, 
he may retain his kitabi wife but not a non-kitäbi one 
such as the Magian, idolateree, or the like. If he 
married more than four wives prior to becoming Muslim, 
he can only retain four of them. This is what the 
Prophet ordered Qays bin al-Härith and Ghaylän b. 
Salamah who had eight and ten wives respectively. 36 
The same case would apply to a man who had married two 
sisters. 37 If a man married a woman and her daughter 
concurrently and bothoFthern become Muslims together 
with him before consummation took place with either 
one of them, the mother should be separated. This is 
because the mother would be automatically non- 
marriageable by virtue of the contract of her daughter 
to the man. But the daughter will not be prohibited 
prior to the consummation of her mother. If the 
consummation took place with both of them, they would 
be separated. For one has become the mother of his 
wife and the other was the daughter of his wife. This 
is the view of all jurists. so 
On the other hand, if the wife alone becomes 
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Muslim, or the wife is of non-kitäbi while her husband 
has become Muslim, the opinions of the schools are as 
follows: 
a. Mäliki School 
According to Maliki jurists if the conversion of 
the wife took place before consummation, they should 
be separated immediately. If it took place after 
consummation, their marriage depends on the conversion 
of the husband during her waiting period. If he 
becomes Muslim within that period of time, their 
marriage continues unaffected otherwise they will be 
separated. so Thereafter the offer of Islam to the 
husband is no longer required. 40 
Moreover, if a man married to a non-kitäbl woman 
has converted, but his wife refused to do so the 
separation should take place immediately after her 
refusal. 41 Needless to say that this case is only 
involved the couple after consummation. 
According to Ibn Shubrumah (d. 144/761), a Kufe 
jurist, 42 the separation should take place at the end 
of the waiting period. He contends that in the time of 
the Prophet, the conversion took place in many forms 
depending on individual's situation. At times, a 
husband took a lead and in many cases the wives 
converted before their husbands as in the case of 
'At ikah bt. al-Wal ld b. al-Mughirah, a wife of Safw,, än 
b. Umayyah and Umm Hakim bt. al-Hdrith b. Hishäm, a 
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wife of 'Ikrimah b. Abf 
Jahl. "3 Therefore whoever 
convert before the end of 
the waiting period, their 
marriage continues otherwise the 
bond is to be cut- 
off. 44 Ibn Shihäb says that the 
duration between the 
conversion of Safwan and his wife was about a month. 
"s 
b. Hanaf¶ School 
As for H. anaff jurists they say that there should 
be an offer to Islam to the party who had not become 
Muslim, if he or she accepts Islam, the bond of 
marriage continues uninterrupted. '' If that party 
reluctant to become a Muslim or changes to another 
religion, they would be separated. In case the 
husband, who is not a Muslim at the time of his wife 
conversion, is a minor, they should wait until he 
attains the age of puberty or he has a sound 
judgement. If he is insane, the offer of Islam should 
be directed to his parents. 47 For if any one of them 
accepts Islam it would be sufficient for him (husband) 
to be included under the rule of dependant. If the 
parents refused to become Muslims, the judge will 
separate them. If the insane has no parents the 
guardian should be appointed for him to arrange the 
separation. "a 
c. Sh6f i'I and Hanbal i Schools. 
According to Shafi 'i and one view held by Hanbalf 
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jurists if the conversion takes place from either one 
of the couple before consummation49 the marriage is 
voidable. If it occurs after the consummation, the 
conversion of the other party before the end of the 
waiting period will save their marriage if the wife 
was of marriageable to him at the first place. If he 
remains in his former religion they will be separated 
at the end of her waiting period. SO Another opinion 
reported from Ahmad b. Hanbal was that they should be 
separated immediately without waiting for the end of 
the period. Si It is noted that the starting point of 
the waiting period takes effect from the conversion 
not the time of separation$2. 
d. Miri School. 
The literalist jurists such as Ibn Hazm (d. 
456/1065) contends that as soon as the conversion 
takes place the marriage is voidable by itself though 
the other party follows the suit. Consequently, they 
should have a new contract to be eligible for each 
other. Ibn Hazm says that this is the opinion of 
Salafi jurists such as QatSdah, Sha'bS and others. It 
is also the view of the two 'Umars and other 
Companions such as Ibn 'Abbas and others. S3 It was 
reported that GUmar I separated a Christian couple as 
sa soon as the wife became Muslim. 
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e. The View of Ibn Qayyim. 
According to Ibn Qayyim if either of the couple 
becomes Muslim what can be construed from the ruling 
of the Prophet is that the marriage is to be suspended 
(maw ti ); it is not immediately null and void. This 
means that if the husband becomes a Muslim before the 
end of the waiting period, the marriage continues 
unaffected. This also means that by the expiry of 
waiting period, she is free to marry to another man or 
wait her former husband. If he joins her, then he is 
her husband without the need of having a new contract. 
In short, there are two alternatives for this case, 
i. e. total separation or waiting for his or her spouse 
for unspecific time. $5 
As for immediate separation or waiting for the 
expiry of waiting period, Ibn Qayyim says that in the 
wake of so many people embracing Islam with their 
wives, sooner or later, we have no knowledge that the 
Prophet has ruled in accordance with eitherAthese. 56 
There was no evidence that the Prophet has renewed 
their contracts despite the fact that their conversion 
did not take place concurrently. It was reported that 
the Prophet returned his daughter Zaynab to her 
husband Abi al-'Äs b. al-Rabf' who embraced Islam 
after the treaty of Iudaybiyyah whereas Zaynab became 
Muslim in early Islam. 57 This is also true for the 
conversion of Companions and their wives including AbO 
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Suf yän. 58 
Finally, Ibn Qayyim says that had it not been for 
the confirmation of the Prophet over their former 
contract, though their conversion occurred one after 
the other, some after the Fiudaybiyyah, some after the 
conquering of Mecca and some after the revelation of 
Mumtahinah verses, 59 we would say the immediate 
separation for reason of Islam without regarding the 
waiting period because the Qur' än says: "They are not 
lawful (wives) for the unbelievers, nor are the 
unbelievers lawful (husbands) for them... But hold not 
to the guardianship of unbelieving women. 60 
We can conclude from this opinion that the waiting 
period' is a good basis for termination of marriage. 
Henceforth the choice is open to the wife either to 
have a new marriage or to wait for her former 
husband. If he embraces, Islam the bond of marriage 
continues even after the lapse of waiting period. But 
this view lacks the practical solution for the wife 
having a new marriage with respect to her waiting 
period. For it says that the wife could have a new 
marriage after the expiry of waiting period, if her 
former husband does not join her. This means that the 
end of waiting period is a cause for termination or 
separation. This is against the established rule in 
Shari'-ah which purported that the starting point of 
waiting period is after separation not otherwise. 61 
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2. Difference of Domicile (Ikhtildf al-Deer) 
In legal sense, the difference of domicile means 
that one of the spouses lives in dar al-Islam, whether 
as dhimml or aman status, then he unilaterally 
converts to Islam. But his wife, who is in dsr al-harb 
remains in her former religion. The other sense of the 
term is that one of the couple who are the citizens of 
dar al-harb becomes a Muslim, and hence migrated to 
dar al-Islam leaving his wife behind in dar al-harb. '2 
In short, the difference of domicile followed by the 
difference of religion between the couple who were 
legally married creates a legal issue among the 
jurists with regard to their future connubial 
relationship. There are two major views over the 
issue. The majority says that the difference of 
domicile per se would not entail separation except for 
no conversion by the other spouse with the expiry of 
the waiting period. This is the opinion of 'Awza'l:, 
Malik, Sh9fi cl and Ahmad b. }ianbal. 63 Conversely, 
HanafS jurists held that if the difference of domicile 
occurred between the couple it is a course for 
immediate separation. 64 No waiting period is required 
except in the case of pregnancy. es 
a. The Majority's Arguments. 
(i) The Qur' do says: 
"0 ye who believe! When believing women 
come unto you as fugitives, examine them. 
God is best aware of their faith. Then, if 
ye know them for true believers, send them 
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not back unto the disbelievers. They are 
not lawful for the disbelievers, nor are 
the disbelievers lawful for them. And give 
the disbelievers that which they have such 
women when ye have given them their dues. 
And hold not to the ties of disbelievers 
women. 66 
The verse above indicates clearly that the cause 
for separation of the Muslim woman from her husband is 
her religion not her migration because God says 
neither she nor he would be lawful to each other. 
Therefore the reason for unlawfulness is Islam not the 
difference of domicile; 67 
(ii) It was reported that Zaynab, the Prophet's 
daughter, joined the Prophet in Medina leaving her 
husband in Mecca without conversion. When her husband 
embraced Islam, the Prophet returned Zaynab to her 
husband with the former marriage. 66 Had the separation 
of marriage inevitably occurred with the difference of 
domicile, it would have been held a new marriage. 
Hence the difference of domicile should not be a 
factor for immediate separation; 69 
<iii) It was contended that when Umm Hakim 
converted in Mecca, her husband, 'Ikrimah refused to 
convert and fled to Yemen. The same happened to Safwän 
when his wife converted during the conquest of Mecca. 
There were so many similar cases wherein the partners 
of the marriages had not. been separated albeit the 
difference in religion and domicile clearly existed; 70 
(iv) The effect of the difference in domicile 
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would be ultra vires for the Muslim authority with 
regard to its jurisdiction. But that fact alone would 
not by itself impair the marriage. This can be seen 
from the case of the unbreakable marriage as between 
ahl al-'adl and ahl al-baghy, where there is no 
authority of one over the other. It is also true in 
the case of a harbi: musta'min in dar al-Islam while 
his wife in dar al-herb as well as the case of Muslim 
musta'min in d6r al-harb and his wife in dar al-Islam 
where in these cases the difference in domicile is 
obvious; 7' and 
(v) It is further contended that the contract of 
marriage is just like a contract of exchange of 
monetary assets or rights. It is a transaction of a 
countervalue like a sale or rent. Therefore it is not 
voidable with the difference of domicile just as the 
case of contracts of sale or rent. 72 
b. The Hanaf S' s Arguments 
The Hanaft jurists relied on the same verse as 
quoted by the majority above. But they concluded with 
different interpretation as follows: 
(i) The Qur' an says: "... send them not back unto 
the disbelievers". 73 The verse suggests that the 
separation occurred between the Muslim woman who 
migrated to d6r al-Isldm, hence becoming a citizen of 
that dar. and between her husband who remains in his 
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religion in dar al-barb . For the order not to return 
the migrated Muslim woman to her husband in där al- 
barb is self-evident that the separation is inevitable 
for difference of domicile. 7" 
(ii) God says: "They are not lawful for the 
disbelievers, nor are the disbelievers lawful for 
them. " The verse indicates that both of them are not 
lawful to each other because the difference of 
domicile and religion. Therefore, it is an evidence of 
separation for the difference of domicile; 75 and 
(iii) God says: "And it is no sin for you to marry 
such women when ye have given them their dues. " Here 
God says that it is lawful for the Muslim to marry the 
migrated Muslim woman provided that he pays her a 
bride-price (mehr) or nuptial gift. This means that 
her first marriage is no longer valid; 76 
(iv) The Iianafi jurists maintain further that the 
version of Qurtubi, in his interpretation of the verse 
quoted above, is one-sided. For it clearly neglected 
the issue in question which iy1 the intention of the 
verse, namely the difference of domicile. For 
according to the verse the separation occurred between 
the migrated Muslim woman and her husband, who had 
been left behind in dar al-herb. Thus it is now lawful 
for her to be married by a Muslim without any 
predicament. Therefore, the phraseology as well as the 
context of the verse should be taken into account as 
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has been mentioned by Malik himself; 77 and 
(v) The objective of marriage is contradicted by 
the difference of domicile. Hence it is grounds for 
immediate separation. For theoretical speaking, the 
people of där al-barb are regarded as non-existent. It 
follows that if an apostate joined där al-herb. he will 
be listed as dead person. Therefore, it is 
inconceivable that the marriage can take place in this 
situation-78 
It should be noted here that the difference of 
opinion between majority and IHanaff jurists here is no 
more than the difference in interpretation and 
understanding (khildf fi al-tafslr) of the verse in 
question. They all agreed that the separation is 
likely to take place if the husband does not join his 
wife with the expiry of waiting period. The main issue 
is therefore whether that separation is immediate, 
after the difference of domicile, or it occurs at some 
other times after the waiting period (Giddah). The 
former was the position of 1Ianaf f jurists whereas the 
majority maintains the latter because the majority, 
especially the Shäf141. does not consider the 
difference of domicile as a factor for separation. 7° 
It seems that the views of majority is more relevant 
in this case. This is because to subscribe to the view 
of the Hanafi school would be largely irrelevant in 
the light of contemporary circumstances where the 
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difference between the two dars hardly exists in 
addition to the facilities in communication. It is 
also maintained that by the time of the expiry of 
waiting period the couple would have ample time to 
decide whether to remain separated or reunion. 80 
Finally, the relevant verse does not seem to suggest 
emphatically (gaJI-i) as to the immediate separation as 
has been alleged by Nanaf i jurists. 81 
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D. Maintenance (nafagah) 
In this section, there are three relevant cases 
pertaining to the subject of 
this inquiry which should 
be discussed. They are: 
1. Maintenance for a non-Muslim wife; 
2. Maintenance among non-Muslims; and 
3. Maintenance in the case of conversion. 
'h" - 
1. Maintenance forAMuslim wife. 
Legally speaking, it is obligatory for a husband 
to provide maintenance, in the forms of food, cloth 
and shelter for his wife. It is part of her right when 
the couple is legally married. There is no dispute 
among the jurists that such a maintenance is required 
Im PI-ovI d. d 6y a 
by Islamic law of marriage toA Muslim husband for his 
Muslim wife as well as non-Muslim kitäbi wife. The 
Qur'an says: "Lodge them where ye dwell, according to 
your wealth, and harass them not so as to make life 
hard for them. " 82 And the Qur' än says: "Let him who 
bath abundance spend of his abundance, and he whose 
provision is measured, let him spend of that which God 
hath given himi' as On another occasion the Qur'an 
says: "But he shall bear the cost of their food and 
clothing on equitable terms. "84 
The verses above indicate that the maintenance is 
a mandatory foe. the husband in accordance with his 
capabilities. For the command to give her a refuge 
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should be also construed as the command for spending 
on other basic needs which will vary from people to 
people in accordance with their social status. This 
command for maintenance in as much'as it is for a 
Muslim wife, also includes the kitäbf wife. For there 
is no evidence to suggest the command to any 
particular group nor do we find any evidence to its 
contrary. as 
As for the Tradition there is a report saying that 
Hind bt. 'Utbah once complained to the Prophet about 
the stinginess of her husband, Abo Sufyän. The 
Prophet said to her, "Take his money in all fairness 
(bi al-ma(rüf) up to what will be sufficient for you 
and your child. "s" In another 
Tradition the Prophet 
in the long speech of his farewell pilgrimage was 
reported to have said: "As for them (wives) it is 
incumbent on you to provide their foods and clothing 
in all fairness (a Grü ). "8 7 From the meaning of the 
two traditions above, it can be said that there is no 
specification of Muslim wives. Therefore, it would 
include kitabS wives as well. ea 
It is worthy to note that the maintenance as it 
is obligatory in the time of marriage, is also made 
obligatory even in the time of waiting period if the 
divorce is revocable (ra. i 'i ); or in the case of 
definite (Win) repudiation while the wife is 
pregnant. The consensus of the jurists of all schools 
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was in favour of this. 89 This maintenance after 
repudiation, irrespective of its category, was 
commonly acceptable with regards to dhimml wives. For, 
the rule pertaining to the case is identical whether 
the wife is Muslim or non-Muslim. 90 
2. Maintenance among non-Muslims 
Shafi'S jurists held that the maintenance is 
obligatory for non-Muslim husbands for his non-Muslim 
wife if their marriage is recognised if they take the 
case to the Muslim court or become Muslims. Therefore, 
the marriage of no witnesses or without legal 
guardian, for instance, would deem lawful hence the 
maintenance is obligatory because those marriages were 
recognised by the Muslim court, but not the marriage 
among non-marriageable persons (mah rim). For such a 
marriage is not acceptable to Islam. 91 The IIanball 
jurists, however, say that the maintenance is 
obligatory for any marriage of non-Muslims regardless 
of whether such a marriage is recognisable by Islam or 
not-92 
On the other hand, the Hanaff jurists maintain the 
application of the rule of maintenance whether for 
the Muslim or dhimmt wife provided that the marriage 
is not among the non-marriageable persons. They held 
that the cause as well as the conditions for 
maintenance is identical between Muslims and non- 
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Muslims. Therefore, there is no evidence to separate, 
in ruling or treatment, between the two cases. 93 The 
same would be applied to the case of musts' min. 9" The 
}Lanafi jurists, however, split over the issue of 
maintenance in the case of marriage among non- 
marriageable persons-95 
3. Maintenance in the Case of Conversion. 
In this case the conversion may take place either 
by the husband or the wife. If a husband embraces 
Islam but his wife, a non-kitäbi, remains in her 
religion, the maintenance will continue uninterrupted 
if she is pregnant until she gives birth. For the bond 
of marriage remains with the pregnancy. If she is not 
pregnant the majority holds that her maintenance is to 
be discontinued from the date of her refusal to become 
Muslim. 96 It is immaterial whether she becomes a 
Muslim or not during her waiting period. For by 
refusing to become a Muslim, she was considered as a 
recalcitrant (n6shizah) which is entitled to no 
maintenance but is still entitled to shelter. 97 It 
would be recalled here that there is no difference in 
the maintenance of a kit8bt wife. 
On the other hand, Shdfi'1, in his old version 
(ad m)98 held that the wife is still eligible for 
maintenance until the expiry of the waiting period, 
for there is no fault on her part which would deprive 
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her of maintenance. It is her husband that has changed 
the religion, thus the bond of marriage is there and 
she is his wife, in theory, until the expiry of 
t4 
awaiting period. Therefore maintenance should not be 
interrupted within that period of time. 99 
If it is the wife who embraces Islam, not her 
husband, t he jurists differ over her maintenance 
during the waiting period. According to the majority, 
the wife is entitled to the full maintenance during 
the time of her husband's refusal. This is because he 
can join her at any moment thus saving their marriage. 
Therefore, the maintenance should not be interrupted 
except after the expiry of the waiting period. '00 
On the other hand, another opinion of Shäfi'i and 
Maliki schools hold that there will be no maintenance 
during that period. For the cause of separation is 
hers by becoming a Muslim, not her husband's. iol 
The view of the majority of the jurists would seem 
appropriate in the case of conversion regardless 
whether the conversion takes place from husband or 
wife. 102 
E. Inheritance (mirath> 
In the realm of family laws, most of the contracts 
can be generally divided into two categories viz. the 
contracts of countervalue, in nature and scope, 
whether in the form of monetary assets or rights, such 
243 
as sales and marriages and its related subjects which 
have been discussed above. The other form of contract, 
however, does not concentrate on countervalue but it 
is rather a unilateral will for the entire benefit of 
the other party. In other words, it is a benevolent 
act such as will, inheritance, endowment, charity etc. 
In this section we shall limit our discussion into two 
topics; that is inheritance and wagf (endowment). 
As for inheritance, two cases will be discussed 
briefly here, namely, inheritance between Muslim and 
non-Muslim; and inheritance in the case of conversion. 
1. Inheritance between Muslim and non-Muslim 
The jurists agreed that a Muslim can inherit from 
another Muslim so long as there is no impediment for 
it. The jurists also agreed that a non-Muslim can 
inherit from another non-Muslim though they disagreed 
over the issue of whether difference of religions or 
sects among non-Muslims would be an obstacle to 
inheritance. The consensus of jurists also maintained 
that a non-Muslim cannot inherit from a Muslim. 103 
This consensus is derived because the Qur'än and the 
sunny speak clearly to that effect. The Qur' än says: 
it... and God will not give the disbelievers any way 
(of access) against the believers. "104 According to 
the verse it is prohibited to allow the inheritance of 
non-Muslims from Muslims which is considered as an 
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access to power over the Muslims. 105 As for the 
Tradition, the Prophet was reported to have said quite 
explicitly: "The Muslim does not inherit from the 
unbeliever nor does the unbeliever inherit from the 
Muslim. '06 According to Mdlik: "The generally agreed 
way of doing things among us and the sunnah in which 
there is no dispute, and what I saw the people of 
knowledge in our city doing, is that a Muslim does not 
inherit from a disbeliever by kinship, clientage 
<walä' or maternal relationship, nor does he (the 
Muslim) overshadow any (of the disbelievers) from his 
inheritance! ' 107 The texts above clearly indicate that 
difference of religion between the deceased and his 
surviving heirs would be an obstacle for inheritance 
unless conversion takes place as will be discussed 
below. 
Conversely, while the jurists agreed that a non- 
Muslim could not inherit from a Muslim, they could not 
agree whether a Muslim could possibly inherit from a 
non-Muslim (dhimmTor must a' min). The majority of 
Companions, the followers of Companions and jurists of 
all schools say that the Muslim, based on the 
tradition above, does not inherit from non-Muslim. 108 
On the other hand, it was reported that Mu'ädh b. 
Jabal, Mu'äwiyah, Masrüq, Ibn al-Musayyab, Sh, 'bi, 
Nakha'i, and others including Shi'i school contend 
that a Muslim may inherit a non-Muslim. 109 They argue 
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that since a Muslim can marry a non-Muslim woman the 
same rule would be applied to the case of inheritance 
from non-Muslim. It was also reported that when Mu'ädh 
was in Yemenis oa case of a Jew who died survived by 
his Muslim brother, was brought to his attention. He 
said that I have heard the Prophet said: "Islam is 
increasing not decreasing". 111 It is noted here that 
this ruling from Mu'ädh was derived from his 
understanding of the text and hence was his iltihäd 
(the use of individual reasoning). Mu'ädh was a sound 
muitahid and had been acknowledged by the Prophet to 
such a quality in his appointment to Yemen. 112 
The view of majority would seem more appropriate 
because of the clear and explicit tradition above 
which prohibited the inheritance from non-Muslims. The 
i_itihSd of Mu'B. dh however could not be justified, if 
it was true, with the presence of a clear text. 113 
Perhaps the strongest case of the argument is what 
was reported as follows: "Yahya related to me from 
Malik from Ibn Shihdb that '-Ali ibn Husayn ibn 'All 
ibn Abi Tdlib told him that 'Agll and Tälib inherited 
from Aba Talib, and 'A1l3 1" did not inherit from him. 
GAU said, "Because of that, we have given up our 
portion of ash-Shdb" (A house belonging to Banü 
Hdshim). 115 This is because 'Agil and Tallb remained 
in the same religion as AbQ Talfb whereas 'All and 
Ja'fer became Muslims. We can conclude therefore that 
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the "doctrine of difference of religion and domicile" 
played a decisive role in preventing the inheritance 
from each other since the time of the Prophet. This 
principle has been followed by the Muslims until our 
time. 
2. Inheritance in the Case of Conversion 
The jurists have agreed that a conversion of a 
non-Muslim after the death of his Muslim testator 
(mOwarrith) would bar him from the inheritance if it 
had already been divided among the surviving Muslim 
heirs. However, even if he converted before the 
division of the inheritance the majority held that no 
share should be given to hire. This is the opinion of 
Malik, Aba Hanif6h and Shäf i'S. 1° Conversely, another 
opinion of MSlik, Ibn Hanbal and Shi 'r school maintain 
that the man could share with the others. 111 
Furthermore, this latter view maintains that if some 
of the property had been divided, the man would share 
the rest of it. The same rule applies to a wife if she 
converts before the division of the legacy provided 
that the conversion occurs during her waiting 
period. 11$ 
a. The Arguments 
(I) The majority rely on the previous Tradition 
that a non-Muslim does not inherit from a Muslim, as 
the impediment exists at the time of the death, hence 
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there will be no inheritance in such a case. It is 
further argued that by the death of the deceased the 
legacy has transferred to the possession (al-milk) of 
the existing Muslim heirs. Thus conversion after the 
demise should not change the present status quo and 
would give him no right to share with the others. 
Therefore, legally speaking, the conversion makes no 
difference to him whether or not the legacy has been 
divided. 119 
(ii) The verse pertaining to the inheritance such 
as: "And unto you belongeth a half of that which your 
wives leave, if they have no child.... 00120 indicates 
that the legacy becomes due and hence the possession 
of the heirs from the moment of the death, after 
clearing the wills and debts, without dependence on 
its division. Therefore, that right to possession 
should not be affected and alienated by the conversion 
after the legacy had become theirs and they were 
merely waiting for division. 
(iii) The rule of inheritance or the law of 
succession has become established. It has no effect on 
it whether the legacy has been divided or not. It is 
like the rule of interest after its prohibition. For 
its rule stands (the same) whether the deal of 
interest has been properly executed or not. 121 
On the other hand, the opposing view argues that: 
(i) To let the new converted heir share the legacy 
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is to encourage him to embrace Islam then leave under 
the realm of Islam. 122 
(ii) The Prophet was reported to hav e said: "Any 
division (of legacy) which had been divided in the 
days of pre-Islam was in accordance with the rule of 
the day (. ibhiliyyah), and any division which falls 
under Islam (which has not been divided) it will be in 
accordance with the rule of Islam. 123 According to 
this Tradition the mode of division, hence its 
beneficiaries, depends on its rule of whether they 
belong to Islam or otherwise. So the dema rcation point 
to be considered is the time of division of the legacy 
not at the time of death. But according to Ibn Uazm 
the Tradition above is in the category of mursal which 
is not accepted by all scholars. 124 
The majority seems to have stronger evidences and 
arguments. 2$ 
F. Endowment (wagf ) 
According to Kasant wagf means an act of waiving 
the ownership of one's property for the sake of 
God, 126 or more generally to set apart his own 
property for charitable purposes. 127 It is an act of 
benevolence which has been practised by the Prophet 
and his Companions. 128 The jurists however have 
formulated some conditions for the endower (wägi f) to 
be eligible to make an endowment. He must inter alia, 
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possess a capacity to give to charity, that is, he has 
attained the age of puberty, has a sound judgement and 
finally, the purpose must be for the sake of God. 129 
1. The Endowment of non-Muslims 
There is no dispute among the jurists that a non- 
Muslim can make an endowment for Muslims. For no 
jurists would say that Islam is something which 
prevents an endowment. '3° If a dhimmi endowed his 
property for his children and his descendants and 
finally for the poor, his endowment is legally valid. 
Hence both the poor of non-Muslims as well as Muslims 
would be eligible to it except if he specifically 
mentioned that the endowment was only for the poor of 
ahl el-dhimmah, then the executor should fulfil his 
wish. t31 If a dhimmi. in his deed of endowment, 
provides that his property is for his descendants, 
then f or the poor, * but if anyone f rom among his 
descendants becomes a Muslim, he should be excluded 
from the endowment, the said endowment is valid 
according to his deed. 132 This is because the endower 
is the owner of his property. He can dispose of his 
property at his free will provided that it is not for 
sinful activities. 133 For according to Hanafi jurists 
the endowment must be made only for the sake of God 
and it must be for common good both to the Muslims and 
the non-Muslims depending on one's respective belief. 
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For instance, the endowment for the poor (Muslims and 
non-Muslims), for Jerusalem (bayt al-Magdis), etc. 134 
If the purpose of the endowment is no good for either 
Muslims and non-Muslims, or each of them the endowment 
is not valid such as, it is made for the criminals or 
the prostitutes or the like. 135 It is worthy to note 
that in addition to the endowment for a Muslim, a 
d immS can do the same for a dhimmi. but Hanaf f 
jurists held that as a Muslim cannot endow a 
must a' min. the same applies to the dhimmi. 136 This is 
simply because the musts' min is an alien resident and 
by no means would his right be equal with the dhimmi. 
However, if the endowment is for all people, the 
musta''min would certainly enjoy the same entitlement 
as others. 
The Maliki, Shdfi cI and Hanball jurists share the 
HanafS's view that a dhimmi can endow a dhimmi or a 
Muslim. But Shgfi'i jurists held that a dh mmS can 
endow a musts' min. 1 37 Mdliki jurists, however, 
maintain that a immi cannot make an endowment for 
the sole religious purposes of the Muslims such as 
building a mosque; but if it is for mundane purposes 
such as building a hospital, school, bridge, etc. the 
endowment is perfectly valid. 198 On the other hand, 
the Shafi cl and IHanball jurists held that ad imml can 
For 
endowAa mosque, for the criterion is subject to and in 
accordance with the Muslim's belief not that of the 
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dhimmi. The general rule is therefore any endowment 
which is not valid from the Muslims is likewise 
considered as not valid from a dhimmr such as the 
endowment for unspecific person or category of 
persons. 
139 
2. Endowment for non-Muslims 
The jurists of different schools have agreed that 
a Muslim can make an endowment for a dhimml and 
musts' min' 40with some condition, inter alia, that the 
motive of the endowment must not for maCsiyah (sin) 
purposes or the like. s"t In other words, the endowment 
must not go against the teaching of Islam. 142 For 
example, a Muslim may endow his property for the 
exclusive use of the poor and the needy of non-Muslims 
be 
but he cannot endow his property toAused for drinking 
wine or other sinful purposes, for such activities are 
obviously against the basic teachings of Islam. 143 
There are at least two textual evidences that 
support the view above: 
a. The Qur'dn says: "And feed with food the needy 
wretch, the orphan and the prisoner, for love of Him. 
(Saying): We feed you, for the sake of God only. We 
wish for no reward nor thanks from you. "1 "4 In another 
occasion the Qur'än says: "God forbiddeth you not 
those who warred not against you on account of 
religion and drove you not out of your homes, that ye 
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should show them kindness and deal justly with 
them. Lo! God loveth the just dealers. "1 45 
The first verse indicates that the endowment for 
non-Muslims which is a charitable gift ( adagah) is 
not only permissible but deserves a reward and 
commendation from God. The prisoners in the verse are 
usually understood as from non-Muslims. 146 The second 
verse suggests the permissibility, in general. in 
giving cedagah to non-Muslims who are not hostile to 
Muslims. Consequently, the ham rbf would be excluded by 
implication. 147 According to Zamakhsharl it was 
alleged that this verse was revealed to correct the 
attitude of Asm6' bt. Abi Bakr, who refused to give 
hospitality to her mother who was disbeliever when the 
latter visited the former. After this revelation the 
Prophet ordered Asm&' to welcome her mother. 148 The 
verse also suggests that there is no harm for the 
Muslims to establish and maintain social as well as 
friendly relationships with non-Muslims especially the 
immSs. 149 
b. It was reported that ýafiyyah bt. I; iuyay, the 
wife of the Prophet, has endowed her brother who was 
a Jew. Had the act been forbidden it would had been 
disapproved of and corrected by the Prophet. But no 
report to suggest to the contrary from the Prophet. 
F 
Therefore, the endowment to non-Muslims is acceptable 
to Islam. ssO 
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It is needless to point out here that the jurists 
of all schools agreed that the endowment for barbi and 
apostate is invalid, 151 for both of them are 
considered to be in the state of uncertainty whereas 
endowment is a perpetual gift (cadagah _iäriah). 
As the 
endowment is not to be made except from a long lasting 
subject it is likewise with respect to the 
beneficiaries. 152 
It should be noted here that of late, the Egyptian 
legislation pertaining to waaf of dhimmf has been 
enacted. Article seven provides that, "The endowment 
of non-Muslim is valid so long as it is not forbidden 
according to his religion and Islamic law. "153 This 
provision means that the endowment of non-Muslims, 
whether Egyptian or foreigner, is not lawful if both 
that 
laws, Muslim and non-Muslim, deem,, it is unlawful to 
ar 
make such4endowment. However, if both or one of the 
laws permits it is to be considered as lawful. It can 
be concluded that the endowment made by a non-Muslim 
to a Muslim or vice versa is lawful according to the 
above provision. '54 As for the term of reference to 
the things forbidden it should be agreed by all 
schools in the case of Islamic law, and it should be 
known to be forbidden or accepted to all in the case 
of non-Muslim's religion. 1s5 
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G. Witness (shahddah) is6 
At the outset it should be stated that there is no 
difference in opinion among the jurists of different 
schools that a Muslim can give 
testimony or be a 
witness for and against a non-Muslim. This agreement 
stem from the conception that since 
Muslims can be a 
witness for each other, it would likewise 
hold true 
that a Muslim would therefore possess a capacity to 
become a witness for or against a non-Muslim. 157 
a. Witness of non-Muslim 
The dispute, however, arises among the jurists 
about whether a non-Muslim could possibly become a 
witness for a Muslim. As a rule, they generally agreed 
that it is not to be accepted except in certain cases. 
According to MAliki jurists the testimony of a 
non-Muslim could not be accepted except a testimony of 
a non-Muslim doctorise such as in determining the 
extent of imperfection of someone, the wounds, or the 
like. They said that such a testimony is accepted 
because of its necessity. 159 The prevailing view in 
E! anafS school held that it is not to be accepted 
except in certain cases such as in case of need. 3.60 
The strictest view in this case is from Shäfi'f school 
which held that in no circumstances will the testimony 
of a non-Muslim be accepted, whether it is for or 
against a Muslim, in travelling or otherwise. 161 
On the other hand, Hanball and ZdhirlA as well as 
255 
al-Thawrl and al-Awz&'i maintain that a non-Muslim 
could be a witness for a Muslim, while travelling in a 
will cases only provided that no Muslim was present at 
that time. 162 
a. The Arguments 
Those who held that no witness could be accepted 
from a non-Muslim, rely on these evidences: 
(i) The Qur'an says: "And call to witness, from 
among your men, two witnesses, And if two men be not 
(at hand) then a man and two women, of such as ye 
approve as witnesses. "163 
(ii) The Qur' än says: "... and call to witness two 
just men among you, and keep your testimony upright 
for God. P#164 
The two verses above require two conditions from a 
witness namely, to be just and to be a Muslim. It is 
not sufficient to be a Muslim alone. Therefore the 
majority holds that the verses above have excluded a 
non-Muslim from being a witness. 165 
(iii) The acceptance of a non-Muslim's testimony 
or as a witness would oblige a Muslim judge to rule in 
accordance with that testimony. Hence, it appears that 
a non-Muslim has some sort of authority over a Muslim. 
A situation which is not acceptable to the Jurists. '" 
The opposing view however relies on these 
evidences: 
<i> The Qur' än says: "0 ye who believe! Let there 
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be witnesses between you when death draweth nigh unto 
one of you, at the time of bequests - two witnesses, 
just men from among you, or two others not from among 
you, in case ye are journeying in the land and the 
calamity of death befall you. "16" 
The verse above suggests that while travelling and 
if there is no Muslim, it is permitted for whoever is 
present, even though non-Muslims to be witnesses in 
matters of will or bequest. Therefore in this case a 
dhimmi could become a witness for a Muslim. This is 
also the view of Abt] MQsS and Shurayh. 146 
(ii) It was reported that Ibn 'Abbas when reciting 
the verse above added that "from the People of the 
Book. " This act of Ibn GAbbäs, who was considered as 
one of the authority on the Qur' dn, must be in 
accordance with what he had heard or taken from the 
Prophet. 169 
(iii) The Companions of the Prophet accepted the 
witness of a non-Muslim while travelling on matters of 
will. Aba 'Ubayd reported that Ibn Mas'Qd had done so 
in the time of 4Uthman. 17o 
(iv) The acceptance of a non-Muslim witness is a 
matter of practicality and necessity at one time. For 
it is inconceivable that in such a critical moment 
with no single Muslim present while the man is away 
from his home, a non-Muslim could not be considered as 
a witness of the will. In this situation, it is like 
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the case of tayammum171 when there is no water, or 
the weak who has to break his fasting during RamaSiän, 
or eating of carrion or swine-flesh in 
the time of 
necessity-172 For it is an acceptable rule 
that 
"necessity could ward off prohibition". It is a 
practical solution for the man who probably had not 
paid his alms-giving, or settled his debts, or wanted 
to contribute for some charity purposes in the form 
of 2adagah endowment or the like. 173 
The view which says that a non-Muslim witness or 
testimony for a Muslim can be accepted in the time of 
necessity would seem to be preferable because of its 
stronger evidences as discussed above. 174 This is : 
in 
addition to the compatibility with the spirit of 
Sharif-ah. For it is not proper to put obstacles on the 
way of people's interaction in the present time where 
the relationships in trade and other sphere of human 
activities between the Muslims and non-Muslims has 
become so complex and inseparable17s Moreover, kianball 
jurists maintain that the cause ('illah) for 
permissibility of a non-Muslim witness is necessity. 
Therefore, it can be applied for any case of necessity 
regardless whether travelling or otherwise, in matters 
of will or any other matter, especially in business 
transactions. 174 
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2. Non-Muslim Witness on Muslim Marriage 
There is no dispute among the jurists that in the 
contract of marriage between the Muslims, two Muslims 
witnesses are required. But in the case of a Muslim 
who marries ad immf woman, a controversy arises over 
the validity of the witnesses being two male dhimmis. 
In other words could non-Muslims be witnesses of 
intermarriage between a Muslim and &dhimmi woman? Abfl 
Hanffah and AbQ Yesuf hold that it is acceptable and 
the marriage is valid. 177 It is immaterial for them 
whether the religion of the wife and the witnesses is 
identical or not. But Malik , Shrafi'1, Shaybäni, Zufar 
and Ahmad b. iianbal maintain that the marriage is not 
valid. '''" For they are of the opinions that Islam is a 
prerequisite for the witness whether the marriage is 
of Muslim or non-Muslim wife. It would seem that the 
majority view is more appropriate in the light of the 
evidences discussed above where the non-Muslim 
witnesses could be accepted only in certain cases. 179 
3. Witness Among non-Muslims 
All schools except Hanaft agreed that non-Muslims 
cannot be a witness for each other. They rely on the 
verse: "And call to witness, from among your men, two 
witnesses. And if two men be not (at hand) then a man 
and two women, of such as ye approve as 
witnesses.... "iao The verse indicates that the witness 
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can only be had recourse to with approval. Hence 
according to those schools, the witness among non- 
Muslims for each other could not be accepted due to 
lack of approval. L81 However, Ibn Taymiyyah 
(d. 728 
A. H. a Hanball: jurist accepted the witness of 
dhimmf for each other and contended that it is a 
riwäyeh (report) from Al}mad b. Hanbal. 182 Conversely, 
Hanaff jurists maintain that the witness among non- 
Muslims is acceptable with the following conditions: 
a. Dhimmi can become a witness for each other 
though they are from different sects so long as they 
are good ('udal) in their religion. 183 The IIanaf t 
jurists argued that if a Muslim can be a witness for a 
Muslim so does a dhimml for a dhimmi. It is also 
contended that a Muslim usually does not involve in 
the affairs of non-Muslims. Therefore, it is 
imperative that they can take up witnesses among 
themselves in case there is a need for it. 184 In 
addition, they also rely on the verse: "And those who 
disbelieve are protectors (awliyä') one of 
another. . .. " 18S If non-Muslims are protectors of one 
another, so the question of witness, which is less 
significant, is also to be construed as included by 
implication. For the protection or guardianship is 
more significant than that of witness. 186 
b. A dhimmi also can become a witness for 
musta'min but not vice versa, f or it is held that a 
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dhimml is considered, by the pact of dhimmah, as 
closer to Muslims and higher in status than musts' min 
since they are residents of dar al-Isl9im. 187 Kdsänf 
formulated the rule for them as "the rule of witness 
as between musta'min and dhimml is as the rule of 
dhimmý to a Muslim"; 16° and 
c. The witness of musta' min, however, is accepted 
to each other if they are from the same dar and same 
sect otherwise their witness will not be accepted. For 
the difference in "domicile" will bar them from 
guardianship (wilayak) and inheritance. Since witness 
is a kind of guardianship. 189 With regard to the 
witness of dhimml for musts' min, the question of 
different dar is immaterial because of his position in 
darr al-Islam as stated above. 
The view of the Hanaft jurists would seem more 
appropriate for the reasons stated above. It would 
also seen reasonable to accept the witness of 
musta'min for each other though they come from 
different Sr. 190 For the concept of different där for 
them is almost irrelevant in the context of the 
present situation. We would also accept the witness of 
musts' min for d immt for the same reason. 1 91 Moreover, 
being a witness is based on the trustworthiness of 
each person, and this could be found in a musts' min. 
This is in addition to the fact that in witness there 
is no religious or spiritual element involved. 192 
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III. The Law of Contracts and Obligations 
A. In Ddr al-Islam 
At the outset we would like to point out that the 
objective of this section is to develop a framework 
that will allow us to comprehend briefly the Islamic 
notions of contracts and obligations. This would then 
be helpful in drawing a conclusion about the 
relationship between Muslims and non-Muslims in this 
respect. 
Unlike other fields of law, where there is a 
considerable number of revealed texts provided as a 
guideline, such as in criminal and family laws, ' the 
Islamic law of contracts or rather the field of 
business transactions (muCamalät) receives less 
attention from the main sources of the Islamic law. 
However, the Qur'dn and the sunnah provide general 
broad rules and principles2 leaving its details to be 
developed, at later stage, by the jurists. The task of 
the jurists therefore, in this regard, is so enormous 
that no single jurist or school could ever have 
developed it without the help of the others. This is 
in one sense due to the flexibility of Islamic law, 
and in another in order to cope with the 
practicality of the contemporary needs which might be 
varied from place to place and from time to time. It 
is these two characteristics of the Islamic law that 
enable it to be relevant to the present time. 
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Generally speaking, in business and trade, 
everything that is allowable for a 
Muslim is likewise 
allowable for a non-Muslim; conversely, anything 
that 
is prohibited for a Muslim, is prohibited for a non- 
Muslim as well except otherwise in certain cases such 
as that of liquor and pigs. 3 For these two 
items have 
been made specially excepted by the terms of the 
contract 
(cagd el-dhimmah). " Therefore, we can say 
that a non-Muslim enjoys the same rights and 
obligations as a Muslim in the field of the 
contractual obligations or business transactions 
(mu malfit). This equality is applicable to all legal 
obligations emanating from any contract concluded as 
between Muslim and non-Muslim. It is also true with 
respect to all dealings pertaining to worldly affairs. 
According to Fianafi jurists a dhimmf is treated 
like a Muslim in terms of his liability under Islamic 
law pertaining to mu'ämalRt because he is the subject 
of the Islamic state. $ Jagqdq held that the d mm is 
treated like the Muslim in terms of his contract of 
sales, inheritance, and any other business transaction 
where Islamic law is applicable to him except that of 
liquor and pigs. For both commodities are recognised 
as their property. 6 
It follows that any contract which is deemed void 
and unlawful according to Islam such as a contract 
that is based on usury and the like7 would 
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necessarily be unlawful for the dhimmT. 8 It was 
reported that the Prophet wrote to the Christians of 
Najrdn to cease taking the interest in their dealings 
or face war from the Prophet. ° The Qur' än says: 
"And if ye do not, then be warned of war 
(against you) from God and His messenger. 
And if ye repent, then ye have your 
principal (without interest). Wrong not, 
and ye shall not be wronged. "10 
It is clear therefore that a dhimmi. in doing 
business in the Islamic state, has to follow the 
Islamic law of contract. It should be noted that in 
business transactions the faith of the contracting 
parties does not stand as a barrier for any contract 
to be deemed valid and lawful. This means that Islam 
is not a condition for a valid contractual 
obligations-" To this was the consensus of all 
jurists from different schools. '2 
The principle above as it applies to dhimmi is 
also true with respect to musta' min. For according to 
Hanaf! jurists the position of musta'min in dar al- 
Islgm in the field of mu'emalät is identical to that 
of dhimmT 13 The fact that he applies for am6n status 
is sufficient to suggest that he is ready to be 
governed by and in accordance with the relevant laws 
applicable to him. For the law is enforceable so long 
as he, remains in dar al-Islam. 14 Therefore, he will 
be treated as the dhimmi in all his dealings whether 
with Muslims or non-Muslims. Is In the words of 
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Sarakhsi, "A mu sta'min as long as he is in där al- 
Islam is obliged to follow Islamic law pertaining to 
mu _emalät as is the dhimmi. This 
is the opinion of Abis 
Yasuf and Shäfi'I. "1 
This principle of equal treatment before the law 
in trade and commerce, formulated by HanafI jurists, 
is also shared by other jurists of different schools. 
According to Sh8fi't "All sales which are deemed 
invalid among the Muslims, are likewise invalid among 
non-Muslims; however, if it had occurred and the 
transaction had been completed, we shall not revoke 
it. But we shall revoke the existing one. 1117 This 
statement of Shdfi 'I is in complete harmony with the 
view of Hanaf i jurists. Hanbal l jurists however say 
that if ad mi revives dead land, the title to the 
land will be his just as it would be for a Muslim. 18 
This equal treatment also discussed by the jurists in 
contracts such as rent ( dra 19 pre-emption 
(shuf'a+ ), 20 profit-sharing (muc drabah ), 21 business 
partnership (sharikah)22 agricultural share cropping 
(muzgra'ah), 23 etc. In the word of al-Mar&ghl, "All 
jurists agreed that non-Muslims are treated, in the 
field of business transaction (mu'ämaldt) and penal 
law ('ugGbät) as Muslims. For the objectives of 
transactions, such as selling and buying, is for 
worldly purposes which is of common interest to 
all. "z4 
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1. Some Exceptional Cases 
We have pointed out earlier that as a general rule 
a non-Muslim will be treated as a Muslim in the field 
of mu'ämalät in där al-Isläm. However, there are some 
exceptional cases to the rule, which the jurists have 
reached, although there are some difference of 
opinions over some cases. 
a. Liquor and Pigs 
According to HanafT and ZaydT jurists non-Muslims 
are allowed to trade, in addition to consuming, both 
liquor and pigs in d6r al-Islam. But both items are 
strictly forbidden to Muslims. They are allowed to do 
this -because both commodities are recognised as 
valuable properties for non-Muslims. 25 This is part of 
Islamic tolerance towards non-Muslims. Had it not been 
the case there would have been no trace of it in the 
Muslim countries. This gesture has been generally 
practised by the Muslims throughout history. It was 
reported that the Muslims collected 'ushr (tithe), 
khar& . and 1 izyah from pigs and liquor of dhimmi. 26 
When 'Umar I heard about it, he ordered the d immi to 
sell the pigs and liquor and pays the taxes from its 
prices. Had it not allowed selling of those items for 
the dhimmi. there would not have been the order to 
sell it. 27 There is also a report agreed by the 
jurists that the Muslims collected iizyah and khara 
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from the prices of both items. 28 On the other hand, 
Abis 'Ubayd reports that both 'Umar I and the II 
prohibited taking 'us r from both commodities. 
For it 
was reported that the Prophet has said: "Verily 
if God 
prohibited something it will include 
its price. "29 The 
reason behind this prohibition being that 
'us would 
then be a tax on the liquor and pigs themselves which 
would be indistinguishable from their prices; whereas 
in the case of iz ah and kharä the tax is taken from 
dim 's property no matter where he got that from. 30 
It is interesting to point out that AbO 4Ubayd in his 
comment says that the opinions as well as the 
practises of the two Caliphs are preferable. sl 
It. seems to be that there are two conflicting 
reports from CUmar I in the case of taking Gus from 
the price of liquor and pigs. 32 To resolve the problem 
it can be said that probably Abü Han! fah and Ibrahim 
al-Nakha cl applied the rule of analogy ( äs ), which 
is one of the sources of the Islamic law, to the 
decision to take the price of both commodities for 
paying _iizyah and 
khar&_i which was hitherto approved 
by GUmar I himself. Since the price has become 
himmi's property thus it liable for 'us . 
This conclusion is vital for practical reasons in 
our time. For the permission to consume both 
commodities for non-Muslims would necessitate the 
approval of manufacturing, trading, and importing 
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them. These transactions however need to be regulated 
and, to some extent, supervised by the state. 
Such 
activities would require the income derived 
to be 
taxed according to the modern notion of taxation. 
What we have said about dhimml is also applicable 
to musta' min. 33 In the case of conversion however it 
would naturally change the validity of the 
transaction. This could be seen from the following 
cases. If a non-Muslim purchases liquor or pig from 
another non-Muslim, then before the deal is completed 
one or both of them is converted to Islam, the deal 
would naturally null and void. 34 But if the conversion 
takes place after the deal had been completed, there 
will be no effect on the deal. ss This is because the 
transaction had taken place completely before the 
conversion. There is nothing which would change his 
ownership and benefits from the transaction by the 
conversion. It is the same as if juice owned by a 
Muslim became fermented and hence alcoholic, his 
ownership of the juice remains unaffected. 36 
b. Vandalism to Liquor and Pigs 
The act of vandalism to both these commodities 
also receives attention from the jurists. They do not 
agree however as to whether or not the vandal would be 
liable for the offence. Hanafi jurists say the robber 
(ghesib) or vandal (mutlif) should pay the 
268 
compensation to non-Muslim owner, 37 for it is a 
valuable property for non-Muslims but not to the 
Muslim owner. It is also the view of Mäliki jurists 
provided that the dhimml does not over expose them to 
the Muslim. 36 On the other hand, Shäfi'5: and Hanball 
jurists maintain that there should be no compensation 
for the damage irrespective of whether the owner is 
Muslim or non-Muslim and the offender is a Muslim or 
otherwise. 39 Their rationale is that anything that is 
not to be compensated for for the Muslim, will be the 
same for a non-Muslim. "0, 
Although this view seems to be consistent with the 
principle of equal treatment in mu'ämalat for both 
Muslim- and non-Muslim, the view of the HanafS school 
is more relevant in this case because both commodities 
are properties of the dhimmi. and the d immi is under 
the guarantee and protection of the state as to his 
life and property. To say otherwise would be undermine 
that security and would put his property in the state 
of non-protection which is repugnant to the contract 
of dhimmah. 4s 
c. Employment Relationship 
In the field of industrial relations, the jurists 
of all schools unanimously agreed that a Muslim can be 
employed by a dhimmi for any economic activity so long 
as the type of work is not repugnant to Islamic 
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teachings. 42 It was reported that 6Al b. Abt Tslib 
was employed by a Jew for irrigation work. 
The news 
reached the Prophet and he did not disapprove of it, 
43 
for it reflects a full sense of contractual 
obligations, normally concluded by an offer and an 
acceptance, hence it is a free bilateral4' agreement 
like a sale which forms the core of the Islamic law of 
contract. 45 It is clear therefore that the Muslim as 
well as the non-Muslim are permitted to establish an 
employment relationship in the field of economic 
activities. 
d. Business Partnership 
Trade and business have become life and blood of 
each community in today's life. The Prophet is 
reported to have said: "0 God! Give your blessing to 
my ummah for their effort, or endeavour (including in 
trade and business, early in the morning. "46 Hence, 
the Prophet urges the Muslims to be an early bird'? so 
that he shall obtain more blessing and subsistence 
from God. In seeking livelihood the Muslims should 
exert all possible means including cooperation and 
joint partnership with non-Muslims. We have pointed 
out that Islam is not a condition for business 
partnership (sharikah). "8 Thus, the Muslim can enter 
into joint venture with non-Muslim, dhimmf or 
musta'min, in commercial activity. The only 
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restriction is that the activity, again, as above, 
must not go against the teachings of Islam. It is for 
this reason that some Jurists such as Shäf i 'i, ' 
expresses caution and regard it is reprehensible 
(karähah) for a Muslim to have a joint partnership 
with non-Muslim, in commercial activities, for fear of 
ribs and other unlawful transactions. The fear was 
based on a tradition reported from Ibn 'Abbas that he 
has said: "Do not share , 
(trade) with Jews nor 
Christians nor Magians because they are taking an 
interest which is prohibited. ""SO 
On the other hand, Hanball jurists maintain that 
the fear of Shäfi 'i could be resolved by, for 
instance, setting a standard policy as not to 
contradict the Islamic law of contract or 
alternatively, the Muslim may share his non-Muslim 
partner in making and deciding the matter. S1 In so 
doing, the Muslim is permitted to join the non-Muslim 
entrepreneurs in trade and commerce. Therefore, the 
view of Hanbalt jurists, with its provision, seems 
preferable in this case. 52 Furthermore, Ibn Qudamah 
comments that the Tradition quoted is an isolated one 
(hadith al-Shad) which had not been proved to be 
acceptable to all the Companions of the Prophet. 53 On 
the contrary, it was widely accepted that the Prophet 
has made many deals with non-Muslims. s4 
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e. Representation or Agency 
(wikälah) 
The jurists also agreed that the representation or 
agency between Muslim and non-Muslim is permissible. 
This view has been expressed by both Hanafi and 
)Ianball jurists. 55 The rule requires that whoever can 
conduct or dispose any affairs for himself, is, in 
fact, entitled to appoint his own representative, be 
it a woman, Muslim or non-Muslim. 56 If a Muslim 
appoints a non-Muslim on matters that he is in the 
capacity to perform it, the representation is legally 
valid regardless whether the representative is a 
d immi. must a' min. harbi. or an apostate. This is 
simply because Islam is not a condition in the case of 
sale or broadly speaking mu'ämalrat. 57 If a Muslim 
appoints another Muslim, then the latter became an 
apostate, the representation would not become void. 
This is true whether he joins dar al-Barb or 
otherwise. $a But Abo I, anlfah says that if he joins dar 
al-barb the representation would be null and void. 59 
B. 
Unlike in dada 
opinions over the 
transaction in ddr al 
remains the same as 
law, namely whether 
essentially change the 
1-Is19m. the jurists hold two 
rule pertaining to business 
-barb . The central issue however 
has been discussed in criminal 
different dar (domicile) would 
a law and its liability. 
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The First Theory 
This theory was formulated by IIanafl jurists, 
except Abis YOsuf, who held that any contract concluded 
between Muslim or d immr and barbi is ineffective or 
bears no legal effect. If a Muslim or dhimmi concluded 
a contract of loan, for instance, with barbi or vice 
versa then they returned to dar al-Islam followed by 
the barbi as musta' min. the Muslim judge has no 
capacity or jurisdiction to try them. ' This is also 
true in other cases involving the said parties in dar 
al-barb. 61 For according to those jurists any 
transaction therein would finally be of no avail 
because of the lack of jurisdiction. The same case 
will be held if there is a contract between two barbt 
when they came to Muslim judge as musta' min. However, 
the Muslim or d immi or a bT while living in dar al- 
barbshould restrain from doing any harm to each 
other because the rule of amän is applicable to all of 
them. 62 On the contrary, the rule will be different if 
the contract was concluded among the residents of dar 
al-Islam when they were in dar al-barb. This is 
because the Muslim judge has complete jurisdiction 
over them when they return, even though the contracts 
were concluded abroad, and also from the the fact that 
they are residents of dar al-Isläm. 63 
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The Second Theory 
This is the theory of the Shdfi'i and Nanbalt 
schools which held that any transaction, regardless of 
the parties involved, is legally valid and could be 
heard in Muslim court. In other words, according to 
this view there is no territorial restriction. The 
emphasis is now made on the kinds of contracts, 
whether they are lawful or otherwise, not to the place 
or persons involved. This is true whether the parties 
involved are two ham rbis, or between a barbi and Muslim 
or dhimmi, or between the residents of d&r al-Islam 
who entered d Ar al-herb as amen. 64 
Their argument was that by virtue of amen alone it 
is incumbent upon the contracting parties, Muslim and 
non-Muslims alike, to honour and fulfil it. For amän 
means restraint and non-aggression against each other. 
If there is a contract concluded between a Muslim or a 
d immi and barbi each party has to fulfil and honour 
his obligation otherwise the remedy will be sought 
through the court of law. 
To illustrate the case in point, the Hanball 
jurist even went to the extent that if a Muslim 
prisoner of war has been given a condition by non- 
Muslim captors that he would be allowed to go out and 
find ransom for himself; the Muslim should undertake 
that and fulfil it. bs To support their argument they 
rely on many verses of the Qur'an such as, "Fulfil the 
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covenant of God when ye have covenanted.... "66 They 
also quoted the treaty of H. udaybiyyah where the 
Prophet had fulfilled his promise to send back to 
Mecca any Muslim, but not women, 67 who emigrated to 
Medina before the conquest of Mecca. 65 The Prophet was 
reported to have said in this regard: "Verily the 
treason is not the practice in our religion. "69 As for 
the Muslim prisoner, having undertaken the promise, he 
should fulfil it as in the obligation to pay the price 
when the sale had been finalised. However, if he was 
unable to pay the ransom, there were two conflicting 
opinions within the school. 70 
Thus, according to the second theory any 
transaction, regardless of the faith of the parties 
involved, should be honoured and fulfilled, for the 
rule of Islam is ultra territorial and the Muslim must 
consistent in observing the Islamic law no matter 
where he lives. The fact that the contract was 
concluded in ddr al-barb does not by itself deny the 
contractual obligation. 71 Moreover, although the 
jurisdiction of the Muslim court was not there at the 
time of concluding the contract, as alleged by the 
Hanaff school, its jurisdiction is relevant in the 
time of hearing in dar al-Islam. To subscribe to 
HanafS's view would undermine and contradict with the 
established concept of amp which has been given to 
either Muslim, dhimml, or e bi 72 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
Dhimmi's Religio - Socio - Political Status 
Introduction 
In this chapter we shall try to throw some light 
on the d immi's position in the social and cultural 
dimensions including the political aspect as seen from 
the Islamic point of view. Naturally, some materials 
used in this chapter, in addition to the classical 
texts which had been used in the previous chapters, 
would be relatively recent, as will be seen. This is 
due to the fact that in some cases the classical 
jurists had not dealt with it either because the 
subject itself was not relevant to their times or the 
problem is new in its nature which necessarily needs a 
new interpretation. The discussion below will enable 
us to see more objectively the dh mmi's rights and 
position in its normative frame work as sanctioned by 
the texts and authoritative interpretation. This 
situation, however, would, in some cases, be 
paradoxical with the existing non-Muslim's position in 
some contemporary Muslim countries. The task of the 
writer therefore is extremely difficult to try to 
resolve or perhaps to justify between the many 
anomalies in the practices of the time. 
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I. Religion- 
Perhaps the most illuminating evidence prescribed 
by the Qur'Ein, in its attitude towards the non- 
Muslims, is the award of the religious freedom. The 
Qur'an inequivocally states: "Let there be no 
compulsion in religion. For truth stands clear 
from 
error. to' It means that the residing subjects as well 
as the temporary sojourners have the assurance and 
guarantees, from God, regarding their safety and 
i-t-c 
liberty of their conscience. Hence, every adherent of 
each religion would have his own way and manner of 
practising his religion, uninterrupted, in accordance 
with its teaching. So the question of compelling 
someone to convert to Islam, is not only unlawful, 
from legal point of view, but unjustified and crime in 
Islam. 2 It follows that every interference, by the 
Muslim authority, on matter of a non-Muslim's religion 
would be against the basic tenets of Islam. For the 
concept of freedom in religion is a matter of 
immutable principle rather than a policy which is 
subject to change from time to time depending on the 
policy makers' decision. Thus the Qur' do says "And if 
thy Lord willed, all who are in the earth would have 
believed together. Wouldst thou (Mui}ammad) compel men 
until they are believers. "3 According to Zamakhshari 
the power to compel men to become believers rests in 
God alone. 4 This is confirmed by the succeeding verse 
4 
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which read: "It is not for any soul to believe save by 
the permission of God. He hath set uncleanness upon 
those who have no sense. "5 
The above verses were revealed in sharp contrast 
to the temper of the age which was marked with forced 
conversion, intolerance, interference, and 
persecution. ' In the then civilized world, the 
Byzantines forced their subjects to choose between the 
state religion or death. They also killed Jacobite 
Christians and others who did not adhere to the sect 
chosen by the state. 7 On the other hand, the Qur' sn 
prohibited forced conversion, for when God guides a 
person, he would naturally embraces Islam with full 
faith and discerning consciousness. It is useless 
therefore, to attempt to bring about his conversion to 
Islam by force, as faith, for the Muslim, is not the 
mere recitation of liturgical phrases, but rather the 
sincere acceptance, total obedience and submission to 
its demands. & It is for this reason that there are 
only exceptional cases of Muslims forcing any non- 
Muslim subjects to embrace Islam, a fact which is 
acknowledged by western historians. ' 
Nonetheless, the Qur'dn urges the Muslims to 
spread Islam worldwide by using the art of persuasion 
and convincing the people. But the call to Islam 
iS 
(a'we ), by peaceful means, tone thing and forcing the 
people, against their will, is something else. The 
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Qur' än says: "Call unto the way of thy Lord with 
wisdom and fair exhortation, and reason with them in 
the best of manners. "10 For the same attitude the 
Qur' do says (in the words of Noah) : 
He said: 0 my people! Bethink you, if I 
rely on a clear proof from my Lord and 
there hath come unto me a mercy from His 
presence, and it hath been made obscure to 
you, can we compel you to accept it when ye 
are averse thereto? " 
This is another clear proof of no compulsion in 
religion-12 
On the other hand, one may aptly ask what 
guarantees can the Muslim authority offer to non- 
Muslims with respect to this freedom? 13 In response to 
this question, perhaps it may be appropriate to recall 
the guarantees provided by the Prophet to the 
Christians of Najrgn, with whom the first pact 
ofdhimmah had been concluded. 14 Among other things, 
the covenant declares that the non-Muslims will be 
placed under the protection of God and His Prophet, 
provided for the safeguarding of their lands, wealth, 
religion and churches. is According to Abu YOsuf this 
covenant had been honoured and left intact by all the 
four Guided Caliphs. 14 It is to be observed here that 
the two significant terms used in that treaty, i. e. 
iiwar Allah and dhimmah Mut}ammad literally the former 
means neighbourly protection whereas the latter 
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signifies protection, responsibility, 
inviolability 
etc. 17 From legal point of view and as 
far as the 
language of the treaty is concerned, the employment of 
those two terms, by the Prophet, is considered to be 
the strongest commitment and obligation with respect 
to the protection afforded to Najr6n, a violation of 
which, whether from the authority or individual, would 
be subject to punishment. It follows that any wrong 
committed to the people of the pact would not only 
against the basic tenets of Islam, 18 as the Muslim 
must fulfil his word, 19 but also a sin and would be 
liable for criminal charges in the court of law. It is 
precisely for this reason that the Caliphs repeatedly 
renewed the same treaty and upheld its spirit. 20 The 
same treatment, in terms of commitment and 
responsibility, would be expected from the subsequent 
Muslim authorities. It is vital therefore, in any age, 
to have a good leadership in any community in order to 
carry out the task, for it is not sufficient to have a 
good law in the society but what is needed in 
addition, is a quality of leadership. As for the 
Muslims, the more pious the man, the better will he 
lead the community. Therefore, the guarantee in 
question will be fully upheld by the true Muslim 
leader since he will be first answerable before God as 
it is before the men. Any dispute concerning any 
matter could well be referred to the writings of the 
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classical jurists, or a new i. itihdd is necessary if 
the matter is new in its nature. Finally, the 
guarantee of God and the Prophet is immutable and 
would not by any means subject to temporary desires. 
Moreover, in a matter of non-Muslims' belief, 
Islam tend to follow a rule of "leave it to them 
whatever they believe. 1921 According to the rule, 
religious freedom is a guaranteed right which will not 
be violated in any way. Had such not been the case it 
would have been absurd, hence illegitimate, to 
conclude the contract of dhimmah. For one of the 
objectives of the contract is to acknowledge the faith 
of the dhimml and not to interfere in matter of their 
religions. 22 This could be seen from the wording of 
the above treaty. 
A. The Basis of Religious Freedom 
According to F&rüq5: Islam has acknowledged the 
non-believer on three distinct levels: 23 
1. Humanism. Islam introduced the concept of din 
al-fitrah (religio naturalis> to express its judgement 
that all men are endowed at birth by God with a 
religion that is true, genuine and valid for all time. 
Without this natural endowment, man would not be man 
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at all. Islam has based its universal humanism on this 
basis of religio naturalis. All men are ontologically 
the creatures of God, and all of them are equal in 
their natural ability to recognise God and His law, 24 
Nobody may even be excused from not knowing God, his 
Creator, for each and every one has been equipped at 
birth with the means required for such knowledge. 25 To 
this end, the Prophet has said: "All men are virtually 
born Muslims (in the sense of endowed with religio 
paturalis; It is their parents <tradition, history, 
culture as opposed to nature) that turn them into 
Christians and Jews. 26 On this level of nature, Islam 
holds the believer and non-believer as equal partakers 
of the religion of God; 27 
2. Universal Revelation. Islam holds that "there 
is no people but that God had sent them a prophet or 
warner"; and that "no prophet was sent but to convey 
the same divine message, namely to teach that God is 
God and that man ought to serve Him. "2b 
In history, every people has been sent a messenger 
to teach them in their own language so that he might 
make (the message) clear for them, "29 Every messenger 
conveyed and made understood identically one and the 
same message from God whose essence i3. the recognition 
of Him as God, i. e. the Creator, Lord, Master and 
Judge, and the service of Him through adoration and 
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obedience. 30 All men, therefore, are recognised as 
possessors of divine revelations, each 
fitting its 
context of history and language, 
but all identical in 
their essential religious context. Hence, Muslims and 
non-Muslims are equal in their 
having once been objectg 
of divine communications$31 and 
3. Islam identified itself with much of the 
historical revelation of Judaism and Christianity. It 
acknowledges the prophets of the two religions as 
genuine prophets of God, and accepted them as Islam' s 
own. It taught its adherents to honour their names and 
memories. With its acceptance of the Jewish prophets 
and of Jesus Christ, it reduced every difference 
between itself and these religions to a domestic 
variation, which may be due to human understanding, 
rather then to God or the religion of God. It thus 
narrowed the gap between the Muslims and the adherents 
of the two religions. 32 
In Islam, therefore, far from being condemned a 
priorily as enemy and object of divine doom, the non- 
believer is rehabilitated as God's creature endowed 
with natural religion, historical revelation identical 
with Islam's, and if he is a Jew or a Christian, as 
possessor of the same tradition of revelation as the 
Muslim. 33 
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The Muslim is required to begin by assuming that 
any Jew and Christian adheres 
to the same faith as 
that of Islam on all the three levels mentioned 
above. 3" On this basis 
the Qur'än invites them as 
follows: 
Say 0 People of the Book! Let us now rally 
together, around a noble principle common 
to both of us, viz. that we shall serve 
(worship) none but God; that we shall 
associate naught with Him, and shall not 
take one another as Lords beside God. And 
if they turn away, then say: Bear witness 
that we are they who have surrendered (unto 
Him). 3S 
For the same context the Qur'an says: 
Lol those who believe (the Muslims), and 
those who are Jews and Christians, and 
Sabeans - whoever believeth in God and in 
the Day of Judgement and do righteous 
deeds, shall have their reward with God. 
They shall have no cause for fear, nor for 
grief-36 
The idea of "salvation" is here made conditional 
upon three elements only, namely, believe in God, 
believe in the Day of Judgement, and righteous deed in 
life. " 
On the religious plane, it grants every non-Muslim 
in the world a double religious privilege and' 
religious dignity by virtue of his sharing of natural 
religion and divine revelation in history. If he 
happens to be a Jew or a Christian, he is granted a 
third privilege and dignity, that he is sharing in the 
tradition of Islam itself. This third privilege 
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granted by God in the Qur' An to the Jews, Christians 
and Sabeans was extended by the Muslims to other 
adherents of religions such as the Zoroastrians, 
Hindus, Buddhists and others as they come into contact 
with them. 36 All three religious privileges, 
therefore, Islam grants today to adherents of all the 
religions of the world. 39 
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B. Places of Worship 
Religious freedom will not be completed unless it 
is accompanied with the freedom to exercise it. For 
this reason it needs places of worships for each 
particular group of religion in order to express their 
beliefs in their respective form of worships. For 
religion is not just an act of belief (in the heart) 
but it demands manifestation and action. It remains 
for us to see how far Islam toleratesnon-Muslims 
with respect to their places of worship and to what 
extent can non-Muslims demonstrate their liturgical, 
ceremonial as well as spiritual activities outside 
their places of worship. 
Generally speaking, Islam protects, in addition to 
life and property, the places of worship of non- 
Muslims, it also allows them to observe their 
religious ceremonies and freedom of worship. 40 This 
can be seen from the Qur' din, the sunnah and the 
practice of the Prophet's Companions. 
The Qur' do says: 
To those against whom war is made, 
permission is given (to fight), because 
they are wronged- and verily, God is Most 
Powerful for their aid- (they are) those 
who have been expelled from their homes in 
defiance of right, -(for no cause) except 
that they say, 'Our Lord is God'. Did not 
God check one set of people by means of 
another, there surely would have been 
pulled down monasteries, churches, 
synagogues, and mosques in which the name 
of God is (mentioned) in abundance 
measure. "1 
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The Qur'dn patently guarantees the freedom of 
worship and it even asks the Muslims not to abuse the 
idol, which the idol-worshippers used to worship, let 
alone the rites of worship of Jews and Christians. It 
follows that Islam not only wants to tolerate but 
indeed to protect and defend the places of worship of 
all religions. 
As for the Tradition, we have pointed out earlier 
the treaty concluded by the Prophet with the Najrdn. 42 
In addition, a brief survey of the treaty made by 
'Umar I with the Patriarch of Jerusalem will evidently 
support the case in point. It reads: 
This is the protection which the servant of 
God, 'Umar ibn al-Khattab, the Commander of 
'the believers, extends to the people of 
Aelia. 
He guarantees for them the safety of their 
persons, property, churches, crosses, and 
of their entire community. Their churches 
are not to be occupied, demolished, or 
damaged, nor are their crosses or anything 
belonging to them to be touched. They will 
not be forced to abandon their religion, 
nor will they be harmed. None of the Jews 
will leave with them in Aelia. 43 
With regards the opinions of the jurists, the 
cities and towns of the Muslims can be classified, 
in terms of its inhabitants, into three categories: 44 
1. The cities built or inhabited (marg$aru) by 
the Muslims such as KCfah, Bacrah, Baghdad, Cairo and 
the like. In these cities the building.. of places of 
worship for non-Muslims will not be permitted since 
the land has become the property of the Muslims. The 
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argument was that to build such places in der al-Islam 
is a form of macsia 
(prohibited act hence a sin) 
something that should be avoided to happen. Should the 
imam conclude the agreement to that effect the 
agreement is invalid and voidable. "S The Prophet is 
reported to have said: "There is neither castration 
nor church in Islam. ""' Abo Yuguf said that when Ibn 
'Abbäs was asked on the same matter he replied: "In 
any city inhabited by the Arabs (Muslims) it is not 
possible for the dhimmis to build their places of 
worship, nor sell wine, nor rear pigs, nor ring bells. 
However, any city inhabited by non-Arabs but that God 
has opened it for the Muslims, the d immi shall have 
anything in accordance with the treaty. The Muslims 
must fulfil it and must not overburden, them. ""7 
Perhaps, it is this saying of Ibn 'Abbds that led the 
jurists conclude that if such a building was there 
from time immemorial or before the Muslims settled 
down, it would be left intact. For the building might 
have been built in the non-Muslims village but it has 
become part of the city because of the urbanization. 48 
Can the imam conclude the agreement of dhimmah 
leaving the existing places of worship in the hands of 
non-Muslims? The jurists are split over the issue. 
Some of them, say it -should not be t-elE to non-Muslims. 
For in so doing, it will deprive the right of 
possession for the Muslims since the title to the land 
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is theirs. Some other jurists say there is no harm if 
there is justification and interest for that as the 
Prophet did in the case of Khaybar and the practices 
of the Four Guided Caliphs. 49 However, if the non- 
Muslims breach the contract then it is legitimate for 
the Muslims to confiscate the building whether it is 
from §ulb or Gänwatan. This is because, in, theory, the 
contract breaker is worst than haarbi jusL as the 
case of apostate is considered as worse than the 
unbelievers' 
On the other hand, Zaydi jurists held that the 
imam may grant permission for the non-Muslims to build 
their places of worship if there is an interest for 
that. 52 It can be concluded therefore that in the 
cities and towns of Muslims the places of worship of 
non-Muslims are in three conditions: 
a. Those that shall remain intact; 
b. Those that shall be demolished because of 6ein 
newly built; and 
c. Those that are under the scrutiny of the 
Muslim authority according to the rule of interest 
(maila, ah). ss 
2. The cities built and inhabited by non-Muslims 
but were later conquered by the Muslims (by force). In 
this case, it is also, as in the first category, not 
allowed for non-Muslims to build any place of worship. 
For, the whole territory has become the property of 
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the Muslims. S4 As for the existing places of worship 
prior to the conquest of the Muslims, there are two 
opinions reported from the jurists. The first view 
says that they must be demolished and it is prohibited 
Ward ) to let them remain, for the land has become 
the property of the Muslims. Therefore, it is not 
proper to have "º1on. 
ý'1ysýi. 'wi ýýaý'ýhes 
in MMSU" areas. This is the view preferred by some 
Hanbal i jurists. s5 
The other view however says that it could be left 
as it is. They rely on the opinion of Ibn 'Abbas 
quoted above. It was also the practice of the Prophet 
in the case of Khaybar where he left the places of 
worship belongs to non-Muslims there as they were. It 
is also contended that the Companions of the Prophet 
conquered so many places by force but there is no 
single report to suggest that they pulled down the 
places of worship of the conquered people. 56 The fact 
of the presence of the places of worship in those 
conquered territories, up to the present time, is a 
clear evidence to the case in point. It is undeniable 
that those places were built before the conquest. 
Moreover, it was reported that GUmar II wrote to his 
governors not to demolish synagogues, churches and 
fire temples (for the Magians). 57 
To sum up we can say that it would be better to 
ike leave the matter to the iltihad ofkimäm in accordance 
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with the rule of maclahah. At any rate, 
if he decides 
to leave the building as it is, hence the non-Muslims 
would enjoy using it. But 
it should be recalled that 
the ownership of land and its properties still belongs 
to the Muslims since it was acquired by force. Se This 
is also the view of Ibn al-Qasim, a Mdliki jurist: who 
says that the non-Muslim could build a place of 
worship with the permission of imam. s9 
3. Any territory which came under the peaceful 
agreement with the Muslims. This category is of two 
kind: 
a. That which the agreement stipulates that the 
land remains with its previous owners but they have to 
pay k ark for it. In this category, there is no 
prohibition to build a place of worship for non- 
Muslims. For the land is theirs. This is what the 
Prophet had done with the Najrän. 60 
b. That which the agreement stipulates that the 
land belongs to the Muslims in addition to paying 
. 
Iizya . In this. category, the question of places of 
worship is determined in the agreement. If it is 
permitted to build will include restoration. For to 
prevent restoration would eventually lead to the state 
of ruinous condition which is the same as 
demolishing-61 
t 
, With regard A the places of worship in the villageS 
and areas which are not considered to be the city of 
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the Muslims most jurists incline to permit the 
building of such places especially in the area where 
the non-Muslim population outnumbered that of the 
Muslims. 62 This is also true with respect to the 
religious ceremonies. But in the Muslim cities and 
predominantly Muslim areas, some jurists hesitate to 
permit non-Muslims to expose their ceremonies, 
crosses, or other religious objects for fear of Muslim 
sentiment which could lead to sedition and disorder. 63 
However, in his covenant with the people of 'Andt. 
Khälid b. al-Walid wrote: "Their place of worship and 
churches will not be demolished. They are allowed to 
ring their bells at any time of the day and night, 
except- during the Muslim prayer times. They are 
allowed to bear their crosses in their festivals. "64 
The same provision was also concluded by Khälid with 
the people of Qargisiyyä'. 65 According to Aba Yesuf 
all the Four Guided Caliphs had not revoked these 
covenants and its provisions. 66 
With all these evidences coupled with the verse 
quoted above and the treatment of the Prophet to the. 
Najran and the like, we fail to understand when Bat 
Ye'or makes a statement that "d i ml places of 
worship were not considered inviolable. They could be 
ransacked, burned or demolished as acts of reprisal 
against the community. "'7 On another occasion the 
author plainly says that the ringing of bells, the 
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public exhibition of crosses and other religious 
objects were all prohibited. 68 This sort of statement 
without giving proper historical evidence= is not 
only misleading but also creates misunderstanding 
among the adherents of the revealed religions. 
Furthermore, ' in Egypt, in the first century of 
the Hijrah, several churches were constructed. For 
example, the "Mar Marqas" church of Alexandria was 
built between 39-56 A. H. 69 When 'Abd al- 'Azlz b. 
MarwAn established the city of Helwdn, near Cairo, he 
allowed the Christians to build a church as well as to 
establish two monasteries for some bishops. 7° 
We can conclude that the building of places of 
worship for non-Muslims in the Muslim cities and in 
the conquered territories is subject to the approval 
of imäm in accordance with the rule of ma$lahah. This 
GtG 
has been the opinions of4 Zaydt school and Ibn al- 
Qdsim, a Malikt jurist. 71 It is to be observed that 
since Islam acknowledges the freedom of religion, it 
follows that the freedom to exercise it should also be 
guaranteed as well. This means that the non-Muslims 
should have a place for the acts of worship, 
festivals, celebrations and other religious 
activities. However, the observance of such activities 
should not be carried out at the expense of public 
order, or religious or racial disorder. 72 
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II. Politics. 
It should be recalled at the outset that in the 
Islamic state, every spectrum of human activities 
should be determined by its ideology,. 
Therefore, 
political rights granted to all its citizens should 
come within the framework underlying 
U?; state' s 
ideology. This is also true with respect to other 
spheres of human activities whether social, economic, 
cultural or even in the works of art and "culture" 
(except those specifically for the non-Muslims). ' 
Hence, any right or liberties granted by the state 
should be construed under such framework. 
As for the political rights of non-Muslims, 
generally speaking, the jurists accepted the 
established principle that "the dhimmis have the same 
rights as us and the' same obligation as US. 092 It 
follows that, as a rule, Islam recognizes no 
difference between Muslim and non-Muslim subjects in 
LIU. 
temporal matters. However, as in&modern concept of 
state and government, the Islamic state would reserve 
some rights and posts to those who share its ideology. 
For the state, any state, is free to regulate its 
internal laws in accordance with its own values and 
a. KtEWJ 
weltanschauung. 3 In this section, we shall confineAto 
A&% 
U" of 
kexamine-htwo important issues, i. e. holding public 
office or government services and participation 
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directly or indirectly in the establishment of 
government. 
A. Holding Public Office. 
According to the Islamic point of view, holding 
public office is not an individual right but 
is rather 
a responsibility which the state assigns 
6 
an 
individual if he is fit for it. " Hence, it is a trust 
(amäneh) rather than a privilege, which must be 
carried out to the best of one's ability, if one is 
entrusted to any post, and one would be answerable to 
God, no matter whether or not one is faithful in the 
course of discharging his jobs This position is 
supported by the Tradition narrated by Abo Masä who 
said: "Two of my cousins and I came to the Prophet. 
One of them said: '0 Prophet of God, appoint us rulers 
to some lands that God has entrusted to you. ' The 
other man said the same to the Prophet. The Prophet 
said: 'By Godl we do not appoint for this position any 
one who asks or is covetous for i t. ,"6 Ibn Taymiyyah 
reports the same Tradition with different wording. 7 
It was the same response from the Prophet when at one 
time Abts Dharr al-Ghiffäri, a Companion, approached 
him for the same purpose. The Prophet advised him that 
authority is a trust. It will be doom and regretful 
on the Day of Judgement except for those who carry it 
justly. 8 All these Traditions clearly point out that 
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holding public offices is not an individual right or 
privilege. On the contrary, the appointment is a trust 
which will be entrusted to some individuals that the 
imäm. or the state, sees fit to carry the job. The 
criterion for the selection to the post therefore is 
al-a$lah (the most suitable person) for any particular 
job. 9 If there is none qualified then al-amthal fa 
am al (from the best to the less good). 1o In this 
respect God says: "Lo! God commandeth you that ye 
restore trusts to their owners, and if ye judge 
between mankind that ye judge justly. "11 
Since the Islamic state is an ideological state, 
it is naturally expected that the state will restrict 
some -positions for those who uphold the state's 
ideology, i. e. Muslims, such as the post of the Caliph 
or äm 12 the Commander of ihäd is the judges 
(among the Muslims), za dt collectors, and some 
policy-making posts. 14 For some of these posts are 
purely religious in nature. Ibn Khaldan says that the 
post of the Caliph is to succeed the Prophet in order 
to safeguard religion and to discharge worldly 
affair:. ss 
The leadership of the army, in Islam, is not a 
civil or secular post. It is a kind of worship. In 
fact, Islam regards jihäd as one of the highest act 
of worships (Gibäddt). sa The same applies to the 
Islamic judiciary system. For it is unreasonable to 
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expect a non-Muslim to deliver a judgement in which he 
does not believe. The same is true with the positions 
of zakdt collectors and officials entrusted with other 
posts of a religious nature. t7 It is for this reason 
that these posts are to be entrusted to the Muslims as 
we have seen throughout the Muslims' history. 
Furthermore, the Head of the Islamic state is bound by 
law to run the government and its machinery in 
accordance with the Shari: Cah. It is inconceivable 
therefore for a non-Muslim to take office and execute 
policies which he does not believe in. 
Other than those positions, the non-Muslims are 
fully eligible and free to participate in the 
administration of their government. This position is 
supported by the Qur' än and the Tradition. The Qur' an 
says: 
O ye who believe! take not for intimates 
others than your own folk, who would spare 
no pains to ruin you; they love to hamper 
you. Hatred is revealed by (the utterance 
of) their mouths, but that which their 
breasts hide is greater. We have made 
plain for you the revelations if ye will 
understand. e 
According to Tabarl, this verse was revealed to 
the people who have the treaty with the Prophet with 
whom intimacy was not prohibited. However, L those who 
clearly demonstrated their enmity to the Muslims, 
intimacy is strictly prohibited. 19 This means that 
the dhimmis who do not show hostility to the Islamic 
state could very well be appointed to the public 
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offices, especially experts, professionals and the 
like. 20 
As for the Tradition there are abundance evidences 
to demonstrate that the Prophet appointed non-Muslims 
during the early stage of Islam. To mention a few, the 
first ambassador of Islam, to defend the Muslims 
before the Negus of Abyssinia against extradition 
demanded by the Quraysh, 21 was 'Amr b. Ummayyah al- 
4amrf, who belonged to one of the allied tribes of 
Medina and had not yet embraced Islam. 22 In year 6 A. H 
when the Prophet and his Companions had camped at Dha 
al-IHulayfah on their way to perform 'umra 
(lesser 
pilgrimage as distinct from the hza. i. i or greater 
pilgrimage), the Prophet sent a man from Banta 
KhuzIR'ah, who was not a Muslim, 23 to collect 
information on Quraysh's movement. 2" Earlier, in the 
Medinah Charter the Prophet made a responsibility 
of defence to Muslims and non-Muslims alike. It 
provides that each must help the other against anyone 
who attacks the people of this document. They must 
seek mutual advice and consultation. The Jews must pay 
with the believers so long as war lasts. 25 All these 
evidences clearly indicate that the Prophet had 
appointed non-Muslims in the affairs of state and the 
community. This has led the jurists to conclude that 
the dhimmt can be appointed, al-M&wardi has 
maintained, to such posts as the wazir al-tenfTdh26 
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(the executive minister> who discharges and executes 
the decision of imam as well as the policy of the 
government. 27 If a classical 
jurist like Mawardi, who 
died in 450 A. H., approved such a position for dhimmi 
in his days, where the Muslims were at the peak of 
their power and civilization, it seem clear that the 
dhimmi should have more opportunity in the present 
circumstances, provided that they meet the 
requirements for each post. 
We have thus seen that the Qur'an and the sunnah 
sanction the appointment of dhimmi, to hold public 
offices in the Islamic state. We can now turn to the 
practice of the Muslims throughout the history to 
throw more light on the subject for deductive purposes 
and its applicability in our times. 
There are innumerable cases throughout the Muslim 
history when non-Muslims have occupied important posts 
in the Islamic state. These cover all aspects of the 
state's machinery ranging from working in the office 
of the Caliph to servicing people at large. 
According to Balddhurl many officials in the 
administration (diwän) of 'Abd al-Malik b. Marwän were 
of Byzantine origin-'. a. 'ºia. were not Muslims. For it has 
become an established convention that both Umäwl: and 
'Abbdsi Caliphs retained the officials employed by the 
Byzantine and Persian authorities to continue running 
the affairs of the state uninterrupted. 28 It was for 
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same reason, perhaps, that CUmar I left thousands of 
non-Muslims in the revenue, finance and other 
departments undisturbed in posts of trust and 
responsibility. 29 He went as far as to invite a Greek 
from Syria and entrust him with the finance department 
in Medina. S° It was not until the year 81 A. H. that 
'Abd al-Malik b. Marwän ordered the language of the 
office work in these departments to be transfered from 
Greek and Persian into Arabic. 31 
From these reports, we can see that if the 
languages used in these departments were not in Arabic 
so the officials as well as the employees were likely 
to have been non-Muslims. Moreover, Arnold has 
recorded many cases of Christians and Jews appointed 
by the Caliphs as counsellors to the Caliph, state 
secretariats, and Public Treasury (Bayt al-Mäl). 32 
Naar ibn HdrQn, for instance, became the (Prime) 
Minister33 of 'A4ud al-Dawlah (949-982), of the 
Buwayhid Dynasty of Persia; he was a Christian, and 
many Churches and monastries were built in his time. 
34 In 380 A. H. al-'AzTz, the Caliph of Egypt, 
appointed '-Is& b. Nestorius as minister (waz ) and 
Manasseh, a Jew, as his deputy in Syria. 3S It was 
reported that both favoured the Christians and the 
Jews respectively. Later when a complaint was made, 
they were removed. 3' Abo MUsä al-Ash'arf had a 
Christian secretary, and it was reported that Sarjün, 
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a Christian had been appointed first by Mu'dwiyah as 
secretary to Caliph. 37 In addition, there were 
several cases that Christians were appointed as 
envoys, ambassadors especially to Christian 
governments., e Finally, the Ottoman government, the 
recent Islamic state, did appoint non-Muslims to- 
several posts as did its predecessors and more 
importantly, it appointed most of its envoys and 
ambassadors to foreign powers from among Christians. 39 
Nevertheless, there were reports that some Caliphs 
tried to exclude non-Muslims from public offices. 
However, Tritton has emphatically pointed out that it 
was seldom that no non-Muslims were to be found in 
government services, for if one Caliph, for one reason 
or another, dismissed them, another Caliph would 
eventually reappointed them, though not necessarily 
to the same posts. "o 
Those are but some evidences to show that non- 
Muslims have been appointed in various posts of the 
Islamic state throughout Muslim history. Indeed, 
they have participated actively in the administration 
as well as contributed no less than the Muslims to the 
advancement of the Islamic state. It is clear 
therefore, that difference of religion was not an 
impediment on non-Muslims to be appointed for public 
offices in the Islamic state. Their appointment, 
except in some posts, has been sanctioned by the 
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Qur'än and the Sunnah, as well as the practice of the 
Muslims. Those are strong evidences or rather 
precedents which can be followed 
by the subsequent 
Muslim authorities. 
r-, 
1. The Islamic state is essentially an ideological 
state's which is based and established in order to 
carry out the implementation of Islamic law and its 
system within its territorial jurisdiction as well as 
to spread Islam outside its territory by lawful means. 
This is the objective of the Islamic state. "2 For God 
says: "Those who, if we give them power in the land, 
establish worship and pay the poor-due and enjoin good 
and forbid evil. And God's is the sequel of 
events. "" 3 As such, it is not exaggerating to state 
that the responsibility to run the state should rest 
primarily with those who believe in its ideology, 
system and objective therein. As for those who do 
not believe in the state's' ideology, they can 
participate or cooperate, provided that they fulfil 
the necessary requirements of efficiency, trust and 
loyalty to the state. "" However, it should not be 
surprising, in this case, if the state would exclude 
all non-Muslims from public offices for reason of not 
upholding state's ideology and its objective. But that 
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unilateral act, would undoubtedly be repugnant to the 
very teaching of Islam where it directs the state to 
open its doors to non-Muslim subjects in the field of 
administration. This is the highest degrees of 
tolerance which Islam affords to people of different 
faiths. "s 
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B. E1 ei on. 
It should be borne in mind that the ideas of 
parliament, election and separation of powers, among 
the executive, judiciary and legislative, is a product 
of the Western Democratic system which is not 
necessarily in harmony with the Islamic concept of 
state and government. 47 Hence, election is a modern 
concept which should be viewed in accordance with 
Islamic perspective. 4a In Islam, however, the Qur' än 
suggested that the affairs of the state should be 
decided through the process of mutual consultation 
(share) so that all the policies would be in line with 
the Islamic principles. In accordance with the 
Qur' äni c statement : 
"And those who answer the call of their 
Lord and establish worship Cal-$alät), and 
whose affairs are a matter of counsel, and 
who spent of what we have bestowed on 
them. "4 9 
We have seen that in the Islamic state a non- 
Muslim could not be elected as Head of State nor could 
he be appointed to be a member of s Drs in the strict 
sense of the term. 50 For, according to the jurists the 
requirements for the elector of the imam is identical 
to the requirements to be an im mitself namely, he 
must be a Muslim. 51 This means that the right to 
choose the äm belongs exclusively to the Muslims. 
There is no evidence to suggest that the d immi had 
ever participated in the election of the Four Guided 
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Caliphs nor do we encounter any report that the dm 
had demanded such a right. This has led to the 
conclusion that the right to choose the imam was 
exclusively held by the Muslims. 52 
However, some leading contemporary Muslim 
authority held that non-Muslims may participate in 
parliamentary election both by voting and membership 
of parliament in today's context which is considerably 
different from that of shOrd in its conceptual sense. 
Such a parliament would have a legislative power which 
should be subordinated to the binding texts of Islamic 
Law in which non-Muslims do not believe. This problem 
could be resolved by stipulating in the constitution 
that it would be ultra vires of the parliament to 
legislate any law which is repugnant to the Qur'än and 
the sunnah. 54 Perhaps this view could be justified if 
we look at some provisions laid down by the Prophet in 
Medinah's charter. For instance, "There shall always 
be a mutual council and advice (between Muslim and 
Jewish subjects). There shall be a joint 
responsibility for defence including its expenses. "5$ 
It is clear from these provisions that seeking mutual 
advice and consultation is recommended between the 
contracting parties (Muslims and non-Muslims). The act 
of consultation is hardly to occur without giving the 
equal opportunity or the equal right to access to the 
central authority which is, in this case, the Prophet 
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himself. 56 It is immaterial in Islam for subsequent 
application, whether it 
is a parliament or any other 
similar institution, to be set up 
in accordance with 
the consensus of the parties concerned, so long es the 
spirit of consultation and advice is observed. 
s7 
Nonetheless, with regard to the election of the 
President or rather Prime Minister, as chief executive 
officer, in the modern state, whose prototype has been 
followed by many contemporary Muslim countries, can 
non-Muslims participate in that election? The answer 
appears to be positive. $& For the President is now no 
longer purely religious in nature (cibghah diniyyah) 
as it used to be. It is not the office of the Caliph 
though' it does seem to a lesser extent, as discussed 
by the jurists. 59 Therefore, there should be no 
exclusion of non-Muslims to partake in the election of 
the President or Prime Minister as was in the case of 
the election of the Caliph because of its different 
nature and function, for the non-Muslim is perfectly 
eligible to participate in the worldly affairs of the 
state. s0 
So far we have discussed two fundamental issues 
relating to dhimmt' s political right, i. e. holding 
public office and their representation. Something 
should be said here on the freedom of opinion and 
related subjects. et Though Islam recognises it as 
inherent right for every individual it is not proper, 
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hence unlawful for non-Muslims to attack Islam, as a 
religion, and the Prophet under the pretext of freedom 
of opinion, 02 for such an attack would be considered 
as against the state itself. Other than these 
sensitive areas the non-Muslims can discuss almost all 
subjects and even criticize the government and its 
policies including the Head of the state so long as it 
is permitted by law with the some limitations as are 
imposed on all Muslims. It may not be exaggeration to 
conclude that all principles of good morals and human 
dignity are equally applicable to both non-Muslim and 
Muslim subjects of the Islamic state. This constitutes 
the ethics of the freedom of opinion in Islam. 
III. Education 
Education in Islam is a state matter. The state 
must provide a proper education to all its citizen, 
Muslims and non-Muslims alike, the Qur'än frequently 
emphasises the need for education. For example, 
And the believers should not all go out to 
fight. Of every troop of them, a party only 
should go forth, that they (who are left 
behind) may gain sound knowledge in 
religion, and that they may warn their folk 
when they return to them, so that they may 
beware. 
Thus, intellectual activities, in all branches of 
knowledge, was, recommended by the Qur'än from the 
early stage of Islam. This is supported by the report 
that the Prophet freed the Badr prisoners of war if 
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they would teach the Muslims to read and write. 2 The 
Qur' An itself praises, on many occasions, the learned 
and their superiority over unlearned 
both in this 
world and the Hereafter. 3 
Can non-Muslims conduct their own separate 
education? It appears that there are 
two levels of 
education involved namely, religions as well as 
national. 
A. As for religious education, the non-Muslims 
would have the liberty to educate their children in 
accordance with their own faiths. " This liberty stems 
from the general principle of Islamic tolerance 
towards the dhimmf's religions. It is a part of 
freedom of religion. For the freedom of religion would 
necessarily entail the right to bring up the children 
in accordance with one's faith. This could be done, 
for instance, by allowing the non-Muslim children the 
right to hear a lesson in their religion at the public 
schools, or the like at the public expense. If the 
non-Muslims wishes to add more religious education to 
his children, he certainly can do that in the privacy 
of his home after school hours or over the weekends.. 5 
The same could be said with regards to the training, 
seminars and activities of religious nature. For 
example, the dhimmi's may organise a conference on 
Biblical exegesis, systematic theology, Christian 
ethics, training priests or the like. ' In the treaty 
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Najran, the Prophet had stipulated that the Najranite 
Christians will appoint their own clergy.? This means 
that non-Muslims can have the exclusive right to the 
affairs of church and religion. 
It is significant to mention here that children 
of the Muslim minorities living in non-Muslim 
countries should be likewise, entitled to receive 
Islamic instruction at the public expense while other 
children are receiving instruction in their religion. e 
B. Other than religious education the non-Muslims 
would be expected to accept the same system of 
education as applies to the whole nation. 9 This would 
means that there appear to be no separate school for 
non-Muslims community unless such a school conforms in 
curricula and general spirit to the public schools. s° 
Hence, a dual ' educational system is hardly accepted 
in the Islamic state, for the demands of national 
integration, comprehend the state philosophy and 
aspiration, do not permit any system contributing to 
fragmentation or dissolution of the unity of the 
state. "- This policy would be put forward in order to 
create one uniform educational system hence one nation 
for all its citizens. In so doing, due regard to the 
heterogeneous religions, customs, languages of non- 
Muslims is maintained so as not to undermine them. To 
this end, the non-Muslim may not object to his 
children, receiving a lesson in Islam, as a subject, 
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perhaps its basic teachings, in the public schools 
because in so doing, they could understand the 
ideology of the state and thus fulfilling a 
requirement of political and national integration and 
patriotism. 12 This is equally true with the children 
of the Muslim minorities living in non-Muslim 
countries where they have to take a lesson hence 
understand the system of laws, state and government of 
the country where they reside. l3 
With regards to the languages, custom and other 
established norms of non-Muslims it is, believed that 
they can preserve and practice it as they wish. There 
is no evidence from the texts, the Qur'an and 
thesunna or the practice of the Companions to suggest 
to the contrary. This is part of the social and 
cultural autonomy of every community. Even among the 
Muslims the difference of customs and languages is 
well preserved unless that particular practice is 
contrary to Islamic teachings, for it is not the 
intention of Islam to annihilate a man's culture, 
language or even ethnic group through a policy of 
assimilation. All background differences have nothing 
to do with Islam as long as they do not contradict the 
teachings of Islam (with the exception of non' 
Muslims). On the contrary, by letting those elements 
of differences flourish, the universality of Islam' 
whereby every race and community can live peacefully 
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and on the equal footing, though different ideology or 
religion, will be more apparent. It is a sign of God, 
the Creator and the Shaper as the Qur'an says: 
0 mankind! Lo! We have created you male and 
female, and have made you nation and tribes 
that ye may know one another. Lo! the 
noblest of you, in the sight of God, i5 the 
best in conduct. Lo! God is knower, 
Aware. 14 
It follows therefore that the state which aims at 
establishing Islamic law as the law of the land must 
take steps to ensure that education is not only 
accessible, but also compulsory for every Muslim man 
and Xwomen. Since it is of the basic tenets of such a 
state, hence it becomes its duty, education must be 
free. and obligatory for all its subjects, regardless 
of background differences. 
IV. Economics' 
In the field of economic activity, the doors of 
industry, trade, agriculture and all other professions 
are open to all, Muslims and non-Muslims alike, for 
this domain is purely worldly affairs, where religion 
has only limited role to play. Hence the non-Muslims 
have always enjoyed unrestricted freedom to perform 
all the professions. Every man in the Islamic state, 
therefore, enjoys equal rights in the field of 
economic enterprise. The Muslims have no special 
privileges over non-Muslims in this regard. 2 This has 
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been the position of jurists who hold that the dhimmi 
enjoys the same rights and opportunities in the field 
of trade and all business transactions except a 
transaction involving usury (ribä) where d imm 
should abstain like a Muslim. This is because the 
Prophet wrote to the Magians of Hajar that either they 
cease taking interest or face a war from God and His 
messenger-3 According to Käsdnl it is the strongest 
warning that the Prophet had ever despatched to non- 
Muslims which must reflect the maximum prohibition. " 
The same provision was rendered by the Prophet to the 
Najran. s The Qur' än condemns the practice of usury in 
many places such as: 
And of their taking usury when they were 
forbidden it, and of their devouring 
people' s wealth by false pretences. We have 
prepared for those of them who disbelieve a 
painful doom. 6 
In the light of this clear warning, perhaps, that 
the jurists come to the conclusion that the 
prohibition of usury is equally applicable both to 
Muslims and dhimmT for the uniformity of the rule 
pertaining to muC9malet as mentioned above. The rule 
has therefore become a public law which takes effect 
to all parties within its jurisdiction.? 
týºo 
As foritrade of liquor and pigs, though thed immf 
is allowed to do so for his own consumption, the 
jurists hold that it is prohibited to run such a 
business in the Muslim cities (areas> or transport it 
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into the cities in an open and unrestricted manner for 
fear of mishandling it. However, the dhimml may 
conduct such a business in his areas or in places 
which are not considered as Muslim areas though the 
muslims are presence. 8 
Moreover, the dhimmfs also have the right to enjoy 
whether in the forms of entertainment, or in work of 
arts for their own consumption. In the privacy of 
their own homes, the dhimmis are entitled to enjoy all 
kinds of enjoyments as they please. The moment such 
enjoyment poses a threat to public morals, which is 
based on the Islamic standards, the Islamic state has 
the right to intervene and put an end to the 
activity. 9 This is because the right of the state or 
public right has superseded the individual right and 
it is a duty of the state to p serve public morality, 
peace and order of the ummah. Any right however, no 
matter where it derives from, is not an absolute 
right. At times, it must give way to duty or 
obligation. 
At any rate, in the field of economic activity, 
the non-Muslims, like their Muslim compatriots, can 
carry on all kinds of trades industry, agriculture and 
adopt any profession of their choice. 10 They will not 
be prohibited from any trade or profession which 
Muslims are permitted to carry on except where there 
is a religious implication involved. " It could be 
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said that non-Muslims, in fact, enjoy more freedom and 
will have wider scope in this regard. This can be seen 
when we take into account the many items which are 
At$ ve}y ýnaturt 
unlawful for Muslims to trade }oip ' while they are 
lawful for non-Muslims. 12 As a result, non-Muslims, at 
any epoch, have always contributed more than Muslims 
in their share of the gross national product. 13 This 
is in addition to the many professions, although not 
forbidden to Muslims, were occupied exclusively by 
non-Muslims such as the exchanging of money, jewelry 
and pharmaceutical business which were their exclusive 
domains. This has been the situation in almost all 
Muslim countries until recent times. 14 Adam Mez 
concludes: 
Legally no calling or profession was closed 
to the protected subjects. In those 
lucrative occupations, such as banking, 
large commercial ventures, linen trade, 
land-ownership, medical profession, the 
Christians and Jews were thickly 
represented and firmly established. They 
are so arranged among themselves that in 
Syria, for instance, most of the financiers 
were Jews and most of the physicians and 
'scribes' Christians. Even at Baghdad the 
head of the Christian community was the 
Court physician, and the Court banker the 
head of the Jewish community. 15 
V. Social Security 
Legally speaking, non-Muslims enjoy the same 
benefits as the Muslims with respect to facilities and 
services afforded by the state. The jurists of 
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different schools are unanimous on this point. The 
Prophet was reported to have said: "People share in 
three common things: water, fire, and pasture. "' This 
would include, undoubtedly, Muslims and non-Muslims, 
d imrn or musta' min so long as he lives in the Islamic 
state, even though temporarily, 2 for to protect a 
immi's life and property would inevitably includes 
both in the time of health and sick, young and old, 
rich and poor etc. But is the d imm entitled to the 
benefit of bayt al-mä1 (Public Treasury) in his 
" 
difficult times? All evidences in hand does not 
suggest to the contrary. This position is supported by 
both theory and practices of the Muslims. In theory, 
since the dhimmT- is a permanent resident, hence a 
subject of the Islamic state, he would therefore be 
entitled to receive all benefits and services afforded 
by the state to its citizens subject to the same 
requirements. It is his right to get such a service, 
and it is a duty upon the state to render it if he is 
in need. 3 The Qur' gn says: 
0 ye who believe! Be steadfast witnesses 
for God in equity, and let not hatred of 
any people seduce you that ye deal not 
justly. Deal justly, that is nearer to your 
duty. Observe your duty to God. Lo! God is 
informed of what ye do. 4 
In this regard, the Prophet was reported to have 
said: "Everyone of you is a shepherd and everyone of 
you is responsible for his subordinate. The am is 
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(also) a shepherd and responsible for his subjects. "5 
The underlying principle from both the Qur' än and the 
Tradition above patently guarantees the equality of 
all people (Muslims and non-Muslims) with respect to 
benefits and services afforded by the state, including 
that from Public Treasury. The Qur' än also encourages 
the Muslims to treat the people justly not on account 
of race or religion. It is clear therefore that the 
dhimmL is entitled to the support of bayt al-mäl in 
time of need. This position is in complete harmony 
with the general characteristics of Islam with respect 
to mercy and beneficence (hsän) to all human beings 
let alone when a man is in need. 6 
Moreover, there are some specific texts and 
incidents concerned with the issue: 
A. It is reported by Abil 'Ubayd from Sa 'i d b. al- 
Musayyab7 that the Prophet gave cadagah (charity) to 
the Jews. The practice was continued after the death 
of the Prophet. $ 
B. In the peace agreement with the people of 
I rah, Khalid b. al-Walld wrote, inter alia, that if 
there was any old man incapable of doing any work or 4, 
calamity betel him or he was rich and then became a 
needy. which made him dependent on his co- 
religionists, he must be exempted from iz ah and he 
and his dependents must be maintained from the bayt 
al-mal (of the Muslims) so long as he lives in där al- 
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Islam 9 This provision, which was concluded in the 
time of Abe Bakr, had no objection from the Caliph nor 
from any of the Prophet' s Companions. In a legal 
sense, such a state of affairs constitutes a binding 
force on all Muslims, hence it is an irrevocable 
precedent, for the matter has become a consensus of 
the Companions of the Prophet. 
C. Abe 'Ubayd reported that 'Umar II wrote to his 
official in Barrah, 4Adi bin Artä#,, "Look after the 
affairs of the dhimmis particularly those who are old, 
weak, and have no any means of livelihood. They should 
be given maintenance from bayt al-mal of the Muslims. 
This is because I heard that 'Umar I had done the same 
to dhimmis. 10 
All these reports clearly indicate that the 
Islamic state is under obligation to support the 
needy im. This principle was laid down by the 
highest authority, after the Qur' än, of the Islamic 
law. The incidents above specifically dealt with the 
dhimml. Hence there is no room for the Muslim 
authority not to abide by it. It is but a reflection 
of social guarantees afforded by the Islamic state to 
all its citizens. " It is clear therefore that the 
dhimmi has equal right with the Muslims in support 
and benefit from the Public Treasury of the Islamic 
state. 
However, can the imm claims his portion from 
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zakät fund? All the evidence seems to be negative 
except in special cases. The majority of jurists from 
different schools, except Zufar, Ibn S1r1n and Zuhri, 
held that adhimmi is not entitled to a share in the 
zak6t fund. 12 The jurists rely exclusively on the 
Tradition reported from Mu'sdh b. Jabal that the 
Prophet said to him: "Impose it (zakat) on the rich of 
them (the Muslims) and give it away to the poor of 
them. "13 According to Ibn Quddmah: "We do not know of 
any disagreement among the scholars that the zakät 
fund is not to be distributed to the dhimmi. Ibn 
Mundhir says the consensus among the scholars that we 
know is that the d mm is not entitled to zakst 
because of the said Tradition of MuGadh. "1 " Abo Ylisuf 
concluded that any obligatory cadagah is not, by 
analogy, to be given to non-Muslims. is AbO 'Ubayd 
reports many Traditions to the same effect and 
concludes that the practice of the Prophet was that 
_ak_t is not to be given to ad immT. 16 
On the contrary, those who held that zakät could 
be given to a dhimmt rely on the saying of 'Umar I who 
after seeing the poor Jew was begging, as reported by 
AbQ YQsuf, recited the verse: "The alms are only for 
the poor and the needy.... "17 GUmar then explained 
that the poor (f ugarg') are "Muslims" whereas the 
needy (rnas5kin) are "People of the Book. " Thereafter, 
CUmar took the Jew's hand and instructed that he be 
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given maintenance from bayt al-mäl. 18 
But this saying and practice of CUmar by no means 
can stand against the above Tradition, for the meaning 
of the Tradition is absolutely clear which needs no 
effort for the jurists to have recourse to another 
means of interpretation. It is therefore, as 
the 
understood by jurists, the generality of 
Averse has 
been properly specified by the Tradition of Mu'didh. 19 
Further, zakdt is a kind of 'ibadah (worship) and 
constitutes one of the five pillars of Islam which is 
prescribed only for the Muslims. The dhimmf 
therefore, does not contribute to it. It follows that 
it is the Muslims who should be the recipients of it 
since the dhimmi could have a support from another 
means. 
It is clear that the d immi is not entitled to the 
zakat fund as long as the needy Muslims, who deserve 
it, are there except when there is no Muslim deserves 
it in which case the dhimml is fully eligible to the 
fund. This is because the dhimmi: is no doubt, entitled 
to receive a cadagah (charity). 20 This position is 
supported by the Tradition reportedAAbU 'Ubayd which 
says that the cadageh is to be given to a dhimmi in 
the absence of the needy Muslims. 21 It was reported 
also that $afiyyah bt. Huyay, the Prophet's wife, gave 
her Qsda! Qsh to her relatives who were Jews. 22 The 
Qur' än, on many occasions, speaks to this effect. 23 
0 
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On the other hand, the jurists disagree over the 
distribution of zakät al-fi1r (the alms of the 
breaking of the fast)2+ for the dhimmi'. The 
disagreement arises over the issue whether the 
recipient should be needy only, or needy and a 
Muslim. 25 The majority held to the latter view, hence 
there is no zakät al-fit r for the dhimmi: whereas Abo 
Hanifah and Mut}ammad al-Shaybänf held to the former. 
This will include the payment of religious expiation 
(ka fdrah) and vows (nudhar). 2' This view is 
supported by the report of Abü 'Ubayd who says that 
some Christian priests were recipients of zakät al- 
Li r. 27 It is for this reason, perhaps, that some 
jurists say that ad imm should be a priest to be 
liable to receive zakät al-fi1r. 26 Moreover, some 
jurists contend that if a dhimmi: is not entitled to 
aý kat under the category of poor, he could well be 
entitled under the category of "those whose heart are 
to be reconciled" Cal-mu' allafati gulübuhum). 29 This 
is the view of Maliki and Zaydi jurists. 30 They held 
that the apportionment for this category should be 
left intact in order to keep thedhimmi near to Islam, 
retain their loyalty to the state and not to side with 
the enemy. 31 
Finally, we can conclude that in addition. to the 
right to bayt al-mal. the d mmi, in time of need, 
could also accept cadagah, with its various forms, so 
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long as there is no enmity on his part to Islam. As 
for zakat which is obligatory for Muslims, the 
majority of the jurists held that the dhimmfis not 




I. The origin and development of the classical 
concept of dhimml and its related subject emerged 
after the revelation of 
the verse of iizyah (Q.. 
9: 29). Since then, the jurists have begun to formulate 
its theory to meet the need of socio-political 
reality. As a result, all socio-legal concepts 
pertaining to the dhimmi were developed and 
systematized. 
Islamic law regards its ideology (al-'agldah ), not 
any other peripheral consideration, as a basis to 
establish its community, the state, and divide 
mankind. It is on this precept that the jurists divide 
the world at large into dar al-Islam and dar al-herb, 




is the territory where the authority 
is in the hand of the Muslims, where Islamic law 
should be fully enforced, and where all the 
institutions therein should be in conformity with the 
general rule of Islamic teachings. The jurists also 
held that all Muslim territories, or to use a modern 
term, Muslim countries, though under different Muslim 
rulers, are considered as one d5r which should be 
governed by one uniform constitution. Those who have 
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concluded the permanent contract of 
dhimmah (pledge of 
allegiance) with dar al-Islam are called 
dhimmis. They 
pledge loyalty to the state, pay taxes, and in return, 
the state protects their security, property and 
religion. 
On the other hand, där al-barb is a territory 
inhabited and controlled by non-Muslims. There is no 
relationship or bilateral agreement between the two. 
There are cases where the status of the där could be 
transformed. The citizens of där al-herb are called 
abs. If there is an agreement with där al-Islam the 
territory would be called dar al-4ahd, hence, its 
citizens are called al-mu'ähid. The majority of the 
jurists reject this category, as a separate entity, 
but would include it under dar al-Islam. However, this 
theory provides a proper basis for international 
relation between Muslim and non-Muslim countries. 
Therefore, the basis of relationship among the states, 
as among human beings, is peace not aggression. ' 
II. There are four obligations of the d immi 
towards the Islamic state. They should pay iz a 
kharäi. 'ushr and observe some aspects of Islamic law. 
As regards iizyah it is a tax for the protection of 
the immT because the dhimml is not required to 
defend dgr al-IslSim. and if the state could not 
protect the dhimmi the tax will not be collected. The 
same rule applies if the dhimmf joins the Muslim 
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army. It is not a poll-tax nor a punishment 
for 
infidelity as alleged by some quarters. For The Qur'än 
says that "there is no compulsion 
in Islam", and not 
every d immt required to pay 
iz ah but only the able 
bodied man. 
Furthermore, it is not a fundamental law. The case 
of BanQ Taghlib and the agreement with 
the Nubians 
serve as modus operandi for the concept. The same 
treatment would be accorded to any group of non- 
Muslims who have the same criteria like BanU Taghlib. 
There is no jizyah collected from non-Muslims in 
contemporary Muslim countries because the governments 
have made a military service compulsory for all its 
citizens. This is in addition to one uniform national 
tax which is equally imposed on all citizens. 
aS, like z ah was not introduced by the 
Muslims. The tax had been imposed by many sovereigns 
on their subjects in many forms. Kharä is conquered 
land which the imAm decided not to divide among the 
warriors but retained in the hands of the original 
owners for cultivation. In return, the tenant has to 
pay khar8t (tax) for the sum agreed upon to the Muslim 
authority. The term khard_1 itself is Arabic as well as 
Islamic. 
While iizyah is the Qur' dnic injunction, khara 
was the iit ingd of 'Umar I. Public interests and the 
consensus of the Companions were the legal basis of 
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the decision to impose harr . Kharal is imposed on 
kha rM-land whether the tenant 
is a Muslim or a non- 
Muslim and whether the land is actually utilized or 
not. Its revenue is to 
be expended for the interest of 
the Muslim community according to the i. ltihäd of imam. 
JUshr or tithe is a trade tax which is levied only 
when the goods are transported 
from one region to the 
other within the Islamic state. 
The rate is a half 
tenth for the mm a tenth for musts' min. and a 
quarter of a tenth for Muslims. However, the goods 
must reach a specific amount in order to be liable for 
taxation. 'Us as arä was the i_itihäd of 'Umar 
I, The Islamic state applies the rule of reciprocal 
treatment in charging it on the musta'min traders. Its 
legal basis were the practice of 'Umar I and the 
consensus of the Companions of the Prophet. At times, 
'Umar I reduced the rate to half if the musta'min 
carried the food-stuff to Medina in order to encourage 
the merchants to bring more food to Medina. Therefore, 
the rate of 'ushr could be fixed in accordance with 
the needs and the interests of the state. 
In addition, the non-Muslim is required to observe 
some aspects of Islamic law except in matters of 
beliefs and personal laws. The maxim says: "Leave them 
with whatever they believe. " Hence, the di mi enjoys 
a social and religious autonomy. Nevertheless, if a 
dhimm% takes his case to the Muslim court, the judge 
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will decide the case in accordance with Islamic law. 
In the law of criminal. civil, contract and the like 
the dhimmi will be treated like the Muslims. 
The non-Muslim also has to respect the Islamic 
state and its ideology. It is not proper for them to 
abuse God. Islam, the Prophet, and the Qur' än. The 
non-Muslim also is not allowed to openly indulge in 
the things prohibited by Islam in the Muslim areas. 
III. Tolerance concerns the acts or practices of 
non-Muslims which are permitted by the Qur' än and the 
su na and the juristic interpretation thereof. It 
implies that every individual has the right to belief, 
the freedom to exercise his religion, and all people 
are equal before the law. In short, it can be said 
that the teachings of Islam do not forbid practices 
that are believed to be lawful by non-Muslims. As the 
maxim says: "Leave them and what they believe. " 
IV. Islamic law is universal in character and its 
scope. It appeals to all mankind. But circumstances 
necessitated Islamic law being territorial rather than 
universal. There are* three theories in respect of 
territorial jurisdiction of Islamic Criminal Law. 
The first theory held that Islamic law is 
applicable on Muslim or d imml if the crimes committed 
in dar al-Islam. The same applies to musta'min if the 
crime related to the rights of human being. But if the 
crime touches on the rights of God he will not be 
i 
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punished. However, if the crime is committed outside 
Islamic territory, Islamic law is not applicable 
because of lack of jurisdiction. If the crime occurred 
in the Muslim camp in där al-barb. it takes the same 
rule as applies to Islamic territory. 
The second theory says that Islamic law should be 
applied to "all people" and on "all matters" in där 
al-Isläm. But this theory agrees with the former that 
Islamic law is not applicable 
Lo 
crime committed by 
Muslim or dhimml abroad with two exceptions: (a) it is 
not permissible for them to conclude a ribs contract 
(with any party) abroad; and (b) if a Muslim prisoner 
of war is killed by a Muslim or dhimmi in där al-harb 
the first theory says no gi28rR or diyah on the killer 
but the second theory says that diyah is still liable 
on the killer. 
The third theory maintains that Islamic law is 
applicable on all persons 
fot- 
all crimes committed in 
ddr al-Islam or d6r al-barb. But not on a har! who 
has become a musts' min. There is no effect of 
difference of domicile in terms of criminal 
responsibility for a Muslim or dhimmr. It seems that 
this theory is more relevant to the letter and spirit 
of Islamic law. For the matter touches on the 
jurisdiction and sovereignty of the state. Therefore, 
Islamic law should be applied to all criminal cases 
committed within its own territory regardless of the 
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culprit, and over the crimes committed 
by its own 
citizens outside its territory. 
The contract of a dhimmi who is involved in crimes 
against the state such as armed robbery, rebellion and 
the like seems to be unaffected, thus he should be 
treated and punished like a Muslim. 
In a matter of qiT,. though the right belongs to 
the victim's heir, it is agreed that it should be 
delegated to the state to carry out the execution. 
However, the right to pardon belongs to every member 
of the victim's family. A Muslim is liable for QiSraif 
he kills a dhimmi or musta'min in d5r al-Islam For 
their blood is deemed inviolable by virtue of contract 
and amnein pact. Likewise, a dhimmi or musts' min is 
liable for Ai2äs if he kills a Muslim, dhimmt. or 
musts' min. It is immaterial whether the victim is male 
or female and whether the parties come from the same 
faith. 
In all udad punishments such as adultery, theft 
and the like, a dhimmi and musta'min are liable for 
badd or ta'zlr as a Muslim, except a hbadd for liquor. 
In the realm of personal law, a Muslim is allowed 
to marry a non-Muslim woman of kitabiyyät. But non- 
Muslims are not allowed to marry Muslim women. With 
regard to the marriage of non-Muslims to each other, 
Islamic family law has left complete legal freedom, 
hence autonomy for non-Muslims provided, that no Muslim 
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is involved or they do not take the case to the Muslim 
court. 
If both husband and wife become Muslim, the bond 
of marriage continues. But if the wife 
is a non- 
marriageable person, they will be separated. 
If the 
wife alone -becomes a Muslim, or the wife is of non- 
kitabi while her husband has become Muslim, the 
jurists are divided over the terms of their 
separation. It seems that the view of 
Hanafl school is 
more relevant in this case. The jurists are also split 
over the case of difference of domicile, followed by 
the difference of religions between the couple who 
were legally married. The majority held that the 
marriage will not be affected unless there is no 
conversion by the other spouse with the expiry of the 
waiting period. 
In the law of contracts and obligations, a non- 
Muslim Ls treated like a Muslim except contracts 
pertaining to liquor and pigs. It is also true with 
respect to all dealings related to worldly affairs. 
This means that everything that is allowable for a 
Muslim is likewise allowable for a non-Muslim and vice 
versa. In short, a non-Muslim, in doing business in 
the Islamic state, has to follow the Islamic law of 
contract. 
V. Generally, the dhimmi's socio-political status 
can be regarded as the same as a Muslim except in some 
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cases relating to faith. There is complete religious 
freedom for non-Muslims. It is a matter of immutable 
principle rather than a policy. However, the building 
of places of worship for non-Muslims in the Muslim 
cities is subject to the approval of imäm 
(authority) 
in accordance with the rule of marlahah. 
In the Islamic state, the political rights granted 
to all its citizens should come within the framework 
underlying the state's ideology. The Jurists-say: "The 
dhimmt s have the same rights as us and the same 
obligations as us. " Therefore, Islam recognises no 
difference between Muslims and non-Muslims in temporal 
matters. Since the Islamic state is an ideological 
state, it is naturally that the state will restrict 
some positions for those who uphold the state's 
ideology. Apart from that the non-Muslims are fully 
eligible and free to participate in the administration 
of their government. The concept of tolerance is 
clearly seen here. There are innumerable cases 
throughout the Muslim history when the non-Muslims 
have occupied important posts in the Islamic state. 
Thus, difference of religion was not an impediment on 
non-Muslims to being appointed to public offices. 
The ideas of parliament, election, and separation 
of powers is a product of the Western Democratic 
system which is not necessarily in harmony with the 
Islamic concept of state and government. Thus, non- 
0 
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Muslims may participate in parliamentary election both 
by Voting and membership of parliament in today' s 
context which is different from that of shure, 
in its 
conceptual sense. By the same token, non-Muslims can 
-participate 
in the election of Prime Minister or the 
President. For the post is no longer considered as 
purely religious in nature. It is not the office of 
the Caliph as perceived by the jurists. 
Freedom of opinion should not be construed as 
absolute. It is not lawful for non-Muslims to attack 
Islam, its tenets, and the Prophet under the pretext 
of freedom of opinion. For such an attack would be 
considered as against the state itself. 
Education in Islam is a state matter. The state 
must provide proper education to all its citizens. As 
for religious education, the non-Muslims will have the 
liberty to educate their children in accordance with 
their own faiths. This appears to be the same case for 
the children of the Muslim minorities living in non- 
Muslim countries. Other than religious education, 
the non-Muslims would be expected to accept the same 
system of education as applies to the whole nation. 
This is vital to create one uniform educational 
system, hence one nation for all its citizens. Thus, 
the non-Muslim may not object to his children 
receiving a lesson in Islam, in the public schools 
because in so doing, they could understand the 
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ideology of the state. 
With regard to the languages, custom, and other 
established norms of non-Muslims, it is believed that 
they can preserve and practice it as they wish. There 
is no evidence from the texts or the practice of the 
Companions to suggest to the contrary. 
In the field of economic activities, its doors are 
opened equally to Muslims and non-Muslims alike. The 
rules and regulations are identical except in cases of 
transactions involving pigs and liquor where the non- 
Muslims are allowed to do so with some restrictions. 
As for a transaction involving usury (ribs), the 
dh mml should abstain like the Muslims. The dhimmf 
also have the right to enjoy, entertainments or in the 
work of arts, provided that it does not pose a threat 
to public morals. In fact, non-Muslims enjoy more 
freedom and will have wider scope in this regard. 
In social security, non-Muslims enjoy the same 
benefits as the Muslims with respect to facilities and 
services afforded by the state. This includes the 
entitlement to bayt-al-mäl, charity and the like. As 
for zakdt the majority of jurists holds that the 
dhimmt is not entitled to it except in the absence of 
the needy Muslims. 
To sum ' up, it can be said that there is no 
prescribed and emphatic (a 'J: ) text pertaining to the 
rule of treatment of dhimml: s. Thus, it falls under the 
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domain of iitihFid by the imäm in accordance with the 
rule of maglahah which is part of a1-siy9sah sl-. 
shar'iyyah. 
It can be seen, then, that in all legal aspects of 
life a dhimmf will enjoy much the same in terms of 
duties and privileges as a Muslim. The jurists, 
through the practice of i_itihäd based on the Qur'an 
and Sunnah, have constructed an Islamic system in 
which Muslim and non-Muslim can live together in 
peace, harmony, and security. 
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